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RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., Idaho Corporation; and 
DAVID and KATHY DONNELLY, husband and wife 
Respondents / Defendants 
Appealed from the District Court of the First Judicial 




JAMES G. REID 
Attorney for Appellants 
.. .. ALLEN B. ELLIS 
Attorney for Respondents 
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JAMES G. REID, IS8 # 1372 
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, ISB # 6579 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-27.73 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail: dpc@ringertlaw.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
ZOOq NOV I 2 A II: ll? 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; and DAVID and 
KATHY DONNELLY, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007-00885 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES G. REID 
JAMES G. REID, upon oath being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. That I am an individual over the age of eighteen (18) and have personal 
knowledge of the facts set forth herein, believing them all to be true and correct to the best 
of my knowledge and belief. 
2. That I am one of the attorneys for the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty 
Company, in the above-titled litigation and make this Affidavit in such capacity. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of Employers Mutual 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES G. REID - 1 
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Casualty Company's policy of insurance with Rimar Construction, Inc. which was in effect 
during the years 2004 through 2005. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of the Amended 
Verified Complaint in the Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner County Case 
No. CV-06-00445. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit "C" is a true and correct copy of the Order re: 
Rimar's Motion in Limine in the case of Donnelly v. RimarConstruction, Inc., et al., Bonner 
County Case No. CV 06-00445. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit "0" is a true and correct copy of a portion of the 
jury instructions given in the case of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner 
County Case No. CV 06-00445 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit "E" is a true and correct copy of the Special 
Verdict in the case of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner County Case No. 
CV 06-00445. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit "F" is a true and correct copy of the Judgment on 
Special Verdict in the case of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner County 
Case No. CV 06-00445. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit "G" is a true and correct copy of the Order on Post 
Trial Motions in the case of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., Bonner County 
Case No. CV 06-00445. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit "H" is a true and correct copy of the Amended 
Judgment on Special Verdict in the case of Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et al., 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES G. REID - 2 
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Bonner County Case No. CV 06-00445. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit "I" is a true and correct copy of two reservation of 
rights letters sent by EMC Insurance Companies to to Ivan Rimar. 
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit "J" is a true and correct copy of the Settlement 
Agreement entered into between Employers Mutual Casualty Company and Rimar 
Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar dated August 17,2009. 
13. Attached hereto as Exhibit "K" is a true and correct copy of Exhibit A in the 
case of Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009, 772 P.2d 216 (1989) consisting 
of the Mutual of Enumclaw'S insurance policy. 
Further your affiant sayeth naught. 
DATED this 9 day of November, 2009. 
by: 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
Sworn to and subscribed before me this cr day of November...-'l't'Jn-.... 
\,\!---.. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This does hereby certify that on the * day of November, 2009, he served the 
foregoing document by placing a true and correct copy in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid and properly addressed as follows: 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, LedJin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Marc A. Lyons 
Michael A. Ealy 
Ramsden & Lyons 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Honorable Steve Verby 
215 S. 1st Avenue 
Sandpoint, 10 83864 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
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r ~ l _'_r_'.<' .. , 
-_._ .. -.- .-~,-. - ~: -
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of 
record, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 15(a) and 57(b) and move this court for its order permitting them 
leave to serve the proposed Amended Answer and Counterclaim attached hereto. 
This motion is made on the grounds that Rule 15(a) allows the Court wide and liberal 
discretion to allow the parties to amend their pleadings when justice so requires and the 
Donnellys are properly joined parties to the plaintiff's declaratory judgment action under Rule 
57(b) and, as third-party creditors, have standing to pursue a counterclaim as set forth in the case 
of Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009,772 P.2d 216 (1989). In addition, the case is 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER - I 
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not presently set for trial and this motion to amend is not made to cause any undue delay or 
prejudice to the plaintiff and/or defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. 
This motion is further supported by the defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Amend Answer and the Affidavit of Michael A. Ealy filed in support thereof. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED thiS~ day of November, 2009. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the2cf day of November, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method imtrcated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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v6sMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 342-4657 
VuSMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (509) 625-1909 
~Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 263-0400 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 




AMENDED ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, husband and wife, (hereinafter 
"Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby amends their Answer as 
follows: 
I. ANSWER 
1. Defendants hereby deny each, every, and all allegations and representations set 
forth in Plaintiffs' Petition unless specifically admitted herein. 
2. In answer to Paragraphs 1,2,5,6, 13, 14 and16 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants 
are without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the matters aileged therein 
and therefore deny the same. 
[PROPOSED] AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - I 
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3. In answer to Paragraphs 3, 4 and 8 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit the 
same. 
4. In answer to Paragraphs 7, of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that a 
contract was entered into, and that the contract speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder 
of said Paragraphs. 
5. In answer to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that Rimar 
performed work on the Donnelly Residence, and deny the remainder of said Paragraph. 
6. In answer to Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit 
only that Plaintiffs' Verified Petition in Bonner County Case No. CV-06-00445 (and any 
subsequent amendments thereto) speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder of said 
Paragraphs. 
7. In answer to Paragraphs 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of 
Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants deny the same. 
II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
8. Defendants incorporate as affirmative defenses the allegations contained ill 
Paragraphs 1-7, above. 
9. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
10. Plaintiffs claims are barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver, laches, unclean 
hands, and in pari delicto. 
11. Plaintiff's claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of estoppel. 
12. Plaintiff s claims are barred due to failure of a condition precedent. 
13. Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party. 
14. The losses and claims asserted by the Defendants against Rimar Construction Inc. 
and Ivan Rimar are not excluded from coverage ofEMC's policy. 
[PROPOSED] AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - 2 
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III. COUNTERCLAIM 
15. At times material hereto, the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company 
("EMC"), is and was an Iowa corporation authorized to conduct the business of selling 
insurance, including commercial general liability insurance, in the State of Idaho. 
16. At times material hereto, the Defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI") is and 
was an Idaho corporation that was engaged in the business of providing general contracting 
services in the State ofIdaho. 
17. At times material hereto, the Defendants, David and Kathy Donnelly 
("Donnelly"), hired RCI to provide general contracting services for improvements to their real 
property located in Bonner County, State ofIdaho. 
18. On or about September 14, 2004, EMC sold and RCI purchased commercial 
general liability policy no. 2DI-32-95-05 ("COL Policy") with the effective coverage dates 
identified as October I, 2004, up and through October 1, 2005. 
19. On or about March 7, 2006, the Donnellys filed suit against RCI for claims 
arising out of and related to RCI undertaking to provide general contracting services for certain 
improvements to the Donnelly property and arising during the effective coverage dates in EMC 
COL Policy in Bonner County Case Number CV-06-00445 (herein "Underlying Litigation"). 
The Underlying Litigation was litigated through trial resulting in a jury verdict in Donnelly'S 
favor as against RCI on or about July 9,2008. 
20. On or about August 14, 2008, in the Underlying Litigation a Judgment On 
Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. 
("Initial Judgment") was entered in the amount of $128,611.55 to accrue interest at the legal rate 
against RCI in favor of Donnelly. Later, on March 20, 2009, in the Underlying Litigation an 
Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant 
Rimar Construction, Inc. I Rule 54(b) Certificate ("Amended Judgment") was entered in the total 
amount of $425,545.44 including an award of the Donnellys' attorney's fees in the amount of 
$277,062.00 and costs in the amount of$19,871.89. 
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21. On or about March 30, 2009, the Amended Judgment was properly recorded in 
Bonner County, State ofIdaho, as record instrument #769177. 
22. Pursuant to its policy of insurance, EMC defended RCI through the trial in the 
Underlying Litigation. Having undertaken the defense of its insured, EMC knew and recognized 
the Donnellys as claimants against RCI's commercial general liability policy. In addition, RCI 
knew and/or expected that the Donnellys would incur costs and attorney's fees to prosecute its 
claim against RCI. 
23. On or about May 24, 2007, EMC initiated this action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that, under the EMC CGL Policy, it has no contractual duty to pay, in whole or in part, 
any of the Donnellys' then claims as against RCI. On or about December 12,2007, this action 
was stayed pending the outcome of the Underlying Litigation. The stay in this action was later 
lifted on or about July 17,2009. 
24. Following a trial and entry of a jury verdict in the Underlying Litigation, the 
Donnellys are judgment creditors ofRCI and have a claim, right or interest including ajudgment 
lien right, in whole or in part, to the proceeds or policy benefits from the EMC CGL Policy due 
and owing to RCI in whole or partial satisfaction of the Donnellys' judgment against RCI. 
25. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1202, the Donnellys are persons interested under 
the EMC CGL Policy whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the policy and, 
therefore, request a construction of the EMC CGL Policy to obtain a declaration of their rights, 
status or other legal relations under the policy. In particular, the Donnellys seek a declaration 
that EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in part, for the 
Donnelly judgment including, but not limited to, post-judgment interest accrued to date on the 
entire judgment. 
26. To date, neither EMC nor RCI has made any payment to Donnelly or to the Court 
in effort to satisfy the Donnelly judgment in whole or in part and the Donnelly judgment remains 
unsatisfied. 
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IV. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
27. Defendants request a jury trial of all matters so triable. 
IV. PRAYERFORRELIEF 
Wherefore, Defendants David Donnelly and Kathy Donnelly demand: 
1. That Plaintiffs Petition be dismissed in its entirety and that it take nothing 
thereby; and 
2. That the Defendant Donnelly have declaratory judgment finding that under the 
EMC CGL Policy, EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in part, 
the Donnelly judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation and including post-judgment interest 
on the entire judgment amount; and 
3. That the Defendant Donnelly be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs as 
incurred herein pursuant to I.e. §§ 10-1201 et seq.; 12-120 and 12-121; and 41-1839; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this __ day of November, 2009. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
By __________________________ __ 
Michael A. Ealy, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ day of November, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, WA99201 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 




__ Facsimile (208) 342-4657 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (509) 625-1909 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 263-0400 
Michael A. Ealy 
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1 BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602 
2 FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
113 South Second Avenue 
3 Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
4 (208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
5 
STEPHEN D. PHILLABAUM, ISB NO. 5127 
6 PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, MATTHEWS 
& SHELDON, PLLC 
7 421 West Riverside, Suite 900 
8 Spokane, Washington, 99201 
(509) 838-6055 
9 (509) 625-1909 (Fax) 
10 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
13 
14 EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
















RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF NO CONTEST 
COME NOW IVAN RIMAR and RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., and state as 
follows: 
NOTICE OF NO CONTEST - 1 
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PHILLABAUM. LEDLIN. MATTHEWS 
&; SHELDON. PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
421 W. R!VEllSIDEAVE •• SUITE 900 
SPOKANE. WASHINGTON 99201.Q418 





























Employers Mutual Casualty Company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this 
matter dated November 9,2009. Neither Ivan Rimar, an individual, nor Rimar Construction, 
Inc., oppose said Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Dated this 2- day of December, 2009. 
NOTICE OF NO CONTEST - 2 
PHILLABAUM, LEDLIN, MATTHEWS 
& SHELDON, PLLC 
Ste en . Phillabaum, ISB #5127 
Attorneys for Rimar Construction, Inc. 
PH~LABAUM.LEDUN. MATTHEWS 
&: SHELDON. PLLC 
AtTORNEYS AT LAW 
421 W . RlVERSIOE AVE .. SUITE 900 
SPOKANE. WASHINGTON 99201-0418 





























CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date, true and correct copies of 
foregoing document were served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James O. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
455 South Third Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Michael A. Ealy 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
DATED December 2,2009. 
Notice of Non Opposition. doc 








Telecopy (Fax): (208) 342-4657 
[-1'" U.S. Mail 
[] Hand Delivered 
[] Overnight Mail 
[ Y Telecopy (Fax): (208) 664-5884 
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. PHILLABAUM. LEDLIN. MATIHEWS 
'" SHELDON. PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
421 W. RlVEaSlDE AVE .• SUITE 900 
SPOKANE. WASHINGTON 99201.()418 
TELEPHONE (509) 838-6055 
JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372 
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, ISB # 6579 
RINGERT CLARK CHARTERED 
455 South Third Street 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Telephone: (208) 342-4591 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657 
E-mail: dpc@ringertclark.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; and DAVID and 
KATHY DONNELLY, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007 -00885 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION RE: 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, by and through 
its attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and hereby provides notice of its non-
opposition to the Defendant Donnellys' Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim, filed 
with the Court on or about November 24,2009. 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION RE: MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM - 1 
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DATED this L day of December, 2009. 
by: 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION RE: MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM - 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This does hereby certify that on the 7 day of December, 2009, he served the 
foregoing document by placing a true and correct copy in the United States Mail, postage 
prepaid and properly addressed as follows: 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Marc Lyons 
Michael Ealy 
Ramsden & Lyons 
700 Northwest Blvd 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, 1083816-1336 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION RE: MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER AND 





BRENT C. FEATHERSTON, ISB NO. 4602 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
(208) 263-0400 (Fax) 
5 
STEPHEN D. PHILLABAUM, ISB NO. 5127 
6 PHILLABAUM, LED LIN, MATTHEWS 
& SHELDON, PLLC 
7 421 West Riverside, Suite 900 
8 Spokane, Washington, 99201 
(509) 838-6055 
9 (509) 625-1909 (Fax) 
10 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
13 
14 EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
















RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION RE: 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., by and through its attorney of record, 
Stephen D. Phillabaum and Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon, PLLC, and states as 
follows: 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION - 1 
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PHILLABAUM. LEDLIN. MAITHEWS 
&; SHELDON. PLLC 
AlTORNEYS AT LAW 
421 W. RIVERSIDE AYE •• SUITE 900 
SPOKANE, WASHINGTON 992014118 





























Defendants Donnelly filed a Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim with the Court 
on or about November 24,2009. Rimar Construction, Inc., does not oppose said Defendants' 
Motion to Amend Answer and Counterclaim. 
Dated this J!lday of December, 2009. 
NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION - 2 
PHILLABAUM, LED LIN, MATTHEWS 
& SHELDON, PLLC 
tephen D. Phillabaum, ISB #5127 
Attorneys for Rimar Construction, Inc. 
PHILLABAUM. LEDLIN. MATTHEWS 
& SHELDON. PLLC 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
421 W. RIVERSlnE AYE •• SUITE 900 
SPOKANE. WASHINGTON 99201-0418 


















CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this date, true and correct copies of th 
foregoing document were served by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James O. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
455 South Third Street 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701-2773 
Michael A. Ealy 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
700 Northwest Boulevard 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur cfAlene, ID 83816-1336 














Telecopy (Fax): (208) 664-5884 











NOTICE OF NON-OPPOSITION - 3 
PHILLABAUM. LEDLIN. MATTHEWS 
.t SHELDON. PLLC 
... T!'OIlNEYS ... T U W 
421 W. RiVERSIDE AVE., SUITE 900 
SPOKANE. WASHINGTON 99201.()418 
TELEPHONE (509) 838-6055 
RA.MSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS 
DONNELL V'S MOTION TO 
AMEND ANSWER 
This matter having come before the Court on the Defendants Donnelly's Motion to 
Amend Answer, and the Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company and Defendant Rimar 
Construction, Inc. having each filed a Notice of Non-Opposition thereto and good cause 
otherwise appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants Donnelly's Motion to Amend Answer is 
hereby GRANTED. 
DATED this !~y Of~re!L. 
ORDER GRANTfNG DEFENDANTS DONNELLY'S MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER - I 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the dL day of ,(ly:;, 2009, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid ~~ail 
David P. Claiborne __ Overnight Mail 
Ringert Clark Chartered Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2773 Facsimile (208) 342-4657 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Michael A. Ealy 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
-U;~ail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 664-5884 
~·Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
_ Facsimile (509) 625-1909 
~SMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 263-0400 
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT 
Deputy Clerk 
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· . RAMSDEN & L YONS,~ 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMP ANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of 
record, and pursuant to Rule 56(b) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, move this court for an 
Order for declaratory judgment in favor of Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly. 
This motion is further based on the documents and pleadings on file herein and upon 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and the Affidavit of 
Michael A. Ealy filed in support thereof. 
Oral argument is requested. 
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DA TED this I ~ day of December, 2009. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
BY~;t 
Michael A. Ealy, e ~ 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the! P day of December, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid ~ Mail 
David P. Claiborne __ Overnight Mail 
Ringert Clark Chartered Hand Delivered 
P.O. Box 2773 __ Facsimile (208) 342-4657 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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VUSMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (509) 625-1909 
VuSMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 263-0400 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of 
record, and submit this memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
opposition to Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
This case is a declaratory judgment action arising out of and related to the interpretation 
and application of a Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policy to the underlying case of 
Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc. et al., Bonner County CV-2006-00445 (herein the 
"Underlying Litigation"). In this action, Employers Mutual Casualty Company ("EMC") seeks 
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declaratory judgment against its insured, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI"), and David and 
Kathy Donnelly, for the purpose of avoiding payment, in whole or in part, of the Donnelly 
judgment entered against RCI in the Underlying Litigation. The Donnellys, however, seek to 
hold EMC to its contractual promises to pay the Donnelly judgment, in whole or in part, on 
behalf of its insured, RCI. Following the entry of a Settlement Agreement as between EMC and 
RCI, EMC and Donnelly both move for summary judgment in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
I. EMC undertook to insure RCI pursuant to a policy of insurance known as CGL 
policy number 2DI-32-95-05 with effective dates from October 1, 2004, through October 1, 
2005. (Reid Aff. Ex. A.) RCI renewed its CGL coverage under policy number 2DI-32-95-06 
with effective dates from October 1, 2005, through October 1, 2006. (Ealy AtE Ex. A.) EMC 
was RCI's CGL insurer from October 1, 1999, through January 17,2006. (Reid AtE Ex. I, p. 3.) 
2. In May of 2005, the Donnellys hired RCI to undertake a remodeling project on 
their home located in Bonner County, Idaho. (Reid Aff. Ex. 's B, E). RCI performed its work 
throughout 2005 and at all times within the effective dates of the EMCIRCI CGL policy. (Reid 
AtE Ex. 's A, B, E) (Ealy AtE Ex. A). 
3. On March 7, 2006, the Donnellys filed suit against RCI in the Underlying 
Litigation. In part, the Underlying Litigation arose out of and related to RCI's defective 
workmanship while undertaking the Donnelly remodel project. (Reid Aff. Ex. B). 
4. By letter dated May 16, 2006, Donnelly tendered notice of the Underlying 
Litigation to RCI's local insurance agent for tender to RCI's insurance carrier. (Ealy AtE at Ex. 
B.) Following receipt of this letter, RCI's agent sent a General Liability Notice of 
Occurrence/Claim to EMC on or about May 22, 2006. (Ealy Aff. Ex. C). 
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5. In response to the Notice of Occurrence/Claim, on or about May 25, 2006, EMC 
initially contacted RCI to discuss the DonneHy claim whereby RCI reported that, among other 
things, RCI had "curt (sic) the heat mats underneath" the slate floor RCI was attempting to repair 
and that the fayade engineered by RCI was "cracking". (Ealy AtE Ex. D). In addition, on May 
25, 2006, EMC generated the first of three "reservation of rights" letters to RCI and/or Ivan 
Rimar. (Ealy AtE Ex. E) (Reid Aff. Ex. I). 
6. By letter dated September 5, 2006, EMC followed up its May 25, 2006, letter by 
further notifying RCI that it was undertaking a defense under a reservation of rights. (Reid AtE 
Ex. I). In that letter, EMC represented to RCI that it "will be providing a defense and conducting 
an investigation" in connection with the Underlying Litigation. (Reid Aff. Ex. I, p. 1). EMC 
represented that it "will be providing a defense for Rimar Construction in this litigation 
because there is a potential for coverage of bodily injury." (Id. at p. 2 emphasis added.) EMC 
represented that the "Donnellys' allegations regarding delay may also infer a loss of use of 
uninjured property which would be property damage." (Id. at p. 4 emphasis added.) EMC also 
represented that "there appears to be an occurrence with regard to bodily injury. " (Id. at 5 
emphasis added.) 
7. Following receipt of the Notice of Occurrence/Claim, EMC opened a claim file 
and began to adjust the Donnellys' claim against RCI arising out of and relating to the 
Underlying Litigation. (Ealy AtE Ex. F). Having been on the claim for nearly a year, on or 
about April 30, 2007, EMC had received notice or confirmation that mediation had been 
scheduled in the Underlying Litigation for May 30, 2007. (Id. at p. 000031). EMC's chosen and 
RCI's appointed defense counsel confirmed the same with mediator Peter Erbland by letter dated 
May 1, 2007. (Ealy Aff. Ex. G). On that same date, EMC decided to file its declaratory 
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judgment action because it "sounds like a good idea" despite notice of the scheduled mediation 
in the Underlying Litigation. (Ealy Aff. Ex. F, p. 000031, Ex. G). 
8. By letter dated May 22, 2008, the Donnellys first learned that they had been 
named as Defendants in this action and, specifically, that EMC "wanted to advise you of these 
matters in advance of the upcoming mediation." (Ealy Aff. Ex. H). 
9. On May 30, 2007, the Underlying Litigation was mediated by and between the 
Donnellys and RCI. (Ealy Aff. Ex. G). Having undertaken a defense of RCI, EMC participated 
in the mediation as RCI's CGL insurer. The mediation failed to resolve the Underlying 
Litigation. 
10. By letter dated June 4, 2007, EMC served a copy of the Summons and Petition 
for Declaratory Judgment on Donnelly. (Ealy Aff. Ex. I). 
11. On July 9, 2007, an EMC claims supervisor noted and commented as follows: 
"dec action???? ... I didn't know anything about this dec action filed in May .... How did this 
come about?" (Ealy Aff. Ex. F at p. 000029). 
12. On July 31, 2007, the Donnellys filed their Amended Verified Complaint in the 
Underlying Action. (Reid Aff. Ex. B). In part, the Donnellys' Amended Verified Complaint 
alleged that RCI caused damage to the Donnellys' original structure and rendered portions of the 
residence uninhabitable, unusable and unsafe, causing a loss of use of those portions of the 
original home. (Id. at p. 6). The Amended Verified Complaint also added Ivan Rimar as a 
Defendant. (Id. at pp. 1,2). 
13. By letter dated September 7, 2007, EMC once again notified RCI and Ivan 
Rimar it was undertaking a defense under reservation of rights. (Reid Aff. Ex. I). The letter is 
similar in form and substance to EMC's prior September 5,2006, letter and similarly represents 
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and concludes that "[a]s you know, EMC has received information regarding carbon 
monoxide poisoning which is "bodily injury" under the policy. Therefore, EMC will be 
providing a defense." (ld. at p. 7 emphasis added.) 
14. On December 12, 2007, this instant action was stayed by order of the Court 
pending the resolution of the Underlying Litigation. (Order dated 12-12-07). 
15. From June 23, 2008 through July 9, 2008, the Underlying Litigation was tried to 
a jury. (Reid Aff. Ex. F). On July 9, 2008, the jury rendered a Special Verdict in favor of 
Donnelly awarding damages in the total amount of $128,611.55. (Reid Aff. Ex.'s E, F). By 
Special Verdict, the jury awarded the Donnelly's $126,611.55 in damages for breach of the 
implied warranty of workmanship; $1,000 in damages for failure to provide required disclosures 
pursuant to the Idaho Consumer Protection Act; and $1,000 in damages for other violations of 
the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. (Reid AfT. Ex. E, pp. 8-9). 
16. On August 14, 2008, Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. ("Judgment") was entered in the Underlying 
Litigation in the total amount of $128,611.55 to accrue post-judgment interest pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 28-22-104(2). (Reid Aff. Ex. F). 
17. On February 13, 2009, an Order On Post-Trial Motions was entered in the 
Underlying Litigation finding the Donnelly's to be prevailing parties in the Underlying 
Litigation as against RCI and awarding further costs in the amount of $19,871.89 and attorney's 
fees in the amount of $277,062.00. (Reid Aff. Ex. G). 
18. On March 20, 2009, Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard to 
Claim~'i}fPiaintiffs And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. ("Amended Judgment") was 
entered in the Underlying Litigation in the total amount of $425,545.44 to accrue post-judgment 
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interest pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2). (Reid Aff. Ex. H). On March 30, 2009, the 
Amended Judgment was recorded in Bonner County as record instrument number 769177. (Ealy 
Aff. Ex. J). 
19. On or about August 17, 2009, EMC and RCI entered into a Settlement 
Agreement. (Reid Aff. Ex. J). In effect, the Settlement Agreement is a "walk-away" whereby 
EMC and RCI mutually release one-another from their respective claims and RCI agrees not to 
contest EMC in this instant action and its effort to avoid payment based on the Donnelly 
judgment against RCI. 
20. By letter dated October 1, 2009, Donnelly made demand upon EMC and RCI to 
satisfY the Donnelly judgment including accrued interest to date in the total amount of 
$446,841.76. (Ealy Aff. Ex. K). 
21. On or about November 10, 2009, a Writ of Execution ("Writ") was issued to the 
Bonner County Sheriff for execution on the Donnelly judgment in the total amount of 
$449,625.66. (Ealy Aff. Ex. L). 
22. On or about December 7, 2009, the Bonner County Sheriff made a partial return 
on the Writ in the total amount of $300.10. (Ealy Aff. Ex. M). After deducting its fees, the 
Bonner County Sheriff issued a check payable to Donnelly in the total amount of $169.10. (Ealy 
Aff. Ex. N). 
23. To date, neither RCI nor EMC has made voluntary payment to Donnelly in effort 
to satisfY the Donnelly judgment or deposited with the Court any part of the judgment that is 
within the applicable limit of insurance. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.c.P. 56(c). Where 
the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues 
and theories, the parties effectively stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
that would preclude the district court from entering summary judgment. Davis v. Peacock, 
133 Idaho 637,640, 991 P.2d 362,365 (1999) (citations omitted). However, the mere fact 
that both parties move for summary judgment does not in and of itself establish that there is 
no genuine issue of material fact. Krornrei v. AID Ins. Co., 110 Idaho 549, 551, 716 P.2d 
1321 (1986) (citations omitted). The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment does not change the applicable standard of review, and this Court must 
evaluate each party's motion on its own merits. Stafford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207, 
998 P.2d 1118, 1119 (2000) (citations omitted). 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
A. THE POLICY - ORGANIZATION AND LANGUAGE 
The material policy provisions of the EMC COL policy are found in the 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE FORM number CO 00 01 1001, 
pages 1 through 16. (Reid Aff. Ex. A) (emphasis added.) The policy is organized by "Sections." 
Section I is labeled "COVERAGES" and includes four (4) capitalized and bold subparts 
labeled COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY; 
COVERAG~ B PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILIY; COVERAGE C 
MEDICAL PAYMENTS; and SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS-COVERAGES A AND 
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B. (ld.) (emphasis added). Coverage "A" is further organized by two (2) subparts labeled 1. 
Insuring Agreement and 2. Exclusions. It is this organization that lends the agreemenf to being 
analogized as "swiss cheese" because the promise to insure (Le. the "cheese) found in the 
Insuring Agreement is thereafter limited by the Exclusions (i.e. the "holes") found in subpart 2. 
The policy language found in Section I, Coverage A, subpart 1 a. provides as follows: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as 
damages because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance 
applies. We [EMe] will have the right and duty to defend the insured [RCI] 
against any "suit" seeking those damages [Underlying Litigation ]. However, we 
will have no duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance does not apply. 
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered 
~ explicitly proved for under Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and 
B. [i.e. The coverage under Supplemental Payments is independent from the 
promise to pay damages for bodily injury or property damage found in subpart 1 
a.j 
(Reid AfT. Ex. A.) (emphasis added.) The policy defines "suit" to mean " ... a civil proceeding in 
which damages because of "bodily injury", "property damage" ... to which this insurance 
applies are alleged." [i. e. The Underlying Litigation and the Donnellys' allegations of bodily 
injury and/or property damage that triggered EMC's duty to defend RCI.] (Id. at Ex. A.) 
(emphasis added.) 
In addition, the policy language found in Section I provides as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS - COVERAGES A AND B 
1. We [EMe] will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate, settle, or any 
"suit" against an insured we defend [i.e. EMC defended RCI in the Underlying 
Litigation.]: 
e. All costs taxed against the insured in the "suit. " [i. e. attorney s fees and 
costs taxed against RCI in the Underlying Litigation.] 
g. All interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues after entry of 
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the judgment and before we have paid, offered to pay, or deposited in the 
court the part of the judgment that is within the applicable limit of insurance. 
[i. e. All interest on the foil amount of the Donnelly judgment.} 
These payments will not reduce the limits of insurance. [i.e. The obligation to 
make supplementary payments is an independent promise from the promise to pay 
damages for bodily injury or property damage.} 
(Reid Aff. Ex. A.) (emphasis added.) As outlined above, EMC not only made promises to pay 
under the plain policy language of Section I, Coverage A; but made independent promises to pay 
under the plain language of Section I, Supplementary Payments. 
B. THE RULES - INSURANCE POLICY CONSTRUCTION 
In Idaho, insurance policies are interpreted under general rules of contract 
construction subject to certain special rules of construction. Arregon v. Farmers Ins. Co. of 
Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008) (citation omitted.) In general, for a 
policy to be ambiguous it must be reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. Id. 
(citations omitted). Because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion--typically not 
subject to negotiation between the parties-a special rule of construction is "that any 
ambiguity that exists in the contract must be construed most strongly against the insurer." Id. 
(citation omitted.) Therefore, a policy provision that seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage 
must be strictly construed in favor of the insured. Id. (citation omitted). This places the 
burden on the "insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its 
coverage." Id. Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question oflaw. Id. 
C. THE DISPUTE - TO PAY OR NOT TO PAY 
1. Damages for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Workmanship Were For 
"Property Damage" That RCI Is Legally Obligated to Pay. 
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In short, EMC's argument is that there is no "cheese" in the EMC policy for either RCI or 
Donnelly because of the "hole" found in Section I, Coverage A, subpart 2 b. Contractual 
Liability excludes EMC's obligation to pay damages for RCI's breach of the implied warranty of 
workmanship. EMC characterizes the damages for breach of implied warranty as contractual in 
order to apply the exclusion. 
The facts of the Underlying Litigation are that RCI contracted with Donnelly to provide 
general contracting services in undertaking the Donnelly remodel. Having undertaken the work, 
by operation of Idaho law, RCI also impliedly warranted that it would provide those services in a 
workmanlike manner. See e.g. Hoffinan v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 37, 539 P.2d 
584, 589 (1975). And while the warranty is implied by operation oflaw, its beach is found in the 
failing to meet the workmanlike standard of care imposed by the warranty. Hoffinan, 97 Idaho at 
37 (citing Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Service, 427 P.2d 833, 840-841 (Alaska 
1967)). In this case, the jury found RCI breached both its contract and the implied warranty of 
workmanship. However, the jury only awarded damages in the amount of $126,611.55 for 
breach of the implied warranty. 
In general, damages can be characterized as "bodily injury," "property damage" and/or 
"economic loss." Economic loss has been held to "include the costs of repair and replacement of 
defective property which is the subject of the transaction .... " Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194, 
196, 983 P.2d 848, 850 ( 1999) (citing Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, Inc. v. Cessna Air. Co., 
97 Idaho 348, 351, 544 P.2d 306,309 (1975) (emphasis in original). This is distinguished from 
property damage which includes damage "to property other than that which is the subject oj the 
transaction." Id. (emphasis in original). 
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Liability insurance, like that found in EMC COL policy, generally purports to insure for 
"bodily injury" and/or "property damage" as those terms are defined in the policy. The EMC 
policy defines "bodily injury" to mean "bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, 
including death resulting from any of these at any time." The policy defines "property damage" 
to mean "a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that 
property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the physical injury that 
caused it; or b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss of use 
shall be deemed to occur at the time of the 'occurrence' that caused it." Therefore, the issue isn't 
whether the damages for the breach of the implied warranty are "contractual" as opposed to 
"tort" damages; the issue is whether the damages awarded for breach of the implied warranty 
were for "bodily injury" or "property damage" as defined in the EMC policy. 
The Special Verdict entered in the Underlying Litigation does not itemize or otherwise 
characterize the damage award. Since the Donnellys presented no evidence of 'bodily injury" at 
trial, the breach of implied warranty damages were not compensation for "bodily injury." 
However, the probable and reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence presented at trial are 
that the damages were compensation for "property damage" as defined by the policy and 
included compensation for damages to property other than that which was the subject of the 
DonnellylRCI transaction. Since there is no practical way to itemize the award after the fact, all 
reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of Donnelly and in favor of finding that the 
award was for "property damage" that RCI became obligated to pay and to which EMC's policy 
applies. 
It is simple enough for an insurer, like EMC, to expressly exclude damages for breach of 
the implied warranty. However, the policy is silent as to any specific exclusion. The exclusion 
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found at Section I, Coverage A, Section 2 b. Contractual Liability provides the insurance does 
not apply to: "Bodily injury" or "property damage" for which the insured is obligated to pay 
damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. This exclusion does 
not apply to liability for damages: (1) That the insured would have in the absence of a contract or 
agreement. ... " (emphasis added). 
As applied, there was no "assumption" of liability by RCI. While the term "assumption" 
isn't defined by the policy, it can been defined as " ... [t]he act or agreement or assuming or 
taking upon one's self. The undertaking or adoption of a debt or obligation primarily resting 
upon another, as where the purchaser of real estate "assumes" a mortgage resting upon it, in 
which case he adopts the mortgage debt as his own and becomes personally liable for its 
payment." Black's Law Dict., p. 123 (6th Ed. 1990). In this case, RCI didn't "assume" any 
liability by way of its contract or agreement with Donnelly. In fact, RCI vigorously contested its 
alleged liability through trial. The holding cited and relied upon by EMC in Magic Valley Potato 
Shippers v. Continental Insurance, 112 Idaho 1073, 1076-1077, 739 P.2d 372, 375-376 (1987) 
was made in dicta; was based on a breach of contract claim to purchase potatoes; and doesn't 
address application to a breach of implied warranty claim. 
In addition, the exclusion doesn't apply for liability RCI would have in the absence of the 
contract or agreement. As applied, RCI would still have liability for breach of the implied 
warranty of workmanship in the absence of its contract with Donnelly. This is because there is 
no dispute RCI undertook the work and the jury found that work to be below the standard of care 
required for it to be workmanlike. A lack of contractual privity does not bar recovery for 
"property damage" as opposed to "economic loss" for breach of thHmplied warranty. See 
Melishar v. State Farm, 143 Idaho 716, 722, 152 P.3d 587, 593 (2007) (citing Salmon Rivers, 97 
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Idaho at 36, 539 P.2d at 588) (citing the rule that "privity of contract is required in a contract 
action to recover economic loss for breach of the implied warranty.") 
Because the reasonable inferences are that the compensatory award for breach of the 
implied warranty was made for and included a compensatory award for "property damage" that 
RCI became legally obligated to pay, the Court should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of 
Donnelly and against EMC and conclude that the award is not excluded by operation of Section 
I, Coverage A, Subpart 2 b and that EMC is obligated to pay on behalf ofRCI. 
2. Damages for Breach of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act Were For 
"Property Damages" that RCI is Legally Obligated to Pay. 
The Special Verdict awarded the Donnellys $1,000.00 for RCI's failure to make the 
residential disclosure required by Idaho Code § 45-525 et seq. The failure to make these 
disclosures is per se violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act subject to a minimum 
statutory penalty of$I,OOO.OO. I.e. §§ 45-525(4); 48-608(1). In addition, the jury awarded the 
Donnellys another $1,000.00 for violation of "other provisions" under the Act. This portion of 
the award is not specific as which or what "other provisions" were violated. 
The jury was instructed "[t]he Donnellys have suffered an injury under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act if they have suffered any ascertainable loss of money or property, real 
or personal. The Donnellys have the burden of proving such loss." (Reid Aff. Ex. D, n #68). 
The jury was further instructed "[i]f the Donnellys have proven that they suffered any 
ascertainable loss of money or property resulting from a violation of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act, they may recover actual damages resulting from the unfair or deceptive act or 
practice, or One Thousand Dollars ($1,000), whichever is greater." (Id. at Ex. D, JI #70). 
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The award was not made to compensate "bodily injury." However, based on the 
instructions and resulting award, one reasonable inference is that the jury found that the 
Donnellys had suffered an ascertainable loss of money or property, real or personal. Since the 
award is not itemized as the loss of money versus property, it is reasonable to infer the award 
was for a loss of property and, therefore, "property damage." This is "property damage" that 
RCI has in the absence of any contract or agreement with Donnelly and it's not expected or 
intended by RCI for the purposes of EMC seeking to apply the exclusion found at Section I, 
Coverage A, Subpart 2 a Expected or Intended Injury. Therefore, the Court should draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of Donnelly and against EMC and conclude that the award is not 
excluded by operation of either Section I, Coverage A, Subparts 2 a or b and that EMC is 
obligated to pay on behalf ofRCI. 
3. EMC Has An Independent Duty To Pay Under SUPPLEMENTAL 
PAYMENTS - COVERAGES AAND B. 
The EMC CGL policy is unambiguous with respect to EMC's independent promise to 
make Supplemental Payments under the policy. Under the plain language of the policy as set 
forth above, EMC promised to pay, with respect to any claim it investigates or any "suit" it 
defends, all costs taxed against its insured in the "suit" and all interest on the full amount of any 
judgment that accrues after entry of the judgment and before EMC has made any offer to pay. It 
is undisputed that EMC "investigated" the Donnellys' claim. It is undisputed that EMC 
defended RCI against the Donnellys' "suit". It is undisputed that EMC provided a defense to 
RCI based on allegations of or the known potential for allegations of "bodily injury" and/or 
"property damage" to which the policy applied. It is undisputed that a judgment including costs 
was taxed against ReI and entered in the Underlying Litigation and that judgment accrues post-
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judgment interest. And it is undisputed that EMC has never made an offer to pay any portion of 
the judgment. 
EMC's argument to avoid its duty to make Supplemental Payments can be read to say 
that its duty isn't independent, but is instead dependent on the policy applying to "cover" the 
Donnellys' underlying claims. EMC cites State Farm v. Mintarsih, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d 845 (Cal Ct. 
App. 2009) as persuasive authority for its arguments and argues Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 
115 Idaho 1009, 772 P.2d 216 (1989) is neither controlling nor persuasive authority on point. 
Mintarsih is a California Court of Appeals decision from District 3 of the Second 
Division. Mintarsih, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d at 845. In the underlying case, Mimin Mintarsih sued 
Dennis and Dina Lam for false imprisonment arising from her employment as a domestic 
servant. Id. at 848. State Farm defended Lam in the underlying action under both a 
homeowner's and umbrella policy. Id. at 850. Mintarsih prevailed and obtained a judgment 
against Lam. Id. at 848. Lam later assigned its rights under both policies to Mintarsih. Id. at 
848-849. State Farm later sought declaratory judgment to avoid payment on the underlying 
judgment. Id. In the declaratory judgment action, the trial court determined the State Farm 
policies covered $87,000 in compensatory damages and the award of $161,591.05 in costs, but 
State Farm had no duty to pay the attorney's fees awarded against Lam based on wage and hour 
claims for which the policies provided no coverage and no potential for coverage. Id. at 851. 
Both Mintarsih and State Farm appealed the decision. Id. at 848. On appeal, State Farm never 
challenged the finding that it had a duty to pay the $161,591.05 in costs plus interest on that 
amount awarded against Lam. Id. at 852. 
On appeal, the California Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part. 
Mintarsih, 95 Cal.Rptr.3d at 858. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision holding State 
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Fann liable for $87,000 in compensatory damages. In part, the Court followed prior California 
case law that rejected a literal interpretation the policy language: "any 'suit' against an insured 
we defend," to conclude that the duty to pay could arise only if the insurer had a duty to defend 
the insured. Id. at 854-855 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Court reasoned that the 
"contractual duty to defend extends only to those claims for which there is a potential for 
coverage under the policy." Id. at 855. In part, the Court concluded that the Lams' misconduct 
toward Mintarsih was "willful" and, therefore, application of California Insurance Code § 533 
precluded any obligation to indemnify or pay by State Fann. Id. at 856. EMC relies on 
Mintarsih for its policy argument that if insurers, like EMC, had to pay costs taxed against its 
insureds, like RCI, it would prevent insurers like EMC from providing a defense when coverage 
was in doubt. EMC's invitation to follow Mintarsih is an invitation to error based on the Idaho 
Supreme Court's holding in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey and its obvious precedential 
application and value to this case. 
In Mutual of Enumclaw v. Havey, the Idaho Supreme Court specifically addressed the 
independent duty of an insurer to make supplemental payments under a homeowner's policy for 
costs and post-judgment interest taxed against its insured arising from an underlying suit the 
insurer had defended. Harvey, 115 Idaho at 1009. In Harvey, Floyd Harvey d/b/a Hell's Canyon 
Excursions ("HCE") sued Bruce Oaks and others seeking damages for property owned by HCE. 
Id. at 1010. Mutual of Enumclaw defended Oaks through trial pursuant to a homeowner's 
policy in effect at the time. Id. Following a trial, judgment was entered in favor of HCE and 
jointly and severally against Oaks and a co-defendant in the amount of $219,200 plus 
$45,444.00 in costs which included $35,000.00 in attorney's fees. Id. HCE made demand on 
Mutual of Enumclaw to pay the costs due under the policy. Id. Mutual of Enumclaw declined 
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and instead filed an action seeking declaratory judgment. Id. HCE answered and counterclaimed 
seeking declaratory judgment that Mutual of Enumclaw had a duty to pay the costs taxed against 
Oaks including attorney's fees and interest as well as interest on the entire judgment amount of 
$264,644.01. Id. at 10 11. 
Harvey later moved for summary judgment on its counterclaim. Harvey, 115 Idaho at 
1011. The trial court issued declaratory judgment in favor of Harvey and ruled "Mutual of 
Enumclaw must pay all interest on the entire judgment, verdict plus costs, from the date of the 
entry of the Order re: Costs and Attorney Fees until it has paid, tendered, or deposited in court 
costs, and interest accrued to the date of that tender." Id. at 10 14-10 15. The trial also awarded 
Harvey attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839. Id. at 1015. On appeal by 
Mutual of Enumclaw, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed and adopted, in substantial part, then 
district judge Schroeder's opinion. 
On appeal, Mutual of Enumclaw raised the same argument as EMC-namely, that it 
owed no duty to make supplemental payment in the absence of coverage on the underlying claim 
and that it undertook the Oaks defense subject to a reservation of rights. Harvey, 115 Idaho at 
1011. Like Donnelly, HCE argued that the duty to make supplemental payments is independent 
from the obligation to pay for the conduct of Oaks and the reservation of rights didn't absolve 
Mutual of Enumclaw's duty to pay. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court adopted Judge Schroeder's analysis and HCE's argument that 
the plain language of the supplemental payments provision and its placement under coverage 
section implied that the "provision contained therein are separate from and in addition to the 
basic policy coverage and, therefore, ... Mutual of Enumclaw's obligation to pay such costs is 
unaffected by the fact that the policy does not cover Oakes' intentionally tortuous conduct." Id. 
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at 1012. Judge Schroeder succinctly reasoned that the "[l]anguage in the policy of this case does 
not indicate that payment of costs is conditioned upon a final determination that the policy 
covers the insured's conduct. The language of the policy says that the Company will pay all 
costs taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the Company." Id. Judge Schroeder 
further reasoned that "since the Company has the right to control the defense, including the 
power to refuse settlement, it should also hear the consequences of its case management 
decisions, including the consequence that the trial court may tax the opponents costs 
against its insured." Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Likewise, Judge Schroeder made 
short order of Mutual of Enumclaw's argument that its reservation of rights exonerated it from its 
duty to make supplemental payments holding that "[t]the fact that the company reserved its 
contractual rights before undertaking a defense in no way dissipates its obligation to pay such 
costs." Harvey, 115 Idaho at 1Ol3. 
In addition, the Idaho Supreme Court adopted Judge Schroeder's analysis and holding 
that the term "costs" includes attorney's fees. Id. at 1Ol3. Further, Judge Schroeder rejected 
Mutual of Enumclaw's argument that it had no duty to pay interest on the judgment because the 
costs were not part of the judgment or, alternatively, that its obligation ceased upon a tender of 
policy limits which was zero. Id. After considering the applicable policy language and finding 
the case law offered by HCE persuasive in the interpretation of the language, Judge Schroeder 
held that Mutual of Enumclaw "must pay all interest on the entire judgment." Id. at 1014. In 
doing so, Judge Schroeder noted the purpose of the "interest-on-judgment" clause "is to the 
insurer an incentive -to discharge its obligation promptly." Id. (citation omitted). Judge 
Schroeder further noted that to ffiterpret the policy otherwise would give an insurer, like Mutual 
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of Enumclaw, "little incentive to settle its obligation for costs promptly, a situation that runs 
contrary to the interest clause's intent." Id. at 1014. 
The Court should follow Harvey. While Harvey addressed a duty to make supplemental 
payments under a homeowner's policy, there is no significant factual or legal distinction to be 
made between this case the Harvey. Like Harvey, the language of the EMC policy indicates 
that EMC's duty to make supplemental payments is independent from any duty to pay based on 
RCI's conduct. Like Harvey, the duty to make supplemental payments is found under Section I 
- Coverages of the CGL Coverage Form and any supplemental payments made are independent 
of the applicable liability limit. Like Harvey, EMC had and exercised the right to control the 
defense of RCI, including the power to refuse settlement including the obvious undermining of 
the DonnellylRCI mediation and, therefore, it should rationally bear the consequences of its case 
management decisions, including the consequence that the trial court may tax the opponents 
costs against its insured in the underlying action. In short, the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 
Harvey is on point and controls this case. Therefore, the Court should find as a matter of law 
that EMC has a duty to make, at a minimum, supplemental payment of the costs taxed against 
RCI in the total amount of $296,933.89 inclusive of $19,871.89 in costs and $277,062 in 
attorney's fees and post judgment interest on the entire judgment accruing, having accrued since 
August 14, 2008. 
D. ATTORNEY'S FEES -APPLICATION OF IDAHO CODE § 41-1839 
Idaho Code § 41-1839 provides as follows: 
(1) Any insurer issuing any policy, certificate or contract of insurance, surety, 
guaranty or indemnity of any kind or nature whatsoever, which shall fail for a 
period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss has been furnished as provided in 
such policy, certificate or contract, to pay to the person entitled thereto the 
amount justly due under such policy, certificate or contract, shall in any action 
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thereafter brought against the insurer in any court in this state for recovery 
under the terms of the policy, certificate or contract, pay such further amount 
as the court shall adjudge reasonable as attorney's fees in such action. 
(2) In any such action, if it is alleged that before the commencement thereof, a 
tender of the full amount justly due was made to the person entitled thereto, 
and such amount is thereupon deposited in the court, and if the allegation is 
found to be true, or if it is determined in such action that no amount is justly 
due, then no such attorney's fees may be recovered. 
To receive fees under the statue, a party must first prevail in the litigation. Harvey, 115 
Idaho at 1015 (citations omitted). Where an insurer, like EMC, denies liability, "it waives the 
requirement that a proof of loss be furnished as a prerequisite to the recovery of attorney fees." 
Id. (citation omitted). In a declaratory judgment action, persons like the Donnellys entitled to an 
amount justly due under the policy "may recover attorney fees at the trial level.. .. " Id. (citation 
omitted). 
In this case, Donnelly made demand for payment justly due under the policy. EMC 
refused to pay. Accordingly, in the event the Court should make declaratory judgment in favor 
of the Donnellys, the Donnellys are entitled to recover their reasonable attorney's fees pursuant 
to Idaho Code § 41-1839. 
CONCLUSION 
In the Underlying Litigation, EMC exercised its right to undertake and control the 
defense of RCI. ReI vigorously contested the Donnellys' claims through a twelve (12) day 
trial. EMC's transparent strategy of undermining the DonnellylRCI mediation to coerce 
settlement; force the matter through trial; then attempt to escape any duty to pay by 
declaratory judgment violates common notions of fair play and, therefore, EMC should bear 
the rational co~ences of its case management decisions including the duty to make 
supplemental payment to Donnelly. To rule otherwise will simply encourage insurers, like 
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EMC, to continue to make poor case management decisions grounded on the placement of 
their own financial interests above those-of their insureds and their insureds' judgment 
creditors. 
DATED this 19 day of December, 2009. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DA YID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
)ss. 
County of Kootenai ) 
CASE NO.CY -07-00885 
AFFIDAVIT OF MICHAELA. EALY 
IN SUPPORT MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Michael A. Ealy, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and states as follows: 
I. I am one of the attorneys for Defendants Donnelly in the above-referenced 
matter and have full knowledge of the matters set forth herein. 
2. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the Change 
Endorsements to the EMC policy effective October 1, 2005, to October 1, 2006, under 
~ilumber 2DI-32-95-06. 
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3. Attached hereto as Exhibit B is a true and correct copy of a letter dated May 
16, 2006, from attorney Michael Schmidt to Harris Dean Insurance, Sandpoint without a 
copy of the referenced attached Complaint. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit C is a true and correct copy of the General 
Liability Notice of Occurrence/Claim dated May 22, 2006, from Harris Dean Insurance to 
Employers Mutual Casualty Company ("EMC") as produced by EMC in discovery in the 
Underlying Litigation. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of a computer print 
screen dated May 25, 2006, from the EMC claims file as produced by EMC in discovery in 
the Underlying Litigation. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit E is a true and correct copy of a letter dated May 
25, 2006, from EMC to Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI") titled "Reservation of Rights" as 
produced in discovery in the Underlying Litigation. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit F is a true and correct copy of excerpts from the 
EMC claims investigation file as redacted by EMC prior to being produced by EMC in 
discovery in the Underlying Litigation. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit G is a true and correct copy of a letter dated May 
1, 2007, from attorney Chris Hansen to mediator Peter Erbland confirming mediation on 
May 30, 2007, in the Underlying Litigation. The letter is copied to EMC adjuster Kristen 
Ziegler. 
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9. Attached hereto as Exhibit H is a true and correct copy of a cover letter dated 
May 22, 2007, from EMC attorney David Claiborne to RCI attorney Brent Featherston and 
then Donnelly attorney Michael Schmidt informing them of EMC's declaratory judgment 
action. The letter is attached hereto without its referenced enclosures. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit I is a true and correct copy of a cover letter dated 
June 4,2007, from EMC attorney David Claiborne to attorney Michael Schmidt without its 
referenced enclosures. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit J is a true and correct copy of the cover page to the 
Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs and Defendant 
Rimar Construction, Inc. showing a filing dated of March 20, 2009, and a recordation date 
of March 30,2009, as Bonner County record instrument number 769177. 
12. Attached hereto as Exhibit K is a true and correct copy of the letter drafted by 
me to RCI attorney's Brent Featherston and Stephen D. Phillabaum and EMC attorney 
James G. Reid calculating the then due interest on the Donnelly judgment and making 
demand on EMC and/or RCI to satisfy the judgment. In this letter, I advised EMC of the 
Idaho holding found in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009 (1989). 
13. Attached hereto as Exhibit L is a true and correct copy of the Writ of 
Execution issued on November 10, 2009, to the Bonner County Sheriff in effort to collect on 
the Donnelly judgment in the Underlying Litigation. 
14. Attached hereto as Exhibit M is a true and correct copy of the partial return on 
the Writ of Execution dated December 7, 2009, issued to me from the Bonner County 
Sheriffs Department. 
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15. Attached hereto as Exhibit N is a true and correct copy of check number 
26177 issued from the Bonner County Sheriff payable to David Donnelly in the amount of 
$169.10. 
16. To date and to my knowledge, neither EMC nor ReI has made any effort or 
attempt to make voluntary payment on the Donnelly judgment in the Underlying Litigation 
despite the Donnellys' demands for the same. 
17. To date and to my knowledge, after entry of the Donnelly judgment, EMC has 
not paid, offered to pay, or deposited in court part of the Donnelly judgment that is within 
the applicable limit of insurance. 
(SEAL) 
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SA YETH NAUGHT. 
DATED this I Y day of December, 2009. 
By ~ ____ ~~~ ____ ~+-____ ___ 
1 
Attorneys for Defendants 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1f1y of December, 2009. 
~f£I PblIc for Idaho 
Residing at ho<.«1. d '~ ( 
My commission expires ~ =i 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thetf.. day of December, 2009, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
vUsMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 342-4657 
l/6SMail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (509) 625-1909 
L<s"Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 263-0400 
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.EMCInsurance ..AlIllpanies 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY 
C HAN G E END 0 R S E MEN T 
*---------------------- -* 
POLICY PERIOD: FROM 10/01/05 TO 10/Ol/06 * POLICY NUMBER * 
* 2 D 1 - 3 2 - 9 5---06 * 
*------------------------* 
N A M E D r N SUR E D 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC 
ARBOR PROPERTIBS LLC 
PO BOX 692 
SANDPOINT ID 83864-0692 
PRO D U C E R : 
HARRIS/DEAN INSURANCE 
706 W SUPERIOR ST STE A 
SANDPOINT ID 83864-1659 
AGENT: AP-6043-S 
DIRECT BILL AGENT PHONE: 208-265-9690 
T HIS END 0 R S E MEN T C HAN G EST H E POL ICY. 
P LEA S ERE A D I T CAR E F U L L Y. 
*---------------------------------------------------* 
* ENDORSEMENT EFFECTIVE DATES: 10/01/05 TO 10/01/06 * 
*---------------------------------------------------* 
IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ADDITIONAL PREMIUM 
THE FOLLOWING CHANGBS ARB APPLICABLB TO THIS POLICY: 
CLASS 87763 HAS BEEN DELETED AND CLASS 87765 HAS BEEN 
ADDED AS PER THE ATTACHED SCHBDULB. ALSO FORM CG7480 
HAS BEEN DBLETBD FROM THE LIST OF FORMS AND FORM 
CG7482(12/00) HAS BEEN ADDED TO THE LIST OF FORMS. 
ADDITIONAL PREMIUM: $ 
AUDIT FREQUENCY: ANNUAL 
PLACE OF ISSUE: BISMARCK. ~~ 
DATE OF ISSUE: 09/09/05 COUNTERSIGNED BY: 
201. 00 
(CONTINUED) 




IEMCInsuranre. . .mpames 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY COMPANY 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC 
POLICY NUMBER: 201-32-95---06 
EFF DATE: 10/01/05 EXP DATE: 10/01/06i 
FORM 




DATE DBSCRIPTION/ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PREMIUM 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CGOO01 10-01 COMMERCIAL GEN LIABILITY COV FORM 
CG0062 12-02 WAR LIABILITY EXCLUSION 
CG0300 01-96 DEDUCTIBLE LIABILITY INSURANCE 
APPLICATION OP ENDORSEMENT (LIMITATIONS) : 
NONE 
CG2147 07-98 BXCL-EMPLOYMBNT RELATBD PRACTICBS 
CG21S0 09-89 AMENDMENT/LIQUOR LIABILITY EXCLUSION 
CG2167 04-02 FUNGI OR BACTBRIA EXCLUSION 
CG2170 11-02 CAP/LOSSES FROM CERT ACTS/TERRORISM 
CG2176 11-02 EXCL PUNITIVE DMGS ACTS OF TERRORISM 
CG2280 07-98 LIMITED EXCL-CONTRACTOR PROF LIAB 
CG7001A 01-86 GENERAL LIABILITY SCHEDULE 
CG7003 10-01 GL QUICK REFERENCE (OCCURRENCE) 
CG7185 08-99 EXCLUSION - LEAD 
CG7191 10-01 COMH'L GENERAL LIABILITY AMENDMENT 
CG731S 10-01 CONTINUOUS OR PROGRESS INJ/DMG BXCL 
CG7422 08-00 EXCL INJ/DAMAGE FROM BARTH MOVBMENT 
CG7474 10-01 TRANSFER RIGHTS/RECOVERY AGAINST OTH 
*CG7482 12-00 BLANKET AI-CONST CONTRACT-VICAR LIAB 
CG7S22.4 06-02 EXCLUSION - DESIGNATED WORK 
CG7523 03-02 EXCLUSION - DBSIGNATED WORK 
IL0021 07-02 NUCLEAR ENERGY LIAB EXCL/BROAD FORM 
IL0204 07-02 ID CHANGES - CANCBLLATION/NONRENEWAL 
IL7028 08-99 ASBESTOS EXCLUSION 
IL7130A 04-01 NAMBD INSURED ENDORSEMENT 
* IL7131A 04-01 COMM'L POLICY ENDORSEMENT SCHEDULE 
IL7137 08-04 EXCL MIXED DUST PNEUMOCONIOSIS 
IL8383.2 09-04 DISCLOSURE NOTICB OF TERRORISM COVG 
PREMIUM THROUGH 12/31/05 $ 37 
PREMIUM BEYOND 12/31/05 $ 111 
IL8384A 09-04 TERRORISM NOTICE 
IL8530 12-04 IMPORTANT NOTICE TO POLICYHOLDERS 
PORMeS) DELETED WITH THIS TRANSACTION: 
CG7480 10-00 
DATE OF ISSUE: 09/09/05 





I LOCATION 001 
87763 !$ DELETED' 
ADDITIONAL INSURED-OWNERS, LESSEES 
~ CONTRACTORS-SCHEDULED PBRSON OR 
ORGANIZATION-VICARIOUS LIAB 
PREMIUM BASIS: 






BLANKET ADDITIONAL INSURED -
CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS - VICARIOUS 
LIABILITY - SEE FORM CG7482 
PREMIUM BASIS: 
FLAT CHARG 
BXPOSURE: IF ANY 
(SUBLINE /334) 
! $ 350 
------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------
TOTAL PREMIUM FOR CHANGES $ 201. 00 
--------------------------------------------
(1) OTHER THAN NOT FOR PROFIT (2) NOT FOR PROFIT 
(3) INCLUDING PRODUCTS AND/OR COMPLETED OPBRATIONS UNLESS OTHBRWISE EXCLUDED 
(4) PRODUCTS-COMPLETED OPERATIONS ARB SUBJECT TO THE GENERAL AGGREGATE LIMIT 
(5) A $250 PD DEDUCTIBLE PER CLAIM APPLIES TO CUSTOMERS AUTOS UNLBSS 
OTHERWISE DESIGNATED BY THIS CLASSIFICATION CODS 
(6) FOR SPRAY PAINTING OPERATIONS, A PD DEDUCTIBLB OF $250 PER CLAIM APPLIES 
UNLESS OTHERWISE DESIGNATED BY THIS CLASSIFICATION CODE 
LOCATION OF ALL PREMISES OWNED, RENTED OR OCCUPIED: 
RATED LOCATIONS: 
LOC 001 1707 CULVBRS DR 
SANDPOINT, ID 83864-7276 
DATE OF ISSUE: 09/09/05 BPP 
FORM CG7001A ED.Ol-56 BPP 08 22 OS 015 
256 
JF 2D13295 0602 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL. L.IABILITY 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULI. Y. 
ADDITIONAL INSURED - OWNERS, LESSEES OR 
CONTRACTORS - SCHEDULED PERSON OR ORGANIZATION -
VICARIOUS LIABILITY . 
This endorsement modifies Insurance provided under the following: 
COMMERCIAl.. GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
SCHEDULE-
Name of P .... O" or Organization: 
Project: 
Location of Project: 
-If no entry appears above, Information required to complete this endorsement will be shown In the Declarations as 
800licabie to thl. endorsement. . _____________________ ---' 
A . SECTION II - WHO IS AN INSURED i. amended 
to Include as an additional Inaurad the peraon or 
organiZation shown In the Schedule, but only with 
respect to "bodIly Injury". "PI'O~rty damage- or 
"peraonal and advertising Injury caused, In whole, 
by: 
1. Your acta or oml$$lons; or 
2. The acta or omls.lona of \hoee actIng on your 
behalf In the performance of your ongoing 
operations for the additional insured at the 
location dealgnated above. 
B. Wth reapecl to the Insurance efforded to this 
addltloneilneured, the following exclualona apply: 
This Inaurance do •• not apply to: 
1, "Bodily Injury", "property damage" or "personal 
and advertising Injury" r_ultlng from any act 
or omlaalon by, or willfUl misconduct of the 
additional Insured shown In the SChedule, 
whether the sole or a contributing cau_ of the 
loes. The covtar.-ge afforded to the addltlonal 
insured Is nmlted solely to the additional 
Inaurad's 'vlcarlous liability" that Is It specifiC 
and direct result of your conduct. 
"VIeatlous liability· aa u.e" In this 
endorsament mean. lJabUlty that Is Imposed 
on the additional Inaurad aolely by virtue of Its 
relatlonahfp with you, and not due to any act 
or omlaalon of the addltlonal Inaured. 
2. This Insurance do.a not apply to "bodily 
Injury" or "property damage" occ:urring after: 
•. All work, InCluding material a, parla or 
equIpment furnished In connection with 
such work, on the project (other than 
service, malntenanca or repairs) to be 
performed by or on behalf of the 
addltlonal Inaure(s) at the location of the 
covered operation a has been completed; 
or 
b. That portion of ·your work" out of which 
the Injury or damage erise. has been put 
to Ita Intended use by any p .... on or 
organization other than another contractor 
or subcontractor engaged In performing 
operations for a prlncJpal .a a part of the 
sama proJect. 




COMMERCIAL. GENERAL. UABIL.ITY 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
BLANKET ADDITIONAL INSURED - CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS -
VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
Thl.s endONl.,.,.,ent modIfies the Insurance provided under the following: 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABIUTY COVERAGE PART 
A. SECTION II - WHO IS AN INSURED Is amended 
to Include _ an adcUtional insured any person or 
organization for whom you are performing 
operations when you and such person or 
orgenlzetlon heve agreed In writing In a contract 
or agreement that auch person or organlzatlon be 
added a. an addltJonal Insured on your polley. 
Such person or orga~tlon I. an additional 
Insured only With respect to liability for "bodDy 
Injury: ·property demage" or "personal and 
adv~ng Injury" caused, in whole, by: 
1. Your acts or oml.alona; or 
2. The acta or omlaalont. of those acting on your 
behalf; 
in the performance of your ongoing operations for 
the additional Insured. 
A peraon'. or organization's atatus as an 
additional Insured under thla endorsement ends 
when your operation. for that additional insured 
ere completed. 
S. VVlth re.pect to the insurance afforded to theae 
additional InltUred., the following additional 
exclualona apply: 
Thl.s Insurance does not apply to: 
1. -Bodily Injury: "property damag." or "personal 
and edvertl.slng Injury" reSUlting from any act 
or omls.lon by. or willful mleconduct of the 
addltlonel InltU red , whether the aole or a 
contributing cau_ of the loea. The coverage 
afforded to the additional Insured la limited 
solely to the additional Inaured'a "vlcerfoUlS 
liability" that is a speclfic and direct result of 
your conduct. 
"Vlcarioua liability" as used In this 
endoraament m_ns liability that la Imposed 
on the additional '"ltUred solely by virtue of Ita 
r.,ationehip with you, and not due to any act 
or omlsaJon of the additional Insured. 
2. "Sodlly injury" or ·property damage" occurring 
after: 
a. All work, InCluding materials. parts or 
equJpment furnished In connection with 
such work. on the project (other than 
.ervlce, maintenance or repairs) to be 
performed by or on behalf of the 
additional insured{s) at the location of the 
covered operatlona has been completed; 
or 
b. That portion of "your wor1<" out of which 
the l'\Jury or damage art_a haa been put 
to Ita intended use by any person or 
organization other than another contractor 
or aubcontractor engaged in performing 
oparatlona for a principal aa a part of the 
.ame project. 
3. "Bodily l'\Jury,- "property damaga- or "personal 
and advertl.slng InJUty" arlaJng out of the 
rendering Of, or failure to rander, any 
profesaJonal, erchltectural, engineering or 
surveying _rvlcea InclUding: 
•• The preperlng, aPPf'Ovlng. or failing to 
prepare or approve mapa, shop draWings, 
opinions. reports, aurveys, field orders, 
changa ordera or drawings and 
speclfication.; or 
b, Supervlao'Y. Inspection, architectural or 
engineering actlvitl ... 
C. The limits of inaurance applicable to the additional 
Inaured .,.. tho •• apeclfled In the Oeclaratlona of 
this policy or In the written contract or wrttutn 
a",,_ment, whichever I. lower. Th_a limit. of 
Insurance ara Incfualv. of and not In addition to 
the limits of Inaurence shown in the DeclaratiON. 
O. Any coverage provided heraunder Shall b. excaaa 
over any other valid and collectible Insurance 
avaUable to the addltlona' Inaured Whether that 
Insurance I. primary, exceas, contingent or on any 
other basla, unle .. you and the additional Inauntd 
have spac/fleetly agreed In a written contract or 
written agreemant that thIs insurance be primary. 
Vllhen coverage is provided on a primary baal. we 
will not s_k contrlbutlon from any other Insurance 
available to the additional Insured If a written 
contract or written agreement requires that this 
insurance be nonconlrlbutory. 
E. All other terma and conditiona of this policy remaln 
unchanged. 
CG7 .. S2 (S'()5) Includ ... copyrighted mat.rI.1 of ISO Properties.. Inc. with II. perml.slon. Page 1 011 
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COMMERCIAL GENERAL UABIUTY 
THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY. PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. 
BLANKET ADDITIONAL INSURED - CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS -
VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
This endorsement modifies the insurance provided under the following: 
COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY COVERAGE PART 
SECTION II - WHO IS AN INSURED is amended to 
include as an additional insured any person or organi-
zation for whom you are performing operations when 
you and such person or organization have agreed in 
writing In a contract or agreement that such person or 
organization be added to your policy and where a 
Certificate of Insurance showing that person or or-
ganization as an additional insured has been issued. 
The written contract or agreement must be: 
(a) currently in effect or becoming effective during 
the term of this policy; and 
(b) executed prior to the "bodily injury" or ·prop-
erty damage: 
The insurance provided to the additional insured is 
limited as follows: 
1. That person or organization is an additional in-
sured only to the extent that you are held liable for 
your ongoing operations performed for that addi-
tional insured. A person's or organization's status 
as an additional insured under this endorsement 
ends when your operations for that additional in-
sured are completed. 
2. This insurance does not apply to any "bodily in-
jury" or ·property damage" resulting from any act 
or omission by, or willful misconduct of the addi-
tional insured shown in the Schedule, whether the 
sole or a contributing cause of the loss. The cov-
erage afforded to the additional insured is limited 
solely to the additional Insured's "vicarious lIabll-· 
ity" that is a specific and direct result of your 
conduct. 
"'Vicarious liability" as used In this endorsement 
means liability that is Imposed on the additional 
insured solely by virtue of Its relationship with you, 
and not due to any act or omission of the addi-
tiona/Insured. 
3. With respect to the insurance afforded to these 
additional insureds, the foflowing exclusion Is 
added: 
This insurance does not apply to "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" occurring after: 
(1) All work, Including materials, parts or equip-
ment furnished in connection with such work, 
on the project (other than service, mainte-
nance or repairs) to be performed by or on 
behalf of the additional insured(s) at the site of 
the covered operations has been completed; 
or 
(2) That portion of ·your worl( out of which the 
injury or damage arises has been put to its 
intended use by any person or organization 
other than another contractor or subcontractor 
engaged In performing operations for a princi-
pal as a part of the same project. 
4. The limits of insurance applicable to the additional 
insured are thOse specified in the Declarations of 
this policy or in the written contract or agreement. 
whichever is lower: These limits of insurance are 
inclusive of and not in addition to the limits of in-
surance shown in the Declarations. 
5. The insurance provided to the additional Insured 
does not apply to "bodily injury; "property dam-
age" or "personal and advertising injury" arI&lng 
out of an architect's, engineer's, or surveyor's 
rendering of or failure to render any professional 
services including: 
a. The preparing, approving, or failing to prepare 
or approve maps, drawings, opinions, reports. 
surveys, field orders, ohange orders or design 
andspedfications;and 
b. Supervisory, inspection, architectural or engi-
neering activities. 
6. Any coverage provided hereunder shall be excess 
over any other vaIld and colectlble Insurance 
available to the additional Insured whether pri-
mary, excess. contingent or any other basis, 
unless a contract specificaUy requires that 1hJs in-
surance be primary, or you request that It apply on 
a primary basis. 
7. All other terms and conditions of this policy remain 
unchanged. 
Includes copyrighted material of ISO Proper1Ies. Inc. with Its permission. 
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LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S. 
ATTORNEYS 
250 NORTIfWESTBLVD, Sn 102 
GaEUl D'ALENE, 10 83814-2971 
OFFICE (208) 667'()Sl1 I FAX (208) 66+4125 
May 16,2006 
MICHABL O. SCHMIDT 
Admitted In: Idaho and Washington 
Bmail address: mschmidt@1ukins.com 
Harris Dean Insurance, Sandpoint 
Ms. Angela Potts 
Ms. Carol Bethel 
706 W. Superior, Suite A 
Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Re: Donnelly 'Y. Rlmar Construction 
Dear Ms. Potts and Ms.Bethel: 
Enclosed is a copy of the Complaint filed against Rimar Construction, Inc. I understand that 
Rimar Construction Inc. and/or Ivan Rimar may be insured through your office. If so, please 
forward this claim to the policy issuer. If you have any questions or comments, please feel free 
to contact me. 
Very truly yours, 
)J.~ 






SPOKANE • COEUR D'ALENE' MOSES LAKE 
WWW.LUKINS.COM 
2soEXHIBIT~ May ( 06 ) - 029 
'l6JUU 5 " . ) -- -- ------ ---' _c;;,;J'Ac£;j. j ! 
GENERAL LJABILITY NOTICE OF OCCUR~"E~CElCLAIM 




3662 Cocolalla Loop R4 
Cocolalla m 83813 
MT STATE INFORMA11OH ON PAGe 2 
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Hote date: 851'25,186 EntPy elate: 851'25,186 Author: KRISTIN-Z Entry by: KRISTlH-Z 
Note nWlber: 4 
Category: I nsW"ed 
Hotes ar.: Inhous. 
Contact date: 851'25/2886 
Pint contact d.layed? No 
Tb.e: . . 
With: Rt.ar Construction Inc 
Method of contact: 
Call.d the I on Tu.sday and discussed the cla~, h. said 
that he was serv.d awhile ago and that he hiPed an attny on 
hia own because he didn't think that he has insurance 
coverage. he said that he was hired by the C to r • .od.1 
their hollt.... It stAl"ted out as doing aiding .tc .. and as they 
went along they continued to add to the pPOject. 
the I was the general and also did a lot of the work with 
his 
own crew. he worked on a t~e and ~terials basis and there 
waa no contract with the C. 
work included: 
..kti... sidin, 
c.;gJ-' addit10n on the fPOnt of the hoe 
~ porch 
I...:::::!:::.. slate flooring 
they subbed out electrical and HUAC. 
Th. I said that they also had a heating type stoue on one of 
the POOIU and the H'1AC person said it couldn- t be installed. 
Th.y C insisted ... as so he w.nt ouer and hooked it up and 
they ran it once and then disconn.ct.d due to fir.box 
proLlellls. 
The I said that they cORpl.t.d the project and that they had 
SOIlQe handrails to put up and that they went to do it and 
the C wouldn't let then on the pl"Operty. He said that they 
were upset but that he was unawaPe of why. 
The I said that dUl"ing the construction PI"OC.ss that they 
put in a slat. floor. he said that the lJPOut start.d to 
, co .... loose and that his elqllo~e was att .... pting to cut out 
the tile an.d that he curt the heat aats underneath. they 
were going to repair it but the C wouldn't let thelll. The 
I cost to Npair is about 8800.88 and the cost to replace is 
V ~ aPOund 18.818.88 the 1 did this install with their own crew • 
.f) 7,. ,,. . 1he facade on the f:t-Ont of the building is hav ing proble ... s. 
Vf ~ . The I said that he engineered this hbas.lE. He said that 
it is cr.ckin9". 
H. said the porch on the backsid. if fine for snow loads and 
-it doesn't have to fteet code ads there are no cod •• in his 
county .(1 CNW did this) 
he said his crew did the roof and that there is nothing 
wrong with the roof except that they didn't like how on. of 
the valleys are. he offuped to fix. 
the I has hir.d his own attny and they aPe defending at this 




May 25, 2006 
IvanRimar 
Rimar Construction, Inc. 
PO Box 692 
Sandpoint ID 83864 
RE: Our Claim No. : 3361.54 KZ 
Our Insured : Rimar Construction, Inc. 
Date of Loss : 05105105 
CERTIFIED MAIL 
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED 
Reservation of Rights 
Dear Mr. Rimar: 
We have received a notice of claim under your Rimar Construction, Inc. policy of insurance. 
This claim notice was received in our office on May 23, 2006. The notice was sent to us by 
Harris-Dean Insurance, Sandpoint, Idaho. 
From reviewing the claim notice and the attached Summons and Complaint, it appears that 
David and Kathy Donnelly are pursuing a claim against Rimar Construction, Inc. The 
information provided indicates that they have filed a lawsuit arising out of alleged construction 
defects. 
This claim has been submitted for our consideration under your policy of insurance policy #2D 1-
23-95 Commercial General Liability policy. Your Commercial General Liability policy provides 
a $1,000,000 per occurrence limit. There is also a $250 property damage deductible. In 
reviewing the information provided, it appears your project began in March of 2005 and ended in 
October of 2005, which is during the effective dates of your general liability policy, October I, 
2004 through October 1, 2005. It appears that EMC Insurance continued to insure you through 
January of2oo6. 
From my review of your Commercial General Liability policy, as well as initial information 
provided, it appears there may be certain exclusions in your policy to exclude coverage. 
However, I have requested additional information from your attorney, Brent Featherston. Upon 
receipt of additional information, we will have coverage reviewed and advise. 
You should understand that it is the intention of this letter to preserve all the rights of Rimar 
Construction, Inc. and EMC Insurance Company and to allow investigation or defense of the 
alleged Joss, injury or damage and the amount thereof without in any way effecting, impairing, or 
adding to the liability of EMC Insurance Company under said policies, or waiving any of its 
EXHIBIT t 
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rights thereunder. No act of EMC Insurance Company shall be construed as an admission of 
liability or coverage, and EMC Insurance Company hereby expressly reserves its right to deny 
such liability or coverage. 
We regret any inconvenience this may cause, and will resolve the coverage issue as soon as we 
receive additional infonnation from your attorney. If you have any questions regarding this 
matter, please feel free to contact me at 1-800-472-2117, extension 5073. 
Sincerely, 




Copy: Featherston Law Finn - 113 South 2nd Avenue, Sandpoint ID 83864 
PLEASE NOTE: The State of Idaho requires the fonowing fraud warning to be placed OD 
all elaims related correspondence. 
"Any person who knowingly and with intent to defraud or deceive any insurance company, files 
a statement containing any false, incomplete, or misleading infonnation is gUilty of a felony." 
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Category : Activity 
Category : Investigation 
reviewed deposition materials -clmnt 
damage estimate totals $328,052.54 however the clmnt atty 
indicated to atty Reid that the real damages total closer to 
$4S0,OOO--reviewof the damage est indicates that in 
addition for work done to correct the ins mistakes, there 
are some items including sale of a collector car, atty fees, 
excess interest rate, and a loan included--no totals are 
given for the excess interest or the loan--also claiming 
damages for inefficient labor which resulted in the job 
taking longer--not sure how this would have made the job 
cost other than the extra rental for dumpsters and 
scaffolding included separately in the estimate 
also documentation of "questionable invoicing" the ins 
allegedly did for items never delivered or items that have 
no explanation--clmnt looking for $12,099.18 including 
adding in a 21' contractors fee 
review of the engineers reports outlines various problems 
with the porches including the fact that they were secured 
to the home through stucco, which affects their structural 
soundness--expert hired by Rimar indicates that the porch 
problems could be repaired without significantly disrupting 
the rest of the porch--Rimar expert (Bonnett) saw no visible 
signs of structural distress, sagging or settlement of the 
front porch or the side porch--the other Rimar expert 
(Maloney) indicates no structural problems with th roof 
covering and that structural problems with the roof can be 
fixed without having to remove it 
appears the propane stove which caused the carbon monoxcide 
poisoning was installed by NU-Tech Services at Rimars 
direction, not by Rimar Contruction 













category : Activity 
supplemental answers to defendant 
From SUE-H to CHARLES-D on 10/16/07 at 14:11:16 
supplemental answers to defendant 

































Category : Activity 
Rimar's atty indicates we mischaracterized the counterclaims 
asserted--feels we unreasonably delayed our covg 
determination, placed our financial intrests ahead of 
Rimar's, by failing to engage in good faith settlement 
negotiations against Rimar, by intentionally interfering 
with Rimar's settlement negotiations and by failing to keep 
Rimar informed of it's covg investigation so Rimar could 
make informed decisions 




































Category : Activity 
Category : Plan of Action 
contingent liability 
From LISA-S to DAWN-S on oa/lS/07 at 10:01:14 
One has been requested but I don't recall seeing it come 
through yet. I can put a hold on it? 
CC:CHARLES-D 
Category : Activity 
HO Covg acknowledgment 
From SUE-H to CHARLES-O on Oa/16/07 at 10:02:18 
HO Covg acknowledgment 











Category : Coverage 
rcv voicemail from Dawn Siebe.rt at HO- -wanted to make sure 



































Category : Investigation 
reviewed amended complaint--appears pltffs added Ivan Rimar 
as an individual 
under para 10 it appears they are saying that the improperly 
const addition and porch has compromised the original 
structure in that it is buckling walls, breaking windows, 
causing the roof line to sag and other problems--this is new 
info 
clmnt is alleging that the improper workmanship has led to a 
diminution in value to the home and that parts of the home 
are unsafe to the point of being uninhabitable, loss of use 
and also lists other non-specific damages 
alleges that Kathy Donnelly became violently ill as a result 
of carbon monoxide poisoning due to improper installation of 
a propane stove 
also alleging the ins did not conform with the clmnt 
specifications for the construction and non-conformance to 
plans 













Category : Investigation 
rev copy of amended complaint-























Category : Investigation 
Category : Activity 
000028 
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Category : Activity 
spoke to Kristin--atty Chris Hansen has informed her that 
the pltffs have amended their complaint--includes naming the 




























Category : Supervision 
dec action???? 
From DAWN-S to CHARLES-D on 07/09/07 at 12:05:37 
I didn't know anything about this dec action filed in May. 
Please have Jim cc me on everything going forward. How did 
this come about? Dawn 
CC:WAYNE-U 














I category: Sys gen:Inbox-Pay OVer limit 
/ 
Check C File Response 
From TONY-B to CHARLES-D 
APPROVED APPROVED 
on 07/09/07 at 11:22:21 
I 


















Category: Sys gen:Inbox-Pay OVer limit 
C File check authorization request 














category : Activity 
--
--- -































Category: Sys gen:Inbox-Sent Message 
New Assignment - Superintendent 
From SYSTBMUSER to DAWN-S on 06/12/07 at 13:46:17 
This claim was changed to a major file. 
User manually marked this file as major. 


























Category : Acti vi ty . 





















Category : Investigation 






















OS/21/07 #001 I 
OS/21/07 































Category : Coverage 
Category : Activity 
spoke to Wayne--he agrees that a DJ sounds like a good idea 
as well and that we should proceed as such unless the depo's 
provide info to the contrary 













Category : Investigation 
informed by Kristin that~~t~h.eIY .. h.a.v.eilsliiiiiliil" 
t his file for May 30th-
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Category : Investigation 
Category : Activity 
Category : Activity 
spoke to wayne--apparently the atty on the main file has 
scheduled depositions for next week, April 23 & 24--Wayne 
feels that we need to get our own coverage atty involved on 
the claim--atty may not need to attend depots but if he does 
we need to get him up to speed quickly--recommends Jim Reed 
Category : Reserves 
reviewed file on diary--at this time the interrogatories on 
the companion file have not been received--a new atty was 
hired and that has slowed things down somewhat--until that 
is received and there is clarification as to whether a BI 
claim will be presented as well as a breakdown of the 
actual amount of property damage the plaintiff is alleging, 
it is difficult to post a meaningful rsv amount 
Reserve: CONTINGENT RSRV NO COV 
Gross Reserve: $5000 














Category : Investigation 
no interrogatories have been received--apparently our 
insured is firing his atty and the file will be taken over 
by atty Chris Hanson or one of his associates--we are going 




ANDERSON, JULIAN" HULL LLP 
A lTORNEYS AND COUNSELORS AT LAW 
Robert A. ADdcnon 
Brian K. Julian 
AlanK. Hull 
am. H. Hansen 
Phillip 1. CoUacr 
Michael P. Stefanic 
AmyG. White 




• Paine Hamblen 
lustin P. Aylsworth 
MarIe D. Sebastian 
Matthew O. Pappas 
Rachael M. O'Ber 
Davis F. VanderVelde 
Stephen L. Adams 
R.obctt A. Mills 
. 701 Front Avenue. Ste. '101: 
P.O.SoxE 
,Coeur d'Alene. Idaho· 83816·0328. 
May 1. 2007 
Re: Donnelly v. Rima, Construction 
Our File No. 792-83 
Dear Mr. Erbland: 
....• ---~ 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707·7426 
Telephone: (208)344-5800 
Facsimile: (208)344-.5.510 
e-mail: ajb@ajblaw com 
Web Site: www.ajblaw.com 
Wido AItan1I)Il Lice...t III l'nIcIice in 
Idaho, AZ.. co. NO. NV • OR, PA ad WA 
This letter confirms the scheduling of the mediation In above-entitled matter. The 
mediation is scheduled for:May 30, 2OQ7 at your office In Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. As you 
know, this firm and Brent Featherston represent Rlmar Construction. Dave and Kathy 
Donnelly are represented by Mike Schmidt and Bill Hyslop. It Is my intention to have the 
insurance adjuster attend by telephone. 
I appreciate your wUJlngness to assist the parties in this matter. 
CHH:dt 





Very truly yours, 
~H.H~ 











Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law 
113 S. 2nd Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Michael Schmit 
William Hyslop 
Lukins & Annis, P.S. 
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 102 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83814-2971 
May 22, 2007 
RECEIVED 
MAY 2,( 2007 
LUKINS & ANNIS, P.S: 
Re: Employers Mutual CasualtY Company v, Rimar Construction, Inc .. and 
David and Kathy Donnelly 
Dear Messrs Featherston and Schmit: 
Lau." E. Burri 
Jeffrey R. Ovtslenson 
David P. Claiborne 
D. Blalr Oark 
S. Bryce FarriS 
JanC. Gould 
DavId Hammcrquisl 
Charles L. HonsInger 
James P. Kaufman 
Jcmller Reid Mahoney 
Jamcs G. ReId 
Daniel V. Steenson 
wuuam F. Ringer!. of Counsel 
Allyn L. Sweeney of Counsel 
samuel Kaufman II Q21·1 D861 
This office is representing Employers Mutual Casualty Company relative to a declaratory 
judgment action that is being filed to resolve issues as to the obligation of EMC to pay damages 
pursuant to policies of insurance issued to Rimar Construction, Inc., as it relates to Rimar's dispute 
with David and Kathy Donnelly, In this action, Rimar Construction and Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly are 
named as Defendants. Enclosed you will find a copy of the Petition that has been forwarded to the 
Bonner County Court for filing, as well as copies of the Summonses that we are requesting be issued. 
We wanted to advise you of these matters in advance of the upcoming mediation. Once we receive 
the issued Summonses and filed Petition, we will contact your office to request acceptance of 
service, If you are not willing or authorized to accept service, please advise. 
Thank you for your attention to this matter. If you have any questions or concerns, please 
do not hesitate to contact me. 
DPC/krm 
Enclosure 
cc: Charles Doppler wi encl. 
Chris Hansen wi encl. 
Very truly yours, 
RINGERT ClARK CHARTERED 
David P. Claiborne 








Lukins & Annis, P.S. 
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 102 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814-2971 
June 4, 2007 
RECEIVED 
JUN 0 6 2007 
LUKINS & ANNlS. P .5. 
Re: Employers Mutual Casualty Company v. Rimar Construction. Inc .. and 
David and Kathy Donnelly 
Bonner County Case No. CV-2007-00885 
Dear Mr. Schmit: 
Laura E. Burri 
Jeflrey R. Chrlslenson 
DaVId P. Claiborne 
O.BIalrClark 
S. Bryce FIIrrIS 
Jon C. 00uId 
DaVId HammerqulSl 
Charles I... liOnSlnger 
James P. Kaufman 
Jennifer Reid Mahoney 
James 0. Reid 
Daniel V. Steenson 
WlDlam F. Ringen. of Counsel 
Allyn I... sweeney 0( Counsel 
samuel Kaurman (192 (·1086, 
Enclosed please find a Summons directed at David and Kathy Donnelly, together with a file-
stamped copy of the Petition for Declaratory Judgment filed in the above-referenced action. 
Additionally, please find an Acceptance of Service for Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly. Please 
execute the Acceptance of Service and return it to our office. If we do not receive the Acceptance 
within 10 days, we will assume you are not authorized to accept service and we will make 
arrangements for personal service upon Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me. 
DPC/krm 
Enclosures 
cc: Chris Hansen wI encls. 
Very truly yours, 
RINGERT ClARK CHARTERED 
David P. Oaiborne 
455 South Third Street • P.O. Box 2773 • Boise, Idaho 8370 I 
.. -' ........ :-~ ..... "-
#.t ",,' ~ • 
.. '"\.":', , " -~ . -




i • . 
• 
;f • 
'. -, . 
MICHAEL G. SCHMiEYi:{:ISB#<691 I 
. WlLLIAMD: HYSLopi.ISB#· 7141 
.LUiaNs&·ANNlS,P~S. ' 
,'2S0'Northwest Blvd., Ste. 102 
.~ 'Coeurd'Alcm~;ID 8j8l~29jl 
. . 
. . T~lephone: (208) 667·..()SJ 7 
Anomeys for ·Plaintiffs 
IN TIlE.'DISTIuCTCO.1JRT:·OF nmFIRST ruDICIAL.mlSmICT OF 11IE 
STATEQF IDAHO,iN ~FOJt"1HE.COUNTY;'OF·BONNER 
PA VID DONNELLY and.KA1l.fY 
PONNELL Y, Husband and Wife; 
Plaintiffs/Counterclaim :~,en~tS; .~. 
. vs .. 
,)UMAR CON.STRUCTION, "INC., Btt1ldaho 





SPECIAL VERI>ICr Wrm: REGARD 
TOC4lMS·.Of pLAINTIFFS AND 
OE~&.NT·~ 
CONStRUm;ION, .INC • 
. . .'c. 
RULE.,S4(b).eERTIFICA TE 
this·may:t~r was tr.ied.befote .tjury-commencing on June ,23, ~OO8 and the jury baying 
, ,. to. . .. • • 
heard the eviden~ and havjpg tep4eted. a verdict on July 9, 2Q.08, iQ)' way of Special Verdict, 
IT IS HEREBY oRDaRED.~'A.DJtJDGED AND DECri'EaD:thatjudgment be entered as , 
follows: 
~'~;,' ... ~. _" : < :;, -t,. ·n..lWitlu~g~d~·the DoMellys' claim of breach of"con~ against Rimar , . . '. ~ . 
:--. • '.' • '. bms.~iion,jInc., the jUry found a, breach of contract, .but ,awarded Zero (so.ooi dollars 
it· " 
' .. 
• t, .. : ... :. 
~ . . ~ 
2. That with respect to the.:DoMeUys' chum of express warranty against Rimar 
Coilstr.ucliOn, ibt¢.; th(l Jur>.: did not find any suchbreacb, aIid therefore Judgment is 
~dCi:eft:.ii1:fa~otlot.Rimat:CQnStruction, Inc. 
3. That Wit~l;Il:'s~i'to·the Donnellys' claim of breach ofimpl~ed w~ty Qfworkmansbip, ..., .. 
the Jury (ound>such _breach and awarded the sum ofS126~61 i.SS, ~d Judgment is 
- 1 -
;. 
AMENDBD'JUl:,)(3MENTkit:~;: ~4(b) CERTIFICATE 
L:\dIdonneIl02S);z9\OOOOJ\P.~n .. \Jud~~~~ ~909·MGS.SCN,dacx : r • 
. 
~, 
'-'-"-_:"-' ___ ...:1-- _ # 
, .... 
• ....0.- __ ,. " •. ' -'- . :2 7 5 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
MICHAEL E. RAMSDEN' 
MARC A. LYONS· 
DOUGLAS S. MARFICE' 
MICHAEL A. EALY" 
TERRANCE R. HARRIS 
APRIL M. LINSCOTT 
RUDY j. VERSCHOOR 
JENNIFER L. DAHLSTROM" 
CHRISTOPHER D. GABBER'T 
V I RGINIA McNULTY ROBINSON 
WILLIAM F. BOYD, OF COUNSEL 
VIA FACSIMILIE ONLY 
Brent C. Featherston 
113 S. 2nd Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Fax: (208) 263-0400 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1336 
COEUR D' ALENE, lD 83816-1336 
TELEPHONE: (208) 664-5818 
FACSIMILE: (208) 664-5884 
E-MAIL: firm@ramsdenlyons.com 
WEBSITE: www.r.msd~nIyons.com 
October 1, 2009 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
421 W. Riverside, Ste 900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
Fax: (509) 625-1909 
STREET ADDRESS: 
700 NORTHWEST BLVD 
COEUR D'ALENE, ID 83814 
ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
• LICENSED IN WASHINGTON 
James G. Reid 
455 S. 3rd Street 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Fax: (208) 342-4657 
Re: EMCC v. Rimar Construction Inc. et aI., Bonner CV-07-00885 
Donnelly v. Rimar Construction et aI., Bonner CV-06-00445 
Gentlemen: 
This firm has been retained by David and Kathy Donnelly with regard to the above-
referenced matters. Following entry of judgment against Rimar Construction on August 14, 
2008, and on March 20, 2009, the Donnellys have accrued interest at the applicable statutory 
rates as follows: 
Judgment Amount $128,61l.55 $431,402.55 $440,594.97 
Interest on Judgment 0.07625 0.07625 0.05625 
InterestlYr $9,806.63 $32,894.44 $24,783.47 
DaysNr 365 365 365 
Per Day Rate $26.87 $90.12 $67.90 
Days 218 102 92 412 
Total Interest $5,857.11 $9,192.42 $6,246.79 $21,296.32 
Total with Interest $134,468.66 $440,594.97 $446,841.76 
Fees and Costs $296,933.89 
Total March 20, 2009 $431,402.55 
Therefore, as of October 1, 2009, the Donnellys are owed a total of $446,841.76 including 
accrued interest. Presently, interest on the judgment continues to accrue at $67.90 per day. 
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EXHIBIT K 
Brent C. Featherston 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
James G. Reid 
October 1, 2009 
Page 2 
Under the circumstances, it is probable that, at a minimum, EMCC has a duty to 
indemnify Rimar Construction under the Supplementary Payments provision of the policy. 
This conclusion is supported by the holding in Mutual of Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 
1009,772 P.2d 216 (1989). While the case involved interpretation ofa Homeowner's policy 
as opposed to a CGL policy, its on-point regarding the interpretation and application of a 
supplementary payment provision like that found in the EMCC CGL policy. Therefore, at a 
minimum, EMCC has a duty to pay a significant portion of the Donnelly judgment including 
interest accrued to date. 
At this time, I understand EMCC has offered or communicated that it would offer 
$150,000.00 toward settlement. This offer is too low considering that EMCC and Rimar 
Construction forced the matter to trial resulting in the Donnellys incurring significant 
attorney fees and costs to prosecute the underlying case. EMCC's transparent strategy of 
offering no money at mediation and leaving its insured to defend through trial with the intent 
to fall back on a declaratory action to get off the loss will likely not be lost on the Court and 
the Mutual of Enumclaw decision provides authority for the Court to hold EMCC responsible 
to pay a significant portion of the Donnelly judgment, including accrued interest. 
In short, EMCC and Rimar Construction put the Donnellys to their proof and the 
Donnellys prevailed. EMCC can hardly be surprised that the Donnellys now want what they 
are owed. Therefore, I make demand on behalf of the Donnellys that EMCC and/or Rimar 
Construction immediately satisfy the judgment including accrued interest in the amount of 
$446,841.76. Otherwise, the Donnellys will begin proceedings to execute on the judgment 
against Rimar Construction. 
Thank you for your attention to these matters. I look forward to hearing from you 
shortly. 
MAE:dr 




RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DA VID DONNELLY and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
R1MAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
DefendantiCounterclaimant. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Case No. CV -06-00445 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
TO THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
GREETINGS: 
WHEREAS on the 20th day of March, 2009, plaintiff recovered an initial Judgment on 
Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. in 
the initial amount of $128,611.55 plus interest at the legal rate (7.625%) as entered on August 
14,2008, and final Amended Judgment on Special Verdict \Vith Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs 
and Defendant Rimar Construction Inc. in the amended amount of $425,545.44 to accrue 
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interest at the legal rate (7.625% to July 1, 2009 and 5.625% after July 1, 2009) as entered on 
March 20, 2009 in the District Court of the State of Idaho, County of Bonner, against the 
defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc., for the total sum of$449,625.66, plus interest accrued at the 
legal rate from entry of the initial judgment on August 14,2008 up and until November 10, 2009 
as follows: 
Judgment Amount $128,611.55 $431,402.55 $440,594.97 
Interest on 
Judgment 0.07625 0.07625 0.05625 
InterestlYr $9,806.63 $32,894.44 $24,783.47 
DaysIYr 365 365 365 
Per Day Rate $26.87 $90.12 $67.90 
Days 218 102 133 
$24,080.2 
Total Interest $5,857.11 $9,192.42 $9,030.69 2 
Total with Interest ~134,468.66 $440,594.97 $449,625.66 
Fees and Costs $296,933.89 
Total March 20, 
2009 $431,402.55 
Note: Rate of Interest on Money Judgments was 7.625% effective July 1,2008 
Rate of Interest on Money Judgments was 5.625% effective July 1, 2009 
AND, WHEREAS, that fmal Amended Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to 
Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction Inc. was duly filed in the Clerk's office 
of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Bonner, on March 20, 2009 and that Judgment was duly recorded as a judgment lien with the 
Bonner County Recorder on March 30, 2009; 
NOW, you, the Sheriff of Bonner County, are hereby required to satisfy said Judgment, 
with the accrued interest as aforesaid, out of the personal property of the defendant Rimar 
Construction, Inc., the judgment debtor, or if sufficient property of said debtor cannot be found, 
then out of the real property in Bonner County belonging to said judgment debtor on the date of 
WRIT OF EXECUTION - 2 279 
service of this writ, and make return of this writ within sixty (60) days after the receipt,hereof, 
with what you have done endorsed thereon. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this n day of ~I ooem bee 2009. 
Marie Scott, Clerk 
B 
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State of IDAHO 
Bonner County Sheriff's Office 
Civil Division 
4001 N. Boyer Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Defendant Disposition: 
Rimar Construction 
1707 Culvers Dr; PO Box 6 Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Garnishee Disposit,ion: SRU Served, returned unsatisfied 
Mountain West Bank 
201 E Superior St Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Served on: 13th day'of November, 2009 
Served to: Cassidie Spinney 
201 E Superior St 
Bank of America 
by Peasha, J 
Manager 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
402 N 2nd Ave Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Served on: 13th day of November, 2009 by Peasha, J 
Served to: Lynn Jennings Assistant Manager 
402 N 2nd Ave Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Panhandle State Bank 
414 Church St Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Served on: 13th day of November, 2009 by Peasha, J 
Served to: Kelly Glenn 
414 Church St Sandpoint, ID 
Plaintiff Disposition: 
David Michael Donnelly 
3662 Cocolalla Loop Road Cocolalla, ID 83813 
Attorney Disposition: 
Michael A Ealy Atty 
PO Box 1336 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Manager 
83864 
Process Number: C09-01949 Court Number: CV06-44S 
I, Daryl D Wheeler, Sheriff of Bonner County Sheriff's Office do hereby certify 
that I received the foregoing Writ of Execution on the 12th day of November, 
2009. 















BONNER COUNTY SHERIFF • Ci~il Account· Sandpoint, Idaho 83864 
Check Number: 26177 
Process Number: C09-01949 
PAYEE: David Michael Donnelly 
3662 Cocolalla Loop Road 




. . .. . ;;~.~~:Y · ·> 26177 
92~360/12317o'1 , . . 
DAlE AMOUNT 
~~~E HuNDRED SIXTY NINE and 10/100*****************12/ 
David Michael Donnelly tl~ . . .------i~~~~~~#,~~~~~~~ 
TOmE 3662 Cocolalla Loop Roa~ 
ORDER OF Cocolalla, . ID 8381~ . 
. . . 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d' Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
AMENDED ANSWER AND 
COUNTERCLAIM 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, husband and wife, (hereinafter 
"Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby amends their Answer as 
follows: 
I. ANSWER 
1. Defendants hereby deny each, every, and all allegations and representations set 
forth in Plaintiffs Petition unless specifically admitted herein. 
2. In answer to Paragraphs 1,2,5,6, 13, 14 andl6 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants 
are without sufficient infonnation to fonn a belief as to the truth of the matters alleged therein 
and therefore deny the same. 
AMENDED ANSWER AND COUNTERCLAIM - J 
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3. In answer to Paragraphs 3, 4 and 8 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit the 
same. 
4. In answer to Paragraph 7, of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that a 
contract was entered into, and that the contract speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder 
of said Paragraph. 
5. In answer to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that Rimar 
performed work on the Donnelly Residence, and deny the remainder of said Paragraph. 
6. In answer to Paragraphs 10. 11 and 12 of Plaintiff s Petition, Defendants admit 
only that Plaintiffs Verified Petition in Bonner County Case No. CV-06-00445 (and any 
subsequent amendments thereto) speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder of said 
Paragraphs. 
7. In answer to Paragraphs 15, 17, 18, 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 and 28 of 
Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants deny the same. 
II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
8. Defendants incorporate as affirmative defenses the allegations contained In 
Paragraphs 1-7, above. 
9. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
10. Plaintiffs claims are barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver, laches, unclean 
hands, and in pari delicto. 
11. Plaintiffs claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of estoppel. 
12. Plaintiff s claims are barred due to failure of a condition precedent. 
13. Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party. 
14. The losses and claims asserted by the Defendants against Rimar Construction Inc. 
and Ivan Rimar are not excluded from coverage ofEMC's policy. 
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III. COUNTERCLAIM 
15. At times material hereto, the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company 
("EMC"), is and was an Iowa corporation authorized to conduct the business of selling 
insurance, including commercial general liability insurance, in the State ofIdaho. 
16. At times material hereto, the Defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI") is and 
was an Idaho corporation that was engaged in the business of providing general contracting 
services in the State of Idaho. 
17. At times material hereto, the Defendants, David and Kathy Donnelly 
("Donnelly"), hired RCI to provide general contracting services for improvements to their real 
property located in Bonner County, State of Idaho. 
18. On or about September 14, 2004, EMC sold and RCI purchased commercial 
general liability policy no. 2D 1-32-95-05 ("CGL Policy") with the effective coverage dates 
identified as October 1,2004, up and through October 1,2005. 
19. On or about March 7, 2006, the Donnellys filed suit against RCI for claims 
arising out of and related to RCI undertaking to provide general contracting services for certain 
improvements to the Donnelly property and arising during the effective coverage dates in EMC 
CGL Policy in Bonner County Case Number CV -06-00445 (herein "Underlying Litigation"). 
The Underlying Litigation was litigated through trial resulting in a jury verdict in Donnelly's 
favor as against RCI on or about July 9, 2008. 
20. On or about August 14, 2008, in the Underlying Litigation a Judgment On 
Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. 
("Initial Judgment") was entered in the amount of $128,611.55 to accrue interest at the legal rate 
against RCI in favor of Donnelly. Later, on March 20, 2009, in the Underlying Litigation an 
Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant 
Rimar Construction, Inc. / Rule 54(b) Certificate ("Amended Judgment") was entered in the total 
amount of $425,545.44 including an award of the Donnellys' attorney's fees in the amount of 
$277,062.00 and costs in the amount of$19,871.89. 
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21. On or about March 30, 2009, the Amended Judgment was properly recorded in 
Bonner County, State ofIdaho, as record instrument #769177. 
22. Pursuant to its policy of insurance, EMC defended RCI through the trial in the 
Underlying Litigation. Having undertaken the defense of its insured, EMC knew and recognized 
the Donnellys as claimants against RCI's commercial general liability policy. In addition, RCI 
knew and/or expected that the Donnellys would incur costs and attorney's fees to prosecute its 
claim against RCI. 
23. On or about May 24, 2007, EMC initiated tltis action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that, under the EMC CGL Policy, it has no contractual duty to pay, in whole or in part, 
any of the Donnellys' then claims as against RCI. On or about December 12, 2007, this action 
was stayed pending the outcome of the Underlying Litigation. The stay in this action was later 
lifted on or about July 17,2009. 
... 24. Following a trial and entry of a jury verdict in the Underlying Litigation, the 
~..:. Donnellys are judgment creditors of RCI and have a claim, right or interest including a judgment 
.'f:. lien right, in whole or in part, to the proceeds or policy benefits from the EMC CGL Policy due 
and owing to RCI in whole or partial satisfaction of the Donnellys' judgment against ReI. 
25. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1202, the Donnellys are persons interested under 
the EMC CGL Policy whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the policy and, 
therefore, request a construction of the EMC CGL Policy to obtain a declaration of their rights, 
status or other legal relations under the policy. In particular, the Donnellys seek a declaration 
that EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in part, for the 
Donnelly judgment including, but not limited to, post-judgment interest accrued to date on the 
entire judgment. 
26. To date, neither EMC nor RCI has made any payment to Donnelly or to the Court 
in effort to satisfy the Donnelly judgment in whole or in part and the Donnelly judgment remains 
unsatisfied. 
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IV. DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 
27. Defendants request a jury trial of all matters so triable. 
IV. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
Wherefore, Defendants David Donnelly and Kathy Donnelly demand: 
1. That Plaintiffs Petition be dismissed in its entirety and that it take nothing 
thereby; and 
2. That the Defendant Donnelly have declaratory judgment finding that under the 
EMC CGL Policy, EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in part, 
the Donnelly judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation and including post-judgment interest 
on the entire judgment amount; and 
3. That the Defendant Donnelly be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs as 
.'t:,' incurred herein pursuant to I.e. §§ 10-1201 et seq.; 12-120 and 12-121; and 41-1839; and 
4. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this :J-)-day of December, 2009. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
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DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife; and IVAN 
RIMAR, an individual; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007-00885 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, by and through its 
attorneys of record, Ringert Law Chartered, and submits this memorandum in OPPOSITION to 
Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly's Motion for Summary Judgment, which was filed on or 
about December 18,2009. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
289 
I. INTRODUCTION. 
Pending before the Court is Plaintiff s _Motion for Summary Judgment, which is opposed by 
Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, but which is not opposed by Plaintiffs insureds, Rimar 
Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar. Plaintiffs argue that there is no basis for coverage under a policy 
of insurance written by Plaintiff to cover claims made by Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly 
against Plaintiff s insureds, Rimar Construction, Inc. and Ivan Rimar. Plaintiff s insureds agree there 
is no coverage. Defendants David and Kathy Donnely dispute the same, and have advanced their 
own motion for summary judgment, arguing the claims are covered by the insurance policy. For the 
reasons argued herein, the Court should conclude there is no coverage and enter summary judgment 
on all issues in favor of Plaintiff. 
II. RELEVANT AND MATERIAL FACTS. 
Plaintiff explained in its Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment (filed November 12,2009) the relevant and material facts, which are really not in dispute. 
Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly have added additional facts in support of their motion, with 
which Plaintiff does not quarrel- however, many of the facts raised are not germane to the instant 
motion and have no materiality with respect to disposition (e.g., facts concerning mediation in the 
underlying litigation, claim notes made by Plaintiffs employees, and collection efforts post-
judgment in the underlying litigation). Plaintiffs contend the following represent the facts that are 
not in dispute, and which are material to resolution of the pending motions. 
The parties to this action include Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company (herein 
"EMC" or "Plaintiff'), Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. (herein "RCI"), Defendant Ivan Rimar 
(herein "Ivan"), and Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly (herein "Donnelly"). Statement of Facts 
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A. The Applicable Insurance Policy. 
On September 14, 2004, EMC and RCI entered in to an agreement of insurance known as 
a Commercial General Liability policy, identified as Policy No. 2Dl-32-95-05, whereunder EMC 
was the insurer and RCI was the insured (herein "the Applicable Policy"). Id., at ~ 2. The effective 
dates of coverage under the Applicable Policy began October 1,2004 and ended October 1, 2005. 
/d., at ~ 3. The coverage limits under the Applicable Policy are $1,000,000 per occurrence. Id., at 
B. The Underlying Litigation. 
Relevant to this action is certain underlying litigation between Donnelly, as Plaintiff, and RCI 
and Ivan, as Defendants, in Case No. CV -06-00445 (Bonner County, Idaho), the proceedings of 
which were conducted before this Court (herein "the Underlying Litigation"). Id., at ~ 5. The 
Underlying Litigation was commenced on March 7,2006. Id., at ~ 6. In the Underlying Litigation, 
Donnelly alleged damages were owed to it from RCI and Ivan based upon remodeling construction 
work performed on the Donnelly home in 2005. Id., at ~ 7. The legal theories ofliability alleged 
by Donnelly included breach of contract, misrepresentation, fraud, nondisclosure, professional 
malpractice, negligence, breach of warranties , violation ofthe Idaho Consumer Protection Act, quiet 
title, and for a declaratory judgment. Id., at ~ 8. 
Part of Donnelly's claim was one allegation that bodily injuries had been suffered by reason 
of carbon monoxide poisoning from the improper installation of a propane stove. Id., at ~ 9. Before 
trial in the Underlying Litigation, the Court ruled that Donnelly's claim regarding bodily injuries (i.e. 
the carbon monoxide poisoning) could not be presented to the jury at triat Id., at ~ 10. 
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At trial in the Underlying Litigation, the Court instructed the jury on applicable law, 
including the following notable instructions -
• That Donnelly's claim that RCI failed to perfonn in a workmanlike manner is a claim 
implied by operation of law; and 
• That a necessary element of proof of the implied warranty claim included proof 
of the existence of a contract between ReI and Donnelly. 
Id., at ~ 11 (emphasis added). The trial in the Underlying Litigation concluded with entry by the jury 
of a Special Verdict on July 9,2008. Id., at ~ 12. Based on the Special Verdict, it was detennined 
that RCI breached its contract with Donnelly, including breach of the implied warranty of 
workmanship, and also violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Id., at, 13. Based on the 
Special Verdict, it was detennined that RCI and Ivan did not breach any warranties, did not commit 
fraud, and did not engage in professional negligence. Id., at ~ 14. The jury awarded Donnelly the 
sum of$126,611.55 for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship and an additional $2,000.00 
for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Id., at, 15. 
As a result of the foregoing, a judgment was entered on August 14,2008 requiring RCI to 
pay the sum of $128,611.55 to Donnelly for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship 
($126,611.55) and for violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ($2,000.00). Id., at ~ 16. 
Post-verdict, the Court in the Underlying Litigation awarded to Donnelly costs as a matter of right, 
and attorney fees, and in so holding did so on the basis that -
• $126,611.55 in damages accounted for compensation to Donnelly for construction 
defects on their home, and an additional $2,000.00 for Consumer Protection Act 
violations; 
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• The basic issue litigated in the Underlying Litigation was whether or not the 
construction was completed in a workmanlike manner; 
• Donnelly prevailed by proving RCI failed to substantially perform the work it 
contracted to perform; 
• The contract between Donnelly and RCI constituted a commercial transaction; 
• The construction contract was breached by RCI by not completing the work it 
contracted to perform in accordance with its agreement with Donnelly, or pursuant 
to sound construction practices in a workmanlike manner; and 
• The gravamen of the action involved construction defects. 
Id., at, 17 (emphasis added). An Amended Judgment was consequently entered on March 20, 2009 
awarding Donnelly an additional $277,062.00 for attorney fees and $19,871.89 for court costs as a 
result of a contract-based commercial transaction, for a total recovery by Donnelly of$425,545.44. 
Id., at, 18. 
C. The Declaratory Judgment Action. 
In the Underlying Litigation, EMC provided a defense against the suit, throughout its entirety, 
under reservation of rights, which was reflected in a letter to RCI on September 5, 2006 and in a 
letter to Ivan on September 7, 2007. Id., at, 19. On May 24, 2007, EMC instituted this action 
(herein "the Declaratory Judgment Action"). Id., at, 20. EMC seeks a declaratory judgment from 
the Court holding that under the Applicable Policy EMC has no duty or responsibility to pay all, or 
any portion, of the damages then claimed by, now awarded to, Donnelly relative to the Underlying 
Litigation. Id., at, 21. In this Declaratory Judgment Action, RCI originally made a counterclaim 
against EMC alleging bad faith, violation of the Consumer Protection Act and breach of contract. 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5 
293 
!d., at ~ 22. 
On December 12, 2007, the Court entered an order staying the Declaratory Judgment Action 
until such time as the Underlying Litigation was concluded. Id., at ~ 23. Once the Underlying 
Litigation was concluded, this Court lifted its stay of the Declaratory Judgment Action, which was 
effective on July 17, 2009. Id., at ~ 24. Thereafter, a Settlement Agreement was entered into 
between EMC, RCI and Ivan, the terms of which effectuate the following-
• That EMC has no duty, responsibility or legal liability to satisfy the judgments 
entered in the Underlying Litigation, and has no duty to indemnify RCI from the 
same; 
• That RCI and Ivan agree that their counterclaims alleged in the Declaratory Judgment 
Action ought to be dismissed with prejudice; 
• That RCI and Ivan release and discharge EMC for and from and all liability 
whatsoever that EMC may have to RCI or Ivan in relation to the Underlying 
Litigation and the Declaratory Judgment Action; 
• That RCI and Ivan do not contest the Declaratory Judgment Action and they further 
admit all of the allegations made by EMC in the Declaratory Judgment Action. 
Id., at ~ 25. 
Now pending before the Court is the question of whether, given the above facts and 
circumstances, and through application of controlling law, EMC has a duty to pay any portion ofthe 
judgment obtained by Donnelly in the Underlying Litigation. Id., at ~ 26. 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
Summary judgment is governed by Rule 56, IDAHO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. The 
standard of review for a summary judgment motion, as articulated by the Idaho Supreme Court, is 
as follows-
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law . 
. .. [The] Court should liberally construe all facts in favor ofthe nonmoving party and 
draw all reasonable inferences from the facts in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Summary judgment must be denied if reasonable persons could reach differing 
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented. If the 
moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that 
no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party 
to present evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact ... 
[t ]he nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue 
of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue. 
Willie v. Board of Trustees, 138 Idaho 131, 133 (2002) (internal citations omitted). 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
A. The pertinent provisions of the Applicable Policy. 
There appears to be no dispute between the parties that the following are the relevant and 
material provisions of the Applicable Policy: 
We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages 
because of "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies.! 
This insurance applies to "bodily injury" and "property damage" only if: 
(1) The "bodily injury" or property damage" is caused by an "occurrence" that 
takes place in the "coverage territory"; [and] 
(2) The "bodily injury" or "property damage" occurs during the policy period[.]2 
The Applicable Policy defines as bodily injury as follows: 
ISee Section I. La. of the Applicable Policy. 
2See Section I. Lb. of the Applicable Policy. 
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"Bodily injury" means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a person, 
including death resulting from any of these at any time.3 
The Applicable Policy defines property damage as follows: 
"Property damage" means: 
a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use of that 
property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the 
physical injury that caused it; or 
b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All such loss 
of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the "occurrence" that caused 
it.4 
The Applicable Policy defines an occurrence as follows: 
"Occurrence" means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions. 5 
The Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion of the Applicable Policy provides as follows: 
This insurance does not apply to: 
"Bodily injury" or "property damage" expected or intended from the standpoint of 
the insured. This exclusion does not apply to "bodily injury" resulting from the use 
of reasonable force to protect persons or property. 6 
The Contractual Liability Exclusion of the Applicable Policy provides as follows: 
This insurance does not apply to: 
"Bodily injury or "property damage" for which the insured is obligated to pay 
damages by reason of the assumption of liability in a contract or agreement. This 
exclusion does not apply to liability for damages: 
3See Section V.3. of the Applicable Policy. 
4See Section V.l7. of the Applicable Policy. 
5See Section V.l3. of the Applicable Policy. 
6See Section I.2.a. of the Applicable Policy. 
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(1) That the insured would have in the absence of the contract or agreement [ . r 
Additionally, the Applicable Policy contains a Supplementary Payments Provision which provides 
as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS -COVERAGES A AND B 
1. We will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate or settle, or any "suit" 
against an insured we defend: 
a. All expenses we incur. 
e. All costs taxed against the insured in the "suit."s 
Relative thereto, the Applicable Policy defines "suit" as "a civil proceeding in which damages 
because of 'bodily injury', 'property damage' or 'personal and advertising injury' to which this 
insurance applies are alleged.9 
B. Damages awarded in the Underlying Litigation for breach of the implied warranty 
of workmanship are not covered under the Applicable Policy. 
Donnelly contends that all the damages awarded in the Underlying Litigation for breach of 
the implied warranty of workmanship are property damages, for which coverage is afforded under 
the Applicable Policy. This argument lacks merit for two reasons. 
First, even assuming these damages are included within the coverage portions of the 
Applicable Policy, coverage fails because of application of the contractual liability exclusion. As 
pointed out in Plaintiff s Memorandum in Support ofPlaintifJ's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed 
November 12, 2009), the contractual liability exclusion applies to the implied warranty of 
workmanship claims for the simple reason that those damages could not even have been awarded 
7See Section 1.2.b. of the Applicable Policy. 
sSee Section I.Supp. Pmt. of the Applicable Policy. 
QSee Section V.l8. of the Applicable Policy. 
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by the jury in the Underlying Litigation without first determining that a contract existed between 
Donnelly and RCI. That is, but for the existence of a contract, no damages could have been awarded 
in the Underlying Litigation for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship. A simple review 
of the jury instructions, and the special verdict form itself, reveal this reality. Moreover, the fact that 
damages were allowed based on the economic nature of Donnelly's claims in the Underlying 
Litigation reveals that the claims were contract-based as no recovery could have been had if the 
claims were tort-based. This Court's decision and reasoning relative to the taxation of attorney fees 
in the Underlying Litigation further exemplifies an understanding that the damages were based on 
a contract claim. The Applicable Policy does not cover claims based on contract - plain and simple. 
Therefore, as a matter oflaw, there is no coverage for the damages awarded based on the implied 
warranty of workmanship. 
Second, even ifthe contractual liability exclusion is inapplicable, summary judgment in favor 
of Donnelly is not proper at this point because a trial will be necessary to determine what, if any, 
portion of the alleged "property damage" is covered by the Applicable Policy. Unfortunately, the 
jury verdict in the Underlying Litigation does not provide any explanation as to the damages 
awarded. Several categories of damages claimed by Donnelly in the Underlying Litigation would 
not be covered under the Applicable Policy because ofthe policy's definition of"property damage," 
and because of other policy exclusions. 
For instance, the Expected or Intended Injury ExclusionlO provides that there is no coverage 
for any property damage that is expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured. Under the 
IOThis exclusion provides that "[tJThis insurance does not apply to: ... "property damage" expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the insured. This exclusion does not apply to "bodily injury" resulting from the use 
of reasonable force to protect persons or property." See Section 1.2.a. of Applicable Policy. 
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policy, an employee is an insured. As such, property damage that is expected or intended from the 
standpoint of the insured's employees is excluded from coverage. There were facts in the 
Underlying Litigation demonstrating that ReI's employees might have expected Donnelly's injury 
to occur. 
Also, the Damage to Your Work Exclusion!! provides that there is no coverage for any 
property damage to the insured's work that arises out of, in whole or in part, the work ofthe insured, 
provided said work is included within the products-completed operations hazard. This exclusion 
does not apply to work performed on the insured's behalf by a subcontractor. In essence, this 
exclusion provides that there is no coverage for property damage to any work actually performed by 
the insured after the completion of operations, but that there is coverage for any property damage to 
any work performed by a subcontractor after the completion of operations. Donnelly's claims in the 
Underlying Litigation that they were due damages to repair or replace defective work performed by 
ReI. The actual work of ReI is not covered under the Applicable Policy, only the work of its 
subcontractors or resultant damage to other property that occurs as a result of ReI' s defective work. 
If, for example, it was claimed that ReI defectively built a patio and it must be replaced, the 
Applicable Policy would not cover damages assessed the replace the patio. The claims of Donnelly 
in the Underlying Litigation clearly reveal they asked the jury to award them damages to 
repair/replace ReI's actual work - a type of damage clearly not covered by the policy. 
Because of these circumstances, a trial in this action will be necessary to determine whether 
!!This exclusion provides that "[t]his insurance does not apply to: ... "Property damage" to "your work" 
arising out of it or any part of it and included in the "products-completed operations hazard", This exclusion does 
not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was performed on your behulfby a 
subcontractoL" See Section I.2.m. of Applicable Policy, 
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the damages legally recovered by Donnelly are actually subject to coverage. 
C. Damages awarded for violation of the Consumer ProtectiowAct were statutory 
damages, not property damage. 
Donnelly contends that the jury award of $2,000 represents an award of further property 
damages by the jury. This is an incorrect interpretation. The $2,000 award does not represent 
economic damages, property damages, or bodily injury - rather, it represents a statutory damage, or 
penalty. This award is not "property damage" as that term is defined by the Applicable Policy, and 
therefore there is no coverage. Moreover, as explained in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (filed November 12,2009), the $2,000 statutory award 
is not covered because the that damage was expected or intended from the standpoint ofthe insured. 
For Donnelly to prevail on this its claim of violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, it had 
to establish that RCI knowingly violated the provisions of the Act. This means that RCI would 
reasonably have expected damage to occur ifit violated the Consumer Protection Act. There is no 
basis of coverage for the statutory penalty of $2,000. 
D. The Applicable Policy does not cover payment of attorney fees awarded against an 
insured resultingfrom ajudgment against the insured based solely upon claims not 
covered by the Applicable Policy, and where the insurer's defense of the insured was 
under a reservation of rights. 
EMC previously advised the Court of persuasive reasons why it has no obligation to pay the 
costs, attorneys fees and accrued post-judgment interest awarded in the Underlying Litigation. Those 
points were set forth and briefed in Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment (filed November 12,2009). Of important note is the fact that the express terms 
of the Applicable Policy vary from the language interpreted by the Court in Mutual of Enumclaw v. 
Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009 (1989). The Applicable Policy indicated that payment of costs, attorney fees 
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and interest is a payment supplemental to other payments already provided or obligated to provide 
because of coverage being afforded to a claim. In Harvey, the covera2e itself was supplemental -
not the payment. This is a crucial distinction because the Harvey Court made it a point to explain 
that "[tlhe results in the cases depend 'upon the lan2ua2e employed by the parties in their 
contract[.1 '" Id. at 1 012 (emphasis added). Under the Applicable Policy, because no other coverage 
is provided, there is no supplemental coverage obligation oOn the part ofEMC to pay costs, attorney 
fees and interest. 
E. Donnelly's request for attorney fees is premature. 
Included within Donnelly's motion is a request for attorney fees incurred in this action based 
on IDAHO CODE § 41-1839. This request is premature in that it is made before entry of judgment. 
If judgment is entered in Donnelly's favor, it can then petition for fees and provide supporting 
authority. At this point, there is no need to brief this issue. The premature request for attorney fees 
ought to be denied. 
v. CONCLUSION. 
For the above and foregoing reasons, and for those reasons set forth in Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motionfor Summary Judgment (filed November 12,2009), 
Defendant David and Kathy Donnelly's Motion for Summary Judgment ought to be DENIED. 
DATED this 5th dayofJanuary, 2010. 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY. an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
RlMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife, 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-0088S 
MEMORANDUM IN REPLY TO 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of 
recordt and submit dlis memorandum in reply to Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant Donnelly's Motion For SummalY Judgment. The Donnellys stand on their prior 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and address the Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition herein. 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
A. Damaees for Breach of the Implied Warranty of Workmanship were for 
"Property Damage" tbat ReI is Legally Obligated to Pay. 
EMe argues that even if damages for breach of the implied warranty of workmanship 
were cllroperty damage" as defined by the policy, they are excluded by the contractual liability 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
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exclusion and/or a genuine issue of fact is created, preventing summaI}' judgment. The jUly 
awarded a specific sum of $126,611.55 for breach of the implied walTanty; not breach of 
contract. However, the damages were never further itemized or characterized by the jUlY. EMC 
nevet1heless asks the COU11 to characterize the damages as "conttllctllal" in order to exclude them 
from coverage on the gro'unds that "[t]he Applicable Policy does not cover claims based on 
contract-plain and simple." (pla.'s Memo. In Opp. p. 10). 
Since insurance policies are contracts of adhesion, they are subject to cer."tain special 
mles of constmction. Arregon v. Falmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459, 461, 180 PJd 
498) 500 (2008) (citation omitted.) Specifically. any policy provision that seeks to exclude 
coverage must be strictly construed in favor of the insured, Id, (citation omitted). Therefore, 
the EMC policy must necessarily have clear and precise language to restrict the scope of its 
coverage to expressly exclude damages for breach of the implied Warlllnty. Id. 
In this case, the EMC policy doesn't specifically exclude damages for breach of the 
implied walTanty of workmanship, Insurers, like EMC, are sophisticated enough to write 
unambiguous exclusionary language into their contracts of adhesion and they aloe 
sophisticated enough to write exclusions specifically addressing an insured's potential breach 
of the implied walTanty of workmanship. Since there is no specific exclusion that applies to 
the damages awarded for breacb of the implied warranty of workmanShip, the policy should 
be strictly construed in favor of Donnelly (and ReI) for coverage because the EMC policy 
fails to expressly exclude the damages for breach of the implied wan'anty from its scope of 
coverage. 
EMC's general argument appears to be that anytime a general contractor, like RCI, 
has a contract with an owner, like Donnelly, that its policy would always exclude coverage 
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based on the fact of privity created by the general contractor/owner contract. EMe's 
argument apparently rests on an application of the contractual liability exclusion as follows: 
"This insurance does not apply to: '[b]odily injtuy' and 'property damage' for which the 
insured is obligated to pay damages [Le. Donnelly judgment] by reason of assumption of 
liability in a contract or agreement [i.e. Donnelly/RCI contract.]." This superficial 
application of the exclusion would effectively render the policy and its stated coverage to be 
illusory because thel'e is almost always an express contract, if not implied in fact or implied 
at law, between a general contractor and owner. 
In this case, EMe ignores or reads out the limiting language found in the exclusion 
which applies as follows: "[t]his exclusion [i.e. the prior exclusionary sentence] does not 
apply to liability for damages [i.e, Donnelly judgment]: (1) That the insured [RCl] would 
have in the absence of the contract 01' agreement [Donnelly/RCI contract]".," This limiting 
language is obviously intended to limit the scope of the exclusion. It doesn't make sense to 
read the limiting language to mean that, on one hand, the policy provides coverage in the 
absence of a contractual relationship between Donnelly and RCI but, on the other hand, 
provides no coverage in the event there is a contl'actual relationship between Donnelly and 
RCI. This is because the exclusion was and is intended to prevent insureds, like ReI, fi'om 
obligating themselves-and their insurer-to pay damages through the "i\Sslmmtion of 
liability in a contract or agreement" and not the mere factual existence of a contract or 
agreement. This gives plain meaning to the word "assumption" and explains the need for and 
presence of the limiting language. Otherwise the limiting language becomes and is rendered 
meaningless. The policy should be read in a manner that gives meaning to the limiting 
language and not in a manner that renders it meaningless. The mere fact that a contract exists 
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between Donnelly and RCI does not exclude coverage under the policy.. If this were the 
case, then insurers, like EMC, would take their claims investigations no further than a factual 
detennination of a contractual relationship to deny coverage and, thereby avoid any ft1l1her 
duty to defend or otherwise indemnify their insureds. 
At bottom, the argument is really whether the implied walTanty damages were 
compensatory for "economic lossu-i.e. the cost to repair and replace RCI"s defective work 
which was the subject of the transaction, or uproperty damage"-i.e. the physical injury to 
tangible property (including loss of use) or loss of use of tangible property that is not 
physically injured that was not the subject of the transaction. EMC argues the damages were 
compensatory for "economic loss" and, therefore, not covered. The Donnellys argue the 
damages were compensatory for "propetty damages" and. therefore, covered. Since the jury 
didn't itemize the award, all reasonable inferences should be drawn in favor of DonneUy and 
against EMC and in favor of coverage under the policy, as there was evidence that there was 
physical injury to tangible propetty (i.e. cut heat mats) and a loss of use of property not 
subject to the transaction. It is important to note that EMC recognized this very "potential" 
for coverage at the time it undeltook its defense of RCI when it represented to ReI that 
"Donnelly's allegations l'egarding delay may also infer a loss of use of injured property 
which would be property damage," Effectively. the jury found RCI breached the standard of 
care required by a contractor to build in a workmanlike fashion and awarded damages 
accordingly. A reasonable inference is that these damages were for ''property damages" as 
defined in the EMC policy and, therefore, EMC is legally obligated to pay for those damages, 
B. Damages (01' Breach ef the Idaho Consumer Protection Act wel'e fcr "Property 
Damages" tllat ReI Is Legally Obligated to Pay. 
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The jUly was instructed "[t]he Dormellys have suffered an injUly under the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act if they have suffered any ascertainable loss of money or property, real 
or personal. The Donnellys have the burden of proving such loss." (Reid Aft: Ex. D, n #68) 
(emphasis added), The DonneJlys met their burden and the jury awarded $2,000 based on two 
violations of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Like the damages for breach of the implied 
wananty, these damages are not itemized or characterized as compensation for a "loss of money' 
as opposed to a loss of "property, real or personal." Therefore, one reasonable inference is that 
the awat'd was for a loss of property, real or personal, as opposed to money and~ therefore. 
"propeJ.ty damage." 
This is "property damage" that RCI has become legally obligated to pay in the absence of 
any contract 01' agreement with Donnelly and it's not expected or intended by RCI for the 
pUlposes of EMC seeking fillther '1101es" in the policy. Under the circumstances, the COUl1 
should draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Donnelly and against EMC and conclude that 
the award is not specifically excluded by the policy and, therefore, EMC is obligated to pay on 
behalfofRCl. 
C. EMC Has An Independent Duty To Pay Under SUPPLEMENTAL PAYMENTS 
- COVERAGES A AND B. 
£Me argues that its policy language differs that that in Mutual of Enumclaw v. H81vey, 
because its policy "indicate[s] that payment of costs, attomey fees and interest is a payment 
supplemental to other payments ah'eady provided or obligated to provide because of coverage 
being Afforded to a claim." (pla.'s Memo. Opp. p. 12-13) (emphasis in Oliginal) (emphasis 
added). In other words, EMC reads its supplemental payments promise as being "dependent" on 
coverage. However, this isn't what the policy says. 
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The plain·language of the policy can be read and applied as follows: 
SECTION I - COVERAGES 
COVERAGE A - BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY 
1. Insuring Agreement 
a. We [EMCI will pay those sums that the insured [RClJ becomes legally 
obligated to pay as damages [Donnelly judgment] because of "bodily injury" or 
"property damage" to which this insurance applies. We [£Me] will have the right 
and duty to defend the insured (RClj against any "suit" seeking those damages 
[the Underlving Litigation sQught those damages]. Howevel~ we will have no 
duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for "bodily injU1'Y" 
or "property damage" to which this insurance does not apply. [EMC undertook 
the defense -of RCI through the Ullderlylng Litigation.] 
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or sClVices is covo'ed 
unless e~licitly proved for under Supplementary Payments-Covca:ues A and 
A [i.e. EMC isn ~ going to "cove,." any other obligation. liability to pay sums. or. 
perform acts or services unless provided for under its supplemental payments 
"coverages II A and B and, therefore, EMC's supplemental payments promises or 
"coverage" is independent from and opposed to dependent on its promises to 
((cover II damages for bodily injury or property damage under Coverages A and 
D.] 
COVERAGE B PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILITY 
COVERAGE C MEDICAL PAYMENTS 
SUPPLEMENTARYPAYMENTS-COVERAGESAANDB 
1. We [EMCl will R,ax. [i.e. mOlley] with respect to any claim we investigate, 
[EMC investigated the Donnelly claims] settle, or any "suit" against an 
insured we defend [EMe d€fe,nded RCI through the UnderlYing Litigation.): 
e. All costs taxed against the il1sur~ in the "suit." [RCI was taxed costs and 
attomey ~ fees in tile U"de1'lying Litigation defended by EMC.] 
g. All interest on the full amount of any judgment tPa! ICCl11es after entty of 
the judgment [Donnelly judgment first entered on August 14, 2008] and before 
we have paid. offered to pay, or depOSited in the court the 1.@1 of the judgment 
that is within the applicable limit of insurance.JEMC has never paid, offered 
to pay, or deposited in the court any part of the judgment on behalf of RCI] 
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These payments will not reduce the limits of insurance. [The obligation to make 
suppJemelltalY payments is an independent promise fi'om the promise to pay 
damages for bodily injury or property damage since those supplemental payments 
are 1Jot applied to reduce the limits of coverage available under coverages A and 
B.J 
The Mutual of Enumclaw ("MOE") policy, like the EMC policy, is organized with similar 
capitalized and bold headings and can be read and applied as follows: 
SECTION II 
COVERAGES 
COVERAGE E - PERSONAL LIABILITY 
This company [MOE] agrees to pay on behalf of the Insured [Bruce Oaks] all 
sums which the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because 
of bodily injury or property damage, to which this insurance applies, caused by an 
occurrence. This Company shall have the right and duty, at its own expense, to 
defend any suit against the Insured seeking damages on account of such bodily 
injuJY or property damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit aloe 
groundless, false or :fraudulent, but may make such investigation and settlement 
of any claim or suit as it deems expedient. This Company shall not be obligated 
to pay any claim or judgment or defend any suit after the applicable fund of this 





2. Personal Liability Claim Expenses: This Company [MOE] will pay: 
a. all ~xpenses incurred by this Company and all costs taxed against the 
Insured [Oah] in any suit defended by this Company. [MOE defended Oaks 
through trial and costs in the 011l0Wlt of $45.444.00 including $35,000.00 ill 
attorney'sfees were taxed against Oab.] 
c. all inteJ.-est on the entire amount of any judgment which accrues after entry 
of the judgment and before this Company has paid or tendered or deposited in 
court that part of the judgment which does not exceed the limit of this Company's 
liability thereon .... 
(Reid Aff. Ex. K). 
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As a cursOlY review of the language and organization of each policy demonstrates that 
when read as a whole) EMC's alleged distinction doesn't exist because the promise to make 
supplemental payments-whether in the EMC or MOE policy-.is a promise that is 
"independent" li:om other promises to pay regardless of whether the supplemental promise is 
titled "Supplementru.y PaYments" as opposed to "Supplementary Coverages." 
As then District Judge Schroeder succinctly reasoned, the "[l]anguage in the policy of this 
case does not indicate that payment of costs is conditioned upon a final determination that the 
policy covers the insured's conduct. The language of the policy says that the Company will pay 
all costs taxed against the insured in any suit defended by the Company." Hatvey, 115 Idaho at 
1011. This plain application of the language found in the MOE policy isjust as applicable to the 
EMC policy as set forth above. 
It is likewise important to consider that EMC, like MOE, exercised its right to control 
the defense ofRCI and made case management decisions in defense ofRCI. In consideration 
of the same, Judge Schroeder reasoned that "since the Company has the right to contl'ot the 
defense, including the power to refuse settlement, It should also hear the consequences of 
its case managemellt decisions, including the consequence that the trial court may tax the 
opponents costs against its insured." rd. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Judge 
Sclu'oeder's reasoning is as applicable to this case as it was to the H8.1vey decision. Having 
controlled the defense of ReI and having exercised its power to refuse settlement (EMC's pre-
mediation and mediation conduct speaks for itself), EMC sholud hear the consequences of its 
case management decisions since it was foreseeable that the Donnellys would be awru:ded costs 
and attomey's fees by prevailing. The Harvey decision is on-point and it is persuasive, if not 
controlling authOlity, on this case. Therefore) the Court should find as a matter of law that EMe 
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has a duty to make, at a minimum, supplemental payment of the costs taxed against RCI jn the 
total amount of $296,-933 .89 inclusive of $19, 871.89 in costs and $277,062 in attorney's fees and 
post judgment interest on the entire judgment accruing, having aCClued since August 14,2008. 
Through its introduction, EMC soft sells the concept that RCI concedes there was no 
"coverage" based on the parties' settlement agreement. Of course, the Coun can take notice of 
the fact that ReI had sued EMC f01" "bad faith.. arising out of its poor case management 
decisions. Regardless, the DonnelIys, as judgment creditors of RCI, had a judgment lien that 
arose and was recorded against any of RCI's tangible assets that could have satisfied the 
judgment-including the right to proceeds from the EMC policy. The EMCIRCI settlement 
agreement, to the extent it seeks to avoid the Donnelly judgment lien, is void because RCI 
couldn't give away or otherwise release the Donnellys' judgmeut lien right to the Donnellys' 
detriment and the benefit of RCI and EMC. To the extent EMC argues as much, then the 
settlement agreement is unenforceable as a fraudulent transfer in accord with Idaho Code §§ 
55-901, 55-905. and 55-906. To the extent EMC intends to rely on the EMC/RCI settlement 
agreement to "get off the loss, "then the Donne11ys necessarily must ask the COUlt to find the 
agreement void to the extent it operates as a fi'8udulent transfer against the Donnellys as 
judgment creditors of ReI. 
CONCLUSION 
EMC made the case management decisions that put the Donnellys through a 
vigorously contested trial at gr~at expense and ultimately led to a judgment against its 
insured, RCI. Despite having made those case management decisions, it now asks the Court 
to protect it from the financial consequences of its case management decisions. In other 
words, EMC wants to "throw punches" without getting "hit." Just as Judge Schroeder saw 
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through the MOE arguments in 1989, this Court should see through the EMC arguments and 
hold EMe accountable for case management decisions that have caused obvious harm to the 
Donnellys. 
DATED this if- day ofJanuary, 20 10. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa corporation; 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; and DAVID and 
KATHY DONNELLY, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007-00885 
REPLY TO COUNTERCLAIM 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff/Counterdefendant, Employers Mutual Casualty Company 




The Counterclaim fails to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted. 
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herein. 
· SECOND DEFENSE 
II. 
EMC denies each and every allegation of the Counterclaim not specifically admitted 
III. 
EMC admits paragraphs 15, 16, 17, 18 and 23 of the Counterclaim. 
IV. 
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraphs 19 and 20, EMC admits that 
Donnellys filed a lawsuit against RCI and that they obtained a judgment in the action. All 
other allegations are denied. 
V. 
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 25, such allegations do not 
appearto require a response. To the extent a response is reqiured, EMC denies the same. 
VI. 
With respect to the allegations contained in paragraph 26, EMC admits it has not 
paid any money to the Donnellys. As to the remaining allegations in paragraph 26, EMC 
does not have sufficient information so as to admit ordenythe same and, therefore, denies 
the same. 
VII. 
With respect to the allegations alleged in paragraph 27, EMC asserts that no 
matters in the Counterclaim are matters that, under Idaho law, can be tried to a jury. 
WHEREFORE, EMC prays as follows: 
1. That the Counterclaim be dismissed in its entirety and Counterclaimant take 
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nothing thereby; 
2. That EMC be awarded its reasonable attorney's fees and costs pursuant to 
applicable provisions of Idaho Code; 
3. For such other relief as to the Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this /'f-1day of .:::ral?ll47 , 2010. 
RINGERT CLARK CHARTERED 
by: 
James G. Reid 
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CASE NO. CV-2007-0000885 
ORDER DENYING CROSS-
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Differing conclusions and inferences can be drawn from the language of the insurance 
policy. Therefore, based on the facts presented in this case, the parties' cross motions for 
summary judgment are denied. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 12, 2009, Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company (hereafter, 
"Employers Mutual") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking a declaratory judgment 
holding that under Employers Mutual's Commercial General Liability Policy (hereafter, 
"Policy"), Employers Mutual has no duty or responsibility to pay any of the damages awarded to 
David and Kathy Donnelly in the underlying litigation, Donnelly v. Rimar Construction, Inc., et 
ai., Bonner County Case No. CV -2006-0445. 
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On December 21, 2009, David and Kathy Donnelly filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, requesting that Employers Mutual be ordered to pay the Donnellys' judgment, in 
whole or in part, on behalf of its insured, Rimar Construction. 
The parties' cross motions for summary judgment came before the Court for hearing on 
January 20,2010. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS 
As it relates to the parties' cross motions for summary judgment, a review of the court 
file reveals the following uncontested facts: 
Plaintiff Employers Mutual filed this action against its insured, Defendant Rimar 
Construction, Inc., (hereafter, "Rimar") and Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, seeking to 
avoid any duty to defend and/or indemnify Rimar based on the claims of the Donnellys against 
Rimar. This action was stayed pending completion of the underlying litigation in which 
Employers Mutual provided a defense to Rimar in a suit prosecuted by the Donnellys. 
A trial in the underlying litigation resulted in a judgment in favor of the Donnellys 
against Rimar. On August 14, 2008, the Court entered a "Judgment on Special Verdict" in the 
initial amount of $128,611.55, plus post judgment interest in favor of the Donnellys. On March 
20, 2009, the Court entered an "Amended Judgment on Special Verdict" in the total amount of 
$425,545.44, which includes the judgment amount of $128,611.55, plus attorney's fees in the 
amount of $277,062.00, and costs in the amount of $19,871.89. The Amended Judgment was 
properly recorded on March 30,2009, in the Bonner County records, as Instrument No. 769177. 
To date, neither Employers Mutual nor Rimar has made any payment to the Donnellys in an 
effort to satisfy. the judgment. 
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Once the underlying litigation was concluded, the Court lifted the stay of this action. 
Thereafter, a Settlement Agreement was entered between Employers Mutual, Rimar 
Construction, and Ivan Rimar, in which the parties agreed that: (l) Employers Mutual has no 
duty to indemnify Rimar Construction and Ivan Rimar as a result of any issues surrounding the 
collection and enforcement of any judgments entered in the underlying litigation; (2) Rimar 
Construction and Ivan Rimar's counterclaims alleged in this declaratory judgment action would 
be dismissed with prejudice; (3) Rimar Construction and Ivan Rimar release and discharge 
Employers Mutual from all liability that Employers Mutual may have to Rimar Construction or 
Ivan Rimar in relation to the underlying litigation and this declaratory judgment action; and (4) 
Rimar Construction and Ivan Rimar do not contest this declaratory judgment action and they 
admit all of the allegations made by Employers Mutual in this action. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 sets forth the standard for granting summary judgment. 
Rule 56 provides, in part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter of law .... 
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if 
appropriate, shall be entered against the party. 
I.R.C.P. 56 (c), (e). 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Boise Tower Associates, LLe v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774, 
215 P.3d 494 (2009), states: 
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On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court's 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally 
ruling on the motion. P.o. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 
Idaho 233, 237, 159 P.3d 870, 874 (2007). Summary judgment is appropriate "if 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if 
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
is on the moving party. Porter v. Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 403, 195 P.3d 1212, 
1216 (2008). However, if the nonmoving party fails to provide a sufficient 
showing to establish the essential elements of his or her case, judgment shall be 
granted to the moving party. Id This Court will liberally construe all disputed 
facts in favor of the nonmoving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be 
drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Id If 
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicting 
inferences from the evidence presented, then summary judgment is improper. 
Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 112, 206 P.3d 473, 
476 (2009). 
215 P.3d at 499. 
IV. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS 
A. Employers Mutual's Arguments 
Employers Mutual claims that the Policy provides no coverage for any of the damages 
awarded to the Donnellys in the underlying litigation. Specifically, Employers Mutual argues 
that the damages which were awarded based upon Rimar's breach of the implied warranty of 
workmanship are not recoverable. Employers Mutual contends that the Contractual Liability 
Exclusion in the Policy excludes contract based damages from coverage. 
Likewise, the damages that were awarded based upon Rimar's violation of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act are not covered because those damages are not "property damage," as 
defined by the Policy. Alternatively, those damages are excluded because they were expected or 
intended by Rimar, and thus, are subject to the Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion. 
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Employers Mutual also asserts that the attorney's fees and court costs awarded to the 
Donnellys are not covered because those costs and fees cannot be supplemental to any other 
award of damages, and thus, are not covered under the Supplemental Payments provision of the 
Policy. Lastly, Employers Mutual contends that none of the damages awarded in the underlying 
litigation are covered because Rimar, a party in privity with Employers Mutual, agreed in its 
Settlement Agreement with the insurer that none of those damages are covered. 
B. The Donnellys' Arguments 
The Donnellys maintain that the damages awarded for breach of the implied warranty of 
workmanship were not based on the contract, but were for property damage. Employers Mutual 
is required to indemnify Rimar for property damage. Thus, Employers Mutual is legally 
obligated to pay the judgment. Similarly, the damages awarded for breach of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act were also for property damage. The Donnellys point out that 
Employers Mutual has an independent duty to pay some of the judgment pursuant to the 
Supplemental Payments provision of the Policy. The Donnellys believe they are also entitled to 
recover reasonable attorney's fees under Idaho Code § 41-1839, which governs the allowance of 
attorney's fees in suits against insurers. 
V. DISCUSSION 
Both parties moved for summary judgment. Therefore, in order to prevail, each party 
carries the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Porter v. 
Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 403, 195 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2008). In matters involving contracts of 
insurance, "[t]he dividing line between legal and factual questions is not always a clear one ... " 
Foster v. Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 66, 685 P.2d 802,807 (1984). In Perry v. Farm Bureau Mut. 
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Ins. Co. of Idaho, 130 Idaho 100, 936 P.2d 1342 (Ct. App. 1997), the Idaho Court of Appeals 
explains the distinction: 
While questions of contract interpretation and meaning may become 
questions of fact only where there has been found to be ambiguity in the contract, 
questions of application of insurance policy language to specific situations 
necessarily must always be questions of fact, to be decided on a case-by-case 
basis, whether or not the provisions themselves are found to be ambiguous. Foster 
v. Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 65, 685 P.2d 802, 806. Furthermore, an insurance 
policy will generally be construed so that the insurer bears the burden of proving 
that the asserted exclusion is applicable. Viani v. Aetna Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 22, 501 
P.2d 706 (1972); Harman v. Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co., 91 Idaho 719, 
429 P.2d 849 (1967). 
Id at 102-103, 936 P.2d at 1344-1345. 
Concerning each party's motion, when all inferences are resolved in favor of the adverse 
party, there remains a question as to whether or not the damages sustained by the Donnellys were 
property damage or contract based damages. For a claim of property damage, Rimar (and its 
insurer, Employers Mutual) would be obligated to pay. For damages based on the contract, the 
Contractual Liability Exclusion may apply. Neither party has met its burden of persuasion on 
this issue. 
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, "[i]f reasonable persons could reach 
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented, then summary 
judgment is improper." Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 112, 206 
P.3d 473, 476 (2009). In this case, the parties assert conflicting interpretations of, and draw 
conflicting conclusions and inferences from the language of the Policy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because the parties have failed to meet their burdens of persuasion, and because differing 
conclusions and inferences can be drawn from the language of the Policy in relation to the facts 
presented, the parties' cross motions for summary judgment are DENIED. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ~ay of April, 2010. 
~1# Steve Yerby 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRlCT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. TN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
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v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE 
APPEAL 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of 
record, and pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 12, move this court for entry of an Order for 
Permissive Appeal from the Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment entered on 
April 7, 2010. 
This motion is made on the grounds that the issues presented on cross-motions for 
summary judgment involve controlling questions of law to which there are substantial grounds 
for difference of opinion and for which an immediate appeal from the order denying cross-
motions may materially advance the orderly resolution of this litigation. 
MOTION FOR PERMISSIVE APPEAL - I 
325 
This motion is further based on the record herein, including the documents and pleadings 
on file and upon the arguments and authorities cited in the Defendants' Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Permissive Appeal. 
Ora] argument is requested. 
DATED this I b day of April, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
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Permissive Appeal from the Order Denying Cross-Motions for Sunm131Y Judgment entet'ed on 
April 7, 2010. 
This motion is made on the grounds that the issues presented on cross-motions for 
sunm1aty judgment involve conh'olling questions of law to which there are substantial grounds 
for difference of opinion and for which an immediate appeal fi'om the order denying cross-
motions may materially advance the ordedy resolution of [his litigation. 
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This motion is further based on the record herein, including the documents and pleadings 
on file and upon the arguments and authorities cited in the Defendants' Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Pemlissive Appeal. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this M day of April, 20 10. 
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RIM~R. C.O~STRU~TlON, INC."nn Idaho. ," , ) 
C:Ol'po'rotion; and 'DAVID nnd I<A THY ..) 
DONNELLY; Jn~sbj1~d ,,~d, wife, : '" ':,.': ':- L :'. . .. '. ) ,', 
. D~fendftllts. ' ) .' , 
) 
CASE NO. CV·2007-000088S 
ORDER DENYING CROSS· 
.MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
. JlJDGi'vuiNT' . : 
0. , .... ~ t.:: <',: ! __ , .... ':._;<: ....... ::;:":':.' 
Differing conclusions and inferences can be drawn from the language of the insurance 
policy. Therefore, based on the facts presented in this case, the patties' cross motions for 
s\lmmary judgment arc denied. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On November 12, 2009, Plaintiff Employers Mutual Casualty Company (hereafter, 
"Employers Mutual") filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, seeking a declaratory judgment 
holding that under Employers Mutual's Commercial General Liability Policy (hereafter. 
~cp.olj~Y!!)iEmpl.oy'ers,Mutual has no duty or responsibility to pay any of the damages awarded to 
'" ... ..' .. :. 
David ~nd, Kathy DonneJJy'jn the uncleriyill8 litigation, Donnelly v: ~fmar Cons(ruc/ion • .1nc .• 61 
al., BOMer County Case No. CV-2006-044S. 
ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
329 
Apr.20. 2010 12:05PM No.6782 P. 5 
On December 21, 2009, David and Kathy DonneHy filed . a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, requesting that Employers Mutual be ordered to pay the Donnellys' judgment. in 
whole 01' jo part, on behalf of its insured, RimaI' Construction. 
The parties' cross motions for summary judgment came before the Court for hearing on 
January 20, 2010. 
II. STATEMENT OF UNCONTESTED FACTS 
As it relates to the parties' cross motions for sumlnary judgment, a review of the court 
tile reveals the followjng uncontested facts: 
Plaintiff Employers Mutual filed this action against its insured. Defendant Rimar 
Construction, Inc., (hereafter, "rumar") and Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly. seeking to 
avoid any d\lty to defend andlor indemnify Rimar based 011 the claims of the Donnellys against 
Rimar. This action was stayed pending completion of the underlying litigation in which 
Employers Mutual provided a defense to Rimar in a suit prosecuted by the Donnellys. 
A rrial in the underlying litigation resulted in a judgment in favor of the Donnellys 
against Rimar. On August 14, 2008, the Court entered a "Judgment on Special Verdict"' in the 
initial amount of $128,611.55, plus post judgment interest in favor of the Donnellys. On March 
20,2009, the CO\111 entered an ('Amended Judgment on Special Verdict" in the total amount of 
$425.545.44, which includes the judgment amount of $128,611.55, pills attorney's fees in the 
omount of' $277,062.00, and costs in the amount of SI9,871.89. The Amended Judgment was 
properly recorded on March 30, 2009, in the Bonner County records, as Instrument No. 769117. 
To date, neither Employers Mutual nol' Rimar has made any payment to the Donnellys in an 
effort to satisfy the judgment. 
ORDER DENYING cnoss MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
330 
Apr. 20. 2010 12:05PM No.6782 P. 6 
Once the underlying litigation was concluded, the Court lifted the stay of this action. 
Thereafter, a Settlement Agreement was entered between Employers Mutual, Rimar 
Construction. and Ivon Rimar, in which the parties agreed that: (l) Employers Mutual has no 
duty to indemnifY Rimar Constntction and Ivan Rimar as a result of any issues sUlTounding the 
collection and enforcement of any judgments entered in the underl}'ing litigation; (2) Rimar 
Conslruction and Ivan Rimar's counterclaims alleged in this declaratory judgment action would 
be dismissed with prejudice; (3) Rimn Construction and Ivan Rimar release and discharge 
Employers Muntal from aU liability that Employers Mutual may have to Rimar Constntction or 
Ivan Rimar in relation to the underlying litigation and this declaratory judgment action; and (4) 
Rimar Construction and Ivan Rimar do not contest this declaratory judgment action and they 
admit an of the allegations made by Employers Mutual in this action. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 sets forth the standard for granting summary judgment. 
Rule 56 provides, in part: 
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, Bnd 
admissions on file. together with the affidavits. if any, show (bat there is 110 
genuine issue 8S to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflaw .... 
... When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in 
this role, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of 
that party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise 
provided in thjs rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial. If thc party does not so respond, summary judgmcnt, if 
appropriate, shall he entered against the party. 
I.R.C.P. 56 (c). (e). 
The Idaho Supreme Court, in Bofse Tower Associates, LLC v. Hogland, 147 Idaho 774. 
215 P.3d 494 (2009). states: 
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On appeal from the grent of a motion for summaI}' judgment) this Court's 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court originally 
ruling on the motion. P.o. Ven'"res, /I7C. 11. LOltc/a Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 
Idaho 233, 237. 159 P.3d 810, 874 (2007). Summary.judgment is appropriate "if 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with (he affidavits, if 
any. show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the 
moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). 
The burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact 
is on the moving party. Porler ~. Bassel/, 146 Idaho 399, 403, 195 P.3d 1212, 
1216 (2008). However, if the nomnoving party fails to provide a sufficient 
showing to establish the essential elemellts of his or hel" case. judgment shall be 
granted to the moving party. Id This Court will liberally constme all disputed 
facts ·in favor of the nonmoving party. and all reasonable inferences tbat can· be 
drawn from the record will be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. Id If 
reasonable persons could reach differing conclusions or draw conflicling 
inferences from the evidence presented, then sumlnaty judgment is improper. 
Jones v. HealthSolith Treasul'e Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109. 112.206 PJd 473, 
416 (2009). 
215 P.3d at 499. 
IV. THE PARTIES' ARGUMENTS 
A. Employers Mutual's ArguDlents 
Employers Mutual claims that the Policy provides no coverage for any of the damages 
awarded to the DOMellys jn the underlying litigation. SpeCifically, Employers Mutual argues 
that the damages which were awarded based upon rumar's breach of ale implied warranty of 
workmanship arc not recoverable. Enlp!oyers Mutunl contends that the Contractual Liability 
Exclusion in the Policy excludes contract based dnmnges from coverage. 
Likewise, the damages that were awarded based upon Rimar's violation of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act are Ilot covered because those damages are not "property damage, n as 
defined by the Policy. Altemfltively. those damages are excluded because they were expected or 
intended by Rimar. and thUS. are subject to the Expected or Intended Injury Exclusion. 
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Employers Mumal also asserts that the attomey's fees and coun costs awarded to the 
Donnellys are not covered because those costs and fees cannot be supplemental to allY other 
award of damages, and thus, are not covered under the Supplemental Payments provision of the 
Policy. Lastly, Employers Mutual contends that none of the damages awarded in the underlying 
litigation are covered because Rimar, a party in privity with Employers Mutual, agreed in its 
Settlement Agreement with the insurer that none of those damages are covered. 
B. The Donnelly!1 Arguments 
The DOMellys maintain that the damages awarded for breach of the implied warranty of 
workmanship were not based on the contract, but were for property damage, Employers Mutual 
is required to indemnify Rimar for property damage. Thus, Employers Mutual is legally 
obligated to pay the judgment. Similady. the damages awarded for breach of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act were also for property damage. The Donnellys point out thQt 
Employers Mutual bas an independent duty to pay some of the judgment pursuant to the 
Supplemenlal Payments provision of ~he Policy. The DonneUys believe they are also entitled to 
recoverreasonsble attomey'S fees under Idaho Code § 41~1839. which governs the allowance of 
attorney's fees in suits against insurers. 
V. DISCUSSION 
Both parties moved for summary judgment. Therefore. in order to prevail. each party 
canies the burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Porter v. 
Bassett, 146 Idaho 399, 403, 195 P.3d 1212, 1216 (2008). In matters involving contracts of 
inSlll'8llCe. "[t]he dividing line between legal and factual questions is not always a clear one ... " 
Foster Y. Johnstone, 101 Idaho 61, 66,685 P.2d 802,807 (1984). In Perry v. Farm B.,,'eall "'lilt. 
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Ins. Ca. a/IdalJo, 130 Idaho 100, 936 P,2d 1342 (et. App. 1997), tbe Idaho Court of Appeals 
explains the distinction: 
While questions of contract interploctation and meaning may become 
questions of fae. only where there has been found to be ambiguity in the contract. 
questions of application of insurance policy language to specific situations 
necessarily must always be questions of facti to be decided on a C8se·by~case 
basis, whether or not the provisions themselves are found to be ambiguous. Fosle,. 
11. Johnstone, 107 Idaho 61, 65, 685 P.2d 802, 806. Furthennot'e, an insurance 
policy will generally be constnted so that the insurer bears the burden of proving 
that tbe asserted exclusion is applicable. Vian;)I. Aetna Ins. Co., 95 Idaho 22, 501 
P.2d 706 (1972); Harman Y. NOl'thweslern MUlual Life Il1s. Co., 91 Idaho 719, 
429 P.2d 849 (1961). 
Id at 102-103, 936 P.2d at 1344-1345. 
Concerning eacb party's motion, when atl inferences are resolved in favor of the adverse 
party, there remains a question as to whether or not the damages sustained by the DonneJJys were 
property damage or confract based damages. For a claim of propelty damage, Rimar (and its 
insurer, Employers Mutual) would be obligated to pay. For damages based on the contract, the 
Contractual Liability Exclusion may apply. Neither party has met its burden of persuasion on 
this issue. 
In mling on a motion for summary judgment, U[i]f reasonable persons could reach 
differing conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented, tben summary 
judgment is improper:' Jones v. Health$o"lh'Il'eas"re Valley Hosp.. 147 Idaho 109, 112~ 206 
P.3d 473, 476 (2009). In this case, the parties assert conflicting interpretations of, and draw 
conflicting conclusions and inferences from the Janguage of the Policy. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Because the parties have failed to meet their burdens of persuasion, and because differing 
conclusions and inferences can be drawn from the language of the Policy in relation to the facts 
preliented, the parties' cross motions for summary judgment are DENIED. 
ORDER DENYING CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUPGMENT - 6 
Apr. 20. 2010 12:06PM 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this .J!!)ay of April, 2010. 
Steve Yerby 
District Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 
DONNELL Y, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWER 
AND COUNTERCLAIM 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of 
record, pursuant to I.R.c.P. 15(a) and 57(b) and move this court for its order permitting them 
leave to serve their [Proposed] Second Amended Answer, Counterclaim and Cross Claim as 
"-
attached hereto. 
This motion is made on the following grounds: 
(1) Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) allows the Court wide and liberal discretion 
to allow the parties to amend their pleadings when justice so requires and the Donnellys are 
properly joined parties to the plaintiff's declaratory judgment action under Rule 57(b) and, as 
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third-party creditors, have standing to pursue a counterclaim as set forth in the case of Mutual of 
Enumclaw v. Harvey, 115 Idaho 1009, 772 P.2d 216 (1989); 
(2) The Settlement Agreement entered into by and between EMC, RCI and Ivan 
Rimar, individually, and attached as Exhibit J to the Affidavit of James G Reid dated November 
9, 2009, is a fraudulent conveyance or purports to be a fraudulent conveyance of personal 
property from RCI to EMC in contravention of the Donnellys' rights as judgment creditors and 
was made in contravention of Idaho Code §§ 55-913(1)(a); 55-913(1)(b); and/or 55-914(1) and 
has otherwise hindered, delayed or defrauded the Donnellys and has otherwise left RCI insolvent 
and/or otherwise unable to satisfy the Donnellys' Amended Judgment and was intended to 
prevent EMC and/or RCI from having to pay any monies to the Donnellys as a result of the 
Donnellys' Amended Judgment against RCI; 
(3) EMC, RCI and the Donnellys are parties to this present action and it is in the 
interest of justice and judicial economy to the court and to the litigants to bring the Donnelly's 
counterclaims and cross claim in one (1) action as they arise out of and relate to the underlying 
litigation of Donnelly v. Rimar et. al., Bonner County CV-2006-00445 and the judgments 
entered therein; 
(4) At the time of the filing of this motion, the case is not presently set for trial and 
this motion to amend is not made to cause any undue delay or prejudice to the plaintiff EMC 
and/or defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. 
This motion is further supported by the Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion 
to Amend Answer and the Affidavit of Michael A. Ealy filed in support thereof 
Oral argument is requested. 
III 
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DATED this I ; day ofJune, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
y, 1 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ( 1 day of June, 20 I 0, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, WA99201 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
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__ Overnight Mail 
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__ Facsimile (208) 342-4657 
L4"Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (509) 625-1909 
l./1Js Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (208) 263-0400 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DA VID and KATHY 




SECOND AMENDED ANSWER, 
COUNTERCLAIM and CROSS 
CLAIM 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, husband and wife, (hereinafter 
"Defendants"), by and through their counsel of record, and hereby amends their Answer as 
follows: 
I. ANSWER 
1. Defendants hereby deny each, every, and all allegations and representations set 
forth in Plaintiff s Petition unless specifically admitted herein. 
2. In answer to Paragraphs 1,2,5,6, 13, 14 and I 6 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants 
are without sufficient information to form a belief as to the truth of the matters alleged therein 
and therefore deny the same. 
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3. In"imswer to Paragraphs 3, 4 and 8 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit the 
same. 
4. In answer to Paragraph 7, of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit only that a 
contract was entered into, and that the contract speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder 
of said Paragraph. 
5. In answer to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiff s Petition, Defendants admit only that Rimar 
performed work on the Donnelly Residence, and deny the remainder of said Paragraph. 
6. In answer to Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of Plaintiffs Petition, Defendants admit 
only that Plaintiffs Verified Petition in Bonner County Case No. CV-06-00445 (and any 
subsequent amendments thereto) speaks for itself. Defendants deny the remainder of said 
Paragraphs. 
7. In answer to Paragraphs 15, 17, 18, 19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27 and 28 of 
Plaintiff s Petition, Defendants deny the same. 
II. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
8. Defendants incorporate as affirmative defenses the allegations contained III 
Paragraphs 1-7, above. 
9. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
10. Plaintiffs claims are barred by the equitable doctrines of waiver, laches, unclean 
hands, and in pari delicto. 
11. Plaintiffs claims are barred by the equitable doctrine of estoppel. 
12. Plaintiff s claims are barred due to failure of a condition precedent. 
13. Plaintiff has failed to join an indispensable party. 
14. The losses and claims asserted by the Defendants against Rimar Construction Inc. 
and Ivan Rimar are not excluded from coverage ofEMC's policy. 
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III. COUNTERCLAIM and CROSS CLAIM 
A. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT 
15. At times material hereto, the Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company 
("EMC"), is and was an Iowa corporation authorized to conduct the business of selling 
insurance, including commercial general liability insurance, in the State ofIdaho. 
16. At times material hereto, the Defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc. ("RCI") is and 
was an Idaho corporation that was engaged in the business of providing general contracting 
services in the State of Idaho. 
17. At times material hereto, the Defendants, David and Kathy Donnelly 
("Donnelly"), hired RCI to provide general contracting services for improvements to their real 
property located in Bonner County, State ofIdaho. 
18. On or about September 14, 2004, EMC sold and RCI purchased commercial 
general liability policy no. 2DI-32-95-05 ("COL Policy") with the effective coverage dates 
identified as October 1,2004, up and through October 1,2005. 
19. On or about March 7, 2006, the Donnellys filed suit against RCI for claims 
arising out of and related to RCI undertaking to provide general contracting services for certain 
improvements to the Donnelly property and arising during the effective coverage dates in EMC 
COL Policy in Bonner County Case Number CV -06-00445 (herein "Underlying Litigation"). 
The Underlying Litigation was litigated through trial resulting in a jury verdict in Donnelly'S 
favor as against RCI on or about July 9,2008. 
20. On or about August 14, 2008, in the Underlying Litigation a Judgment On 
Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. 
("Initial Judgment") was entered in the amount of $128,611.55 to accrue interest at the legal rate 
against RCI in favor of Donnelly. Later, on March 20, 2009, in the Underlying Litigation an 
Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard To Claims Of Plaintiffs And Defendant 
Rimar Construction, Inc. I Rule 54(b) Certificate ("Amended Judgment") was entered in the total 
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amount of $425,545.44 including an award of the Donnellys' attorney's fees in the amount of 
$277,062.00 and costs in the amount of$19,81'l.89. 
21. On or about March 30, 2009, the Amended Judgment was properly recorded in 
Bonner County, State ofIdaho, as record instrument #769177. 
22. Pursuant to its policy of insurance, EMC defended RCI through the trial in the 
Underlying Litigation. Having undertaken the defense of its insured, EMC knew and recognized 
the Donnellys as claimants against RCI's commercial general liability policy. In addition, RCI 
knew and/or expected that the Donnellys would incur costs and attorney's fees to prosecute its 
claim against RCI. 
23. On or about May 24, 2007, EMC initiated this action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that, under the EMC CGL Policy, it has no contractual duty to pay, in whole or in part, 
any of the Donnellys' then claims as against RCI. On or about December 12, 2007, this action 
was stayed pending the outcome of the Underlying Litigation. The stay in this action was later 
lifted on or about July 17,2009. 
24. Following a trial and entry of a jury verdict in the Underlying Litigation, the 
Donnellys are judgment creditors of RCI and have a claim, right or interest including a judgment 
lien right, in whole or in part, to the proceeds or policy benefits from the EMC CGL Policy due 
and owing to RCI in whole or partial satisfaction of the Donnellys' judgment against RCI. 
25. Pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1202, the Donnellys are persons interested under 
the EMC CGL Policy whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by the policy and, 
therefore, request a construction of the EMC CGL Policy to obtain a declaration of their rights, 
status or other legal relations under the policy. In particular, the Donnellys seek a declaration 
that EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnifY RCI, in whole or in part, for the 
Donnelly judgment including, but not limited to, post-judgment interest accrued to date on the 
entire judgment. 
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26. To date, neither EMC nor RCI has "made any payment to Donnelly or to the Court 
in effort to satisfy the Donnelly judgment in whole or in part and the Donnelly judgment remains 
unsatisfied. 
B. FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE 
27. The Defendants/Counterclaimants, David and Kathy Donnelly, re-allege 
paragraphs 15-26 as ifset forth herein. 
28. On March 20, 2009, in the Underlying Litigation an Amended Judgment in the 
total amount of $425,545.44 was awarded in favor of Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly and 
against Defendant RCI. On or about March 30, 2009, the Amended Judgment was properly 
recorded in Bonner County, State of Idaho, as record instrument #769177. A true and correct 
copy of the Amended Judgment, Bonner County Record Instrument # 769177 is attached hereto 
as Exhibit A and is adopted by reference pursuant to !RCP 1 O( c). 
29. Following entry of the Initial Judgment and Amended Judgment, the Donnellys 
were and are judgment creditors of RCI. The Amended Judgment recorded as a judgment lien 
against the real property, if any, of RCI pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1110 and rendered the real 
and personal property ofRCI liable to seizure pursuant to Idaho Code § 11-201. 
30. The Plaintiff, EMC, had actual and/or constructive knowledge of the Initial 
Judgment and Amended Judgment awarded in favor of the Donnellys and against its insured, 
RCI, having tendered a defense to RCI and Ivan Rimar, individually, in the Underlying 
Litigation and having initiated this declaratory judgment action against the named Defendants 
herein. As a result, EMC, knew or should have known that the Donnellys had a legal and/or 
equitable right in the real and/or personal property of RCI liable to pay the Amended Judgment. 
In particular, EMC knew the Donnellys were the beneficiaries and/or intended beneficiaries of 
insurance benefits and/or monies owed by EMC to RCI under EMC's Commercial General 
Liability ("CGL") policies 2D 1-32-95-05 and 2D 1-32-95-06 with RCI. 
31. The Defendant, RCI, had actual and/or constructive" knowledge of the Initial 
Judgment and Amended Judgment awarded against it having defended the Underlying Litigation 
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through trial. As a result, RCI knew, or should have known, that the Donnellys had a legal 
and/or equitable right in the real and/or personal property ~of RCI liable to pay the Amended 
Judgment. In particular, RCI knew the Donnellys were the beneficiaries and/or intended 
beneficiaries of insurance benefits and/or monies owed by EMC to RCI under EMC's 
Commercial General Liability ("CGL") policies 2D 1-32-95-05 and 2D 1-32-95-06. 
32. On or about March 30, 2009, the Defendant RCI, a judgment debtor of the 
Donnellys, had a contract claim to certain policy benefits or monies against EMC pursuant to 
EMC's CGL policies. In particular, RCI had a claim that EMC indemnify it, in whole or in part, 
against the Donnellys' Amended Judgment pursuant to the terms of its CGL policies. 
33. In addition, on or about March 30, 2009, the Defendant RCI, a judgment debtor 
of the Donnellys, had a pending counterclaim seeking money damages against EMC. In part, 
RCI's counterclaim against EMC included causes of action for insurance bad faith and breach of 
contract. 
34. Sometime in September of 2009, EMC and RCI entered into a Settlement 
Agreement with a stated effective date of August 17, 2009. In part, the Settlement Agreement 
purports to be a transfer of RCI's property right in its contract claims against the EMC CGL 
policy and its pending counterclaim to EMC. A true and correct copy of the Settlement 
Agreement produced by EMC as Exhibit J to the Affidavit of James G. Reid is attached hereto as 
Exhibit B and adopted by reference pursuant to IRCP 1 O( c). 
35. EMC, RCI and Ivan Rimar, individually, entered into the Settlement Agreement 
with no notice to David or Kathy Donnelly and the Donnellys are not parties to the Settlement 
Agreement. 
36. On November 10, 2009, the Donnellys caused a Writ of Execution to issue from 
the Clerk of the Bonner County Court under the Underlying Litigation case number to seek 
collection against RCI on the Amended Judgment. Along with the Writ of Execution, a letter 
with Instructions to the Sheriff was sent to the Bonner County Sheriff for the purposes of 
collecting on the Amended Judgment. A true and correct copy of the letter with Instructions to 
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the Sheriff without its attachments is attached hereto as Exhibit C and adopted by reference 
pursuant to IRCP lO(c) and a true and correct copy of the Writ of Execution is attached hereto as 
Exhibit D and adopted by reference pursuant to IRCP 10( c). 
37. Following execution on the Writ of Execution by the Bonner County Sheriff, the 
Donnellys received a copy of a Memorandum dated November 24,2009, from counsel for RCI 
to the Bonner County Sheriff that, in part, represented as follows: Please be advised that RIMAR 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. owns no property, real or personal. Further, RIMAR 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. owns no equipment, heavy equipment, titled or untitled motor 
vehicles, tools, receivables, inventory, or any other personal property of any description. A true 
and correct copy of the Memorandum from RCI to the Bonner County Sheriff dated November 
24,2009 is attached hereto as Exhibit E and adopted by reference pursuant to IRCP (c). 
38. On or about December 7, 2009, the Bonner County Sheriff returned the Writ of 
Execution unsatisfied. A true and correct copy of the return on the Writ of Execution from the 
Bonner County Sheriff s Office is attached hereto as Exhibit F and adopted by reference 
pursuant to IRCP 1 O( c). In particular, the Sheriff was unable to or could not levy on: 
a. Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's claims 
to insurance benefits and/or monies from Employers Mutual Casualty Company Commercial 
General Liability policy number 2DI-032-95-05 dated October 1, 2004 through October 1,2005 
and policy number 2DI-32-95-06 dated October 1,2005 through October 1,2006; and 
b. Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's causes 
of action and/orcounterclaim(s) as set forth in Bonner County CV-2007-00885. 
39. The Settlement Agreement by and between EMC, RCI and Ivan Rimar is 
considered a fraudulent transfer to the Donnellys as judgment creditors of RCI, as the Settlement 
Agreement purports to be a transfer made by RCI after the debt obligation to the Donnellys was 
incurred and was made with (a) the actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud the Donnellys, or (b) 
was made without receiving a reasonably equivalent value from EMC in exchange for the 
transfer and, the transfer resulted in RCI having little or no assets remaining and/or left RCI 
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otherwise insolvent and unable to satisfy the Donnellys' Amended Judgment in contravention of 
Idaho Code §§ 55-913(I)(a); 55-913(b) and 55-914(l} 
40. As a result of the transfer by and betw'een EMC and RCI set forth in the 
Settlement Agreement, the Donnellys have been damaged and are entitled to the remedy of 
creditors as set forth in Idaho Code § 55-916 et. seq. including the avoidance of the transfers 
from RCI to EMC set forth in the Settlement Agreement and the attachment, levy and execution 
on the transferred property in favor of the Donnellys in partial satisfaction of their Amended 
Judgment. 
41. The Donnellys have retained the law firm of Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, and have 
incurred attorney's fees and costs in defense and prosecution of this action. 
NOW WHEREFORE, Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly pray for the following 
relief: 
1. That the Plaintiffs Petition be dismissed in its entirety and that it take nothing 
thereby; 
2. That the Defendant Donnelly have declaratory judgment fmding that under the 
EMC CGL policies, EMC has a contractual duty to pay and/or indemnify RCI, in whole or in 
part, the Donnellys' Amended Judgment entered in the Underlying Litigation and including 
post-judgment interest on the entire judgment amount; 
3. That the Settlement Agreement by and betw'een EMC, RCI and Ivan Rimar be 
avoided with regard to the transfer of property from RCI to EMC and that the court order 
levy and execution on the transferred property and/or its proceeds in favor of Donnelly in 
accord with Idaho Code § 55-916 et. seq.; 
4. That th~ Defendants Donnelly be awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs as 
incurred herein pursuant to I.C. §§ 10-1201 et seq.; 12-120 and 12-121; and 41-1839; and 
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5. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and equitable under the 
circumstances. 
DATED this __ day of June, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS 
[fClD PI) 5t":.f) J 
By __________________________ __ 
Michael A. Ealy, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _ day of June, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
David P. Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint,ID 83864 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 342-4657 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
__ Facsimile (509) 625-1909 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Facsimile (208) 263-0400 
Michael A. Ealy 
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entered in favor of the Donnellys in the amount of$126,611.55 againstRimar 
Construction, Inc. 
4. That with respect to the Donnellys' claims for violatio~s of the Idaho Consumer 
Protection Act against Rimar Construction, Inc .• concerning the specific disclosures by a 
general contractor, the jury detennined that the failure to make such disclosures 
constituted a violation of the Consumer Protection Act and awarded $1,000.00 for the 
failure to provide such disclosures, and Judgment is hereby entered in favor oftbe 
DonneUys in the amount of$l,OOO.OO. 
S. That with respect to other aUeged violations of the Consumer Protection Act brought by 
. the DonneUys against Rimar Construction, Inc., the jury found that such a violation 
occurred an4 awarded damages in the amOunt of$l,OOO.OO, and Judgment is hereby 
entered in favor of the Donnellys in the amount of$l,OOO.OO. 
6. That with respect to the Donnellys' claim for negligence against Rimar Construction Inc. 
as an architect the jury found that Rimar Construction Inc. did not act as an architect and 
therefore, there is no liability under that theory and Judgmen~ is rendered in favor of 
Rimar Construction, Inc. on the architectural negligence cause of action. 
7. That with respect to the DonneUys' claim of alleged engineering negligence against 
Rimar Construction, Inc., the jury found that Rimar Construction, Inc., did not act as an 
engineer and therefore, found no liability. Accordingly, Judgment is rendered in favor of 
Rimar Construction, Inc., on the engineering negligence cause of action. 
8. That with respect to Rimar Construction, Inc. 's claims against Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly for 
breach of contract, the Court has detennined that the Donnel1ys were excused from 
perfonnance of the Contract, and that Rimar Construction, Inc. is not entitled to an award 
of any damages. 
9. That with respect to Rimar Construction, Inc. 's claims against Mr. and Mrs. Donnelly for 
foreclosure of its mechanic's and materialmen's lien under I.C. 45-501 et seq., thejury 
and Court have detennined that Rimar Construction Inc. failed to establish its right to 
foreclose said lien. Accordingly, Judgment is rendered in favor of the Donnellys on the 
lien foreclosure cause of action. The Claim of Lien filed as Bonner County Instrument 
No. 695132, and the Lis Pendens :tiled as Bonner County Instrument No. 702306, are 
therefore declared to be of no legal effect, and are hereby expunged. 
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10. That Plaintiffs / Counterclaim Defendants David and Kathy DopneIly; as the prevailing 
party against Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc., recover from Defendant Rimar 
Construction, Inc. attorney's fees in the amount of $277.062.00 and costs in the amount 
of $19,871.89. for a total recovery against Defendant Rimar conStruction, Inc. in the sum 
of $425,545.44, which shall accrue interest at the legal rate as provided by Idaho Code 
§ 28-22-104(2) from the date of entry of judgment • 
. ~~ 
STEVE VERBY,  
District Judge 
RULE 54(bl CERTIFICATE 
With respect to the issues determined by the above judgment or order it is hereby 
CERTIFIED, ~in accordance with Rule S4(b), I.R.C.P., that the court has determined that there is 
no just reason for delay of the entry of a final judgment and that the court has and does hereby 
direct that the above judgment or order shall be a final judgment upon which execution may 
issue and an appeal mayjp ~en as by the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATEDthis2fT_d;dayof 009. ~
STEVE VERBY, ~ 
District .Tudge 
AMENDED~G~T/RULES4(b)CERTnnCATE 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the t:JJiday of 'trJd~ .200---1 I caused to be served 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated be ow. and addressed to all counsel of 
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Brent C. Featherston ~ U.S. Mail 
Featherston Law Firm 0 Hand Delivered 
113 South Second Avenue 0 Overnight Mail 
Sandpoint, m 83864 0 Telccopy (FAX) 
Fax: (208)265-1713 
Chris H. Hansen ~ U.S. Mail 
Anderson JuHan & Hull. LLP 0 Hand Delivered 
250 South Fifth Street, Sfe 700 0 Overnight Mail 
. PO Box 7426 0 Telecopy (FAX) 
Boise. ID 83707-7426 
Fax: (208) 344-5510 
MichaeIO. Schmidt 0/ U.S. Mail 
WiWamD. Hyslop 0 Hand Delivered 
Lukins & Annis, p.s. 0 Overnight Mail 
250 Northwest Blvd., Ste. 102 0 TeJecopy (FAX) 
Coeur d'Alene. 10 83814-2971 
Fax: (208) 664-4125 
Michael L. Haman ~ U.S. Mail 
Haman Law Office PC 0 Hand Delivered 
923 North 3rd Street 0 Overnight Mail 
P.O. Box 2155 0 Telecopy (FAX) 
Fax: (208) 676-1683 
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'LDBCLAAATORY ACTlONj; and 
2111 
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5. ·Tho lJNl)!RLYlNO ACTION did result fnjudsmtnt'bClnl mtor.d Jgainm 
lUMAR. but only as to"l~fmm' ConstnJorio.rn ~D.d 
F. !Me and RlMAa b,v, !.lome te) an agrcemont. the t«ms and eonditions ofwhfob 
1m' RDt JOrfb Ml'Clin, whereby the I>BCLARATORY ACTION wiU be lbrevor molved as batw~ 
thorn. and whereby BMC wUl oQotfnuo to provido a. dofens. to lUMAR. in what rcmeins of the 
UNI)!RLtING AC'J,'[ON. 
J\.GURMENT 
WHEREFOU the partl", aoicnowleqs~ the underntandfng3 oxpressed in ~be abQv$ 
Reoitel', IlIld for good IJlld v,Juablo tJollllldemt.iQn. the reelllfp~ and 6Uftlcfcncy of whfob ill bereby 
mowleagcd, tho partlcs agree AS followsl 
I. EriinfJ.g 9J:2a.ttlU. 'Inoident to this A~m.nt. tho foUo. promisoR arc mad" 
(a) Ctm(iI.t!J.g~ PlJ1J.uil1l'/.vlu, ,4t;/len· 8MC ·~hftll ooJ)tinuo t<? provfdo to ~ a 
full. and completo detenso ImCl JOBall'~rescntation as to all pendlng, unresolved ~d·romafnIng 
m~teJli and fPtl§ Iuvolye4 In ~b, VNDBRLYJN(l ACTION, fnl;lludins·upon Bppea'4provided 
(I) BMC shan bavo no duty to Indomnify, d,flmd or bold hmmleuruMAR for and 
1rom any and aU l$au~ and matters tmnQulldfnS the cplJ~tton and cIIlfol'lJomcnt of any judgments 
entered agalnst RlMAR in tho ON.PBRL YJNG ACTION; and 
(U) »Me shan h~vo no ~My to fMcm1nJt}r. dctimd Of bold h;mnleal RlMAR for 
IfIld from any and. aU olafms which could havo b,en brought, but were no!' by DONNELLY 
asafn$t RIMAR in tho VNOlVtL YING ACTION, melvdfng but mrt Jumted to .ltau"ll1ent transfer 
alI~tiOfl$ and tbt like. 
3/U 
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(b) StiQ«lated Dismissgl D(Counterclaims to DeclaralorV Action, RIl\4AR. hereby agrees 
and stipu'lates to the dismissal. with prejuciic~. of any and all counte.rclaims~ whetber known or 
unloiown •. and whetlIet.allegecf or'Uot •. lq~rit has or mig{1t have against EMC'in the 
DE~LARATORY ACTION. RIMAR shall further execute, orcausc to be e~ecut~d, such 
additional documents'and pleadings necessal)l 10 effecti.tate the foregoing. tncluding but not. 
limited to execution ofa pleading dismissing; its counterclaims alleged against EMC in the 
DECLARATORY ACTION. 
(c) lielease ofLiability k~,/U.MAR:. RIMAR forever relea~es and discharges EMC for and 
.from any alldall actions. causes of aetioDi; grie"an~ claims 'or demands for dalllages;.jncluding; 
but not limited to,;attQmey ftc$, court costs, and litigation ~xpcnses. a.rising out of or which 
oorild hav~ arisen OUT of -
.(i) the UNDERLYING ACTlON and' the SJibje~t matter llwolved. therein; and 
{ii} the DECLARATOR.Y.ACTION and the subject matterillvolved therein; and 
(iil} EMC's handlil1~ processJl)g, investigation, trealment and disposition ofth.~ 
.jnsuranj;~ claims "~nd demands wade, O'f.·wlucb could have been made, by RIMAR andlor 
DONNELLY in relation to anyihi,ng r~]ated. In whole or in part, to the UNDERL YINO ACTION 
or its subject matter. 
(d) No Contesl Q/Dec{arntoryActioll. With respect "to the DECLARATORY ACTION. 
RlMAR snail no Jo~~t ~ntest the same, RIMAR shaH n9t 0Pp'.ose in any way EMC's e"£fOI1$ to· 
obtain ajudgmeint therein favorable to' EMC •. RlMAR shall adrnit.lhe anegat~9ns made in.the 
DECLARATORY ACTION by .EMC, and ru;MAR ~hall confess to entry of judgment against 
RlMAR in the DECLARATpRY ACTT.ON,pto\lided however that EMC and RIMAR shall each 




pc ob1igat~to satisfY tileir own attome.r fees andcourt costs incurred in tbe DECLARATORY 
·-ACTION and EMC shalf take no effort to receive It judgment for attilrney fees and CQurt costs as" 
against RIMAR in the PJ;CLARATORY ACTION~ RIMAR shall further e,ecute. qr cause to be 
eieCute~ such additional" documents.a~d plelldinga J:lec~ary to effectu&.e the foregoing. 
,2. Represelltatioils •. The partienach represent that: 
(a) at the time of execution oftbis Agreement. th~'Patty freeiy iind' voJuotarily assented to 
being bound by the tenns'and cOnditions ofthis Agreement; 
(b). at the time of exec;ution of this Agreement and during all times related to the 
n~gotiationand drafting of this Agreement, the party bad capacity to a.c:! and was knowl~geabJe 
and aware of the dealings and. effeot of this Agreement; 
~c) this:Agreementis nol bein&ex~cute4 for. an iJ/egal purpose aJid the terms and' 
con~itioll~ of this a~eenlent do not, contain any illegal subject matter; 
'Ed)Jhe pa~'y. at the time of executiofl·of Ulis Agreement and during all "times ~18ted to the 
negotiation and ~rafting of this Agreement, made no misrepres~ntations. false assertions of facts, 
and did !'lot conceal any facts; 
(e)'at ihe time of' execution ofthis Agreement and during all times. related to the 
negotiation and.:drafiing of this Agreement, the partywas.acting voluntarily and not subject to 
duress or coercion; 
(f) ihe party is unaware of ~y mutual or unilateral mistakes related (0 the fonnntion or 
execution of this Agreement; 
(g) the party bas read and understandS the teflll~. flnd conqi,(ions ofihis Agreement alld 
believes aU ofthelMo b'e fair ~4 .r~~onable; 
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( 
(ll) tb~ P.1Il1Y rcoelved UdOqll8tq conaldelrati<tn in support of OXetlutiDn onIda Agreomont. 
. -
Thesa repmcntations imall mrvlvo tbe ""caution O.t'thill AgNtmle~t ami contlnQ" until the t~nns 
and ~rlditfonf otthi, Asroement bivo been &UUled by Moh ])arty. 
3. AJQwnIDtJ'BIaJ$ !!ld~tjtlD ofnUu@!t No pmy to tWa Aareement may ~lIrd'sn 
any.d,ltts of that party under ~{It Agroemillt Without tho expro$S wriUon ooDlleni of all p~rdes to 
tlli~ ~srcemMt and mlypurpo.t.ted.MsIsnment not ~mp.JyJng wlUl .JUs seotion .hatl be 
- . 
QOfllliqm-ed invalid and ofno otlbof; NQ party to tbls Agreoment may dolegatct any dl,ltit' of that 
PIll'lY under tbJs ~ont wffllout tho IIXPreii writwn C~Q"t otall paJ't:i1l3 to Jhlll' Agroemeni 
and any. purported d~le .. tfon not complying with tbis seotlon $hall be consldcml JnVliUd and of 
no c:ffeot. 
4. I!!!U( 01 !i~~d fluk.: Booh of1ho partfes.1o lhl;s Aare.mrmt agiw~ to perLbnn and ex~to 
this A:smmcmt 'fn acoorchmoe v,:ith tho .highost standanI. of soor! faith, booc$ty In taot. Md tlIlr 
d~Uns, 
5. QOQ,~cftQa.· In tbe went tbat ,n), word,. tQrm, Of lansua.se contalnod In ()f Inoo1'pQm!.ed In' 
Ud:. Contfflot shill1 be neecssmy to re$otve an ambiguIty OJ,' ~r df~asreemollt betwol)n the partica. 
lbt wor-d, torm, 01' lansuagc Mall bo cons1Md or 1ntofP~ed aocardlng to .its pt£\(11 meanfng 
within tho col1lext in whicb It fa us~. 1'0 asceriftin plam meaning, Weblte,fg 'fhlr(i New 
/"tqJ'1Ullio1UJI D.lcJtQl1fl1,)! may "tie cOllaulted, to tho ~xol"aion of 1111 otber stmldlll'd dlctionurl08. It 
plaIn meaning does not telJolv~ tho·ambfsulty Qr 'dillll8fecmont; th(' word. trmu, or langullg.., eball 
b~ oohstmechimpty ano fairly and not tor. or ~ eltb~r of tho PMiQ lltmiCo b~ft\1S0 tpat 
pmy Qr tba1 party'lilegal ropfllf'entativ~ dm.ftfo tho CO{1tfaot:-
6 •. 1,"«01. In tll~ evont ora disPllto or dlsqn-eoment l'osar4lng pClliPrm,ooo. ~Kocut1cm. 




interpretation, or anyotb~imatter roiafl'!4 to tba,.tbm1aUon (')f thltlllment o1tbis Agr(JemC!nt: 
(a)' ali. f},fJa, 'The Jaws of 610 Stat" QfIdahO alulU SQvem all mattera, rolated to sJlO.b; 
(b) 'lJ~z.lc" fJ/'.&am.~ Th" D(strlot Coun ofthc lfl'$t Judicial, ~fillioc ottbe Stato,of 
Idtth(l. in and for the County of Bonner, sbRlI have oxoluslvo juriBdfotJon tQ boar amd ,rosfllv~ 
(0) ~J!illIIJJS!J9/Jr BRon of1ho parties:to tbftl Aatcemrmt exprlllQly consents to 
porsonafJurI,sdfotfon 1I11d vemuo III thQ,DfIl1t1ot Court oflhlJ FfM Judioia! l)isirl~, of.he State! 01 
Idaho. in and for the Co\1nty ot~Clnncr, md waives any objootfon to porsona) jmisdlction. or 
vanuo. tllttt tiles purty might bflVO: 
Cd) d!tQrMJ!I. I J!.w. 9D!l C.ewt ~t" It any party $eeka tho serviCe$ of an attomey 
rO~ng such, the prcwUlnS party upon tripl. appSIIl. 01' other judiohil dfsPolihlon shan bo 
entitled to tef~b~ement of olll'OaBonable attomey fees, Qe)ure ooGts, ;md IltlSfttiQn OKPe~oa 
Jnoumd in onforoins this A$WmOllt ~d in oollectlng on any Judgment J.'9SUlting 1hw<lfroUl., 
oxcepf auch feos, cOlta, aad expOf1sosimrurted in pl.1raui\)8' an fuv.Ud Qr unonf9roeab/o PfQVblion 
~f Ih{s Agreement. 
7. ,MJscotraneoUII. 
(I) C!J.lt~ Thfs ABI'cmTl4ltt may be ~ooutod in ,,,voral OO"Q~s. ollOh'of 
whIcb shan be deomed IUJ Qrislnal, but all of wbfeh tatcf$R togoUt", shaIl oolU,ti.tmo one illd tho 
same lnstrumCl'lt 
(b) ~t{J(!fliJ11JUnr., If my tcmn Of provJafO.n QflhJ$ Aatoement Qr tbo Itpplicatfon oiit to /lilY 
pmon or oiroumlltan~ Mall to any exf~nt bGl j~valid or un<mftlJ'Q~bJ" the remainder of1.!U:a. 





thoso to Which it is l1el« bmdld or-uJlonforooablo shall not be ,meted thentbY, and each term ()f! 
provlilon of this Apement shllll bnaUd lU.ld enforcoabJo to ~ ~1ost ",tent permitted by law 
and tn equity. 
(~) bsfJilJU!o As tho eontoxt may require 111 thl~ Apm.OR~ the use'llf any gendw' 
,(male, female, or ntutor) ahallinolud. the other gouder, and till) eingul81 ahull inolude tho pluMl 
lind the plural Ute singular. 
(d) /!JJ..ll&c£ This Agreement shall bo binding upon lUld operate to tho benofit at all 
partfea to this Agremnem attd tbolr mpcctfVG Mlrs, ~ucce~orSi legal ~a peraollll1 
rept'OHnWivMt and Jlt?nuittod ~. 
M~, The captions beading tho secticma otthis Agrooment ~e ili8crtlJd fol.' 
oonvenff'riQe'of~tbJ'(lnoo only. and hi ItQ way de1lno.·Umjt, QonfStme or 4esorlbt Ute SQOPO or 
intol'lt of any term", provilllQn. or scotkll1'oftlUl A8T<IOl1l~Qt, 
(I) Xime. RliM ~ Tima til oftho tl8St.lQeo fn tQ{' Asrtement In all particulArS. All 
t1m~ roforrt)(! to OJ' described In tlds Agreemonl 311a11 h~IMftor ~ply to the tnlnSftQtlon unllSllR. 
/fub,equcmt to tb. dato otthfiJ Ajreomonft the parties oxpres~ly agrel othorw~sa In writIng. Tho 
term ·jdflYS" meanB calendar days unless tho t\trm.''bus'ntna dn)'lJ11 is \l~ed, 
(~J.dJ!I9IIJ!C.QJIJII.. _~ch oftbe pard. Qoimowledge fbat tilt)' have hftd tho. 
opportmtity t(l aon$ult with their l'C$pl)Qt{V.,l'SDl QQtlosel'pflQ/.' tq ~nd ~$IlrdiJ.lS tho fcm~atlon., 
"xecuifon, fID~ poriQrmanoe of thfJ A~mtmf, 
(h) ~ The tlrtluro, of ofther of tho parties to flUB Agreement t~ insist I)ll the strict 
per.fbmllU1o~ of any otUl8 ~vh~lcm; oftllie ~~nt shall not ba comtrued aliI\. waiver ahny, 
$Ub~quent delhult of'the same or sImilar l1t!turo.l'IQr abdl it afti:lot ~Q pllni~' M8bt3 t() olalm 
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$trice porfQmnmco 01 any Of her porii9nB ofthill Asrefllle.nt. 
8. ~1J1Jaw! .. All oftba partlos ~,tbis A8I'teltlane 1Jg'rea that the tmns and oondltf()J\s or 
Qllli A~t and th~ <ijspaaltlotly ~ol"Uon.lfld othw matt." rtlfttod to tbJ~Uing 'the ~$ 
and conditions (lfthl,ApYomtDt'shI1JJ ~q. CONPlDl!NTlAL betwocm tho plil'tfM. and. MIln 
not be dlBoJOIe« to anyono o1toopt to tho extent that. ,(thor PIU'W fa Il'sally QQllgatod t(l d{soJQso. or 
to tfll' extent thaf any party is ,requtredto dlsolo.se to ~f:fIll tliet'Tms Md c~nditlons.of'this 
A,",emont. The pantOI mqdlaclQso tbe terms tmd o0n6ftiorta oft1lfll Apmont to a "'0\.130 or 
~rotQS$fonaJ a4vfsof1 providod web pel'SOn a~ to'~ bound by tbfs provisIon and lbat any 
0"",011 oftftls provision by lhftt person shaU 'be a broaoh tmder this Agreemqnt by the J)lW(y the 
pe~ Rpm_s, Tho p/U'tfo. shAll safe_ all confiqentia] inf<mnatfon in ~oh manner as to 
8Qsral'ltet ap.lnst its Inadvtrtent (lr nesJlpt dlsolo~ure. Thta APlUen' may be uscrd as 
cvid'Poc In IUlY snbaequant l,rooceding in whioh MY ofUlopartfes to tfils AtP'oomont allege, A 












9. ~& TfUS lNS'l'.R.UMSNT CONTAINS THB JlNAL AND CONCLUSM 
J.\.GRlEM!N'l' BBT,'WPN THE PAR1US PiR,TAlNlNCrTO ~ S,UBJ!Cl'MATTn. 
DBSCRlBJro IN ITt AND,SUP13RSBOBS AlLPlUplt AND CONTlSMPO~US 
AORBBM!NTS,1ROMISSS, WR!SBNTATlONS AM) UNOJR.STANoJNGS. oRAL 'OR. 
WlU"l'TaN. NO MO~lFlCATIONS OR AM'SNDMSNTS OF m1S AORBMNT-SRAU. BB 
BINPINOtfNLBSS R1!DlJC!D.l'O 'WJ.U'rtNa AN.D SI.0N8D .BY '11m PARTY S.OtIOHT TO 
!B.80OND. 
EXICUTltD by tho ,parties' or tnmr duly authorb:ed representatives. to bo (lfibotivc as 
PfovLdod abovo. 
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,v 
.......... J 
oAAlA G. FRIE 
~PubHc 
Staia of Idaho 
.,. - --...... - -.- -----,. 
O~:33:13 p.m. os..17~2009 
l.k,.~;;g.~~~;::;..., lO....e.;L, b.~tQro mo. J.. notllry pUbliq for the 
State of . P~Q I~ appe~ beforo an. Employers Mull1at CliJlullty C()JIIPIUlY, 
by andtliiough its above.ideiltified 8Senf. who is (or arc) porsonally known to me fo be ~CI person(s) 
$)JUl!Ued, o~ Pf()YCn to me on ~e basi" ofsa~c~evldone6 to be tfl~ pl'r$On(s) $0 named, whose 
name(s) is (or are) SltbiCdbed to the within instrument. and aolmowledsed to me thalhel$ho (or they) 
.,,,ot;lltod tho sqm.. -




RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
MICHAEL E. RAMSDEN" 
MARC A. LYONS" 
DOUGLAS S. MARFICE" 
M ICHAE!. A. EALY" 
TERRANCE R. HARRIS" 
APRIL M. LINSCOTT 
RUDY /. VERSCHOOR 
JENNIFER L. DAHLSTROM" 
CH RISTOPHER D. GABBERT 
VIRGINIA McNULTY ROBINSON 
TH ERON /. DE SMET 
WILLIAM F. BOYD. OF COUNSEl. 
Bonner County Sheriff 
Civil Section 
4001 N, Boyer Road 
Sandpoint, Idaho, 83864 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 1336 
COEUR D'ALENE. 10 B3816-1336 
TELEPHONE: (20B) 664-5818 
FACSIMILE: (208) 664-5884 
E-MAIL: flrm@ramsdenlyons.com 
WEBSITE: www.ramsdenlyons.com 
November 10, 2009 
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE SHERIFF 
Re: Donnelly v. Rimar Cpnstruction, Inc. 
Bonner County Case No. CV-06-0044S 
Name of Defendants to be executed against: Rimar Construction, Inc. 
Defendants Social Security# and/or date of birth: N/A 
Mailing address of Defendant: 
Rimar Construction, Inc. 
11707 Culvers Drive 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Employer of Defendant including their address and phone number: N/A 
Bank(s) to be served and their address: 
1. Mountain West Bank 
201 E Superior Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
STREET ADDRESS: 
700 NORTHWEST BIND. 
COEUR D'ALENE, 10 83814 
ALL ATTORNEYS LICENSED IN IDAHO 
" LICENSED IN WASHINGTON 
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2. Bank of America 
405 N. 2nd Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
3. Panhandle State Bank 
414 Church Street 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Vehicle(s) to be picked up and their vehicle inquiry forms: None identified to date. 
Misc. personal property (including description, serial#'s and location: 
1. Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's claims to 
insurance benefits and/or monies from· Employers Mutual Casualty Company 
Commercial General Liability policy number 2DI-32-9s-0s dated October 1, 2004 
through October 1, 2005 and policy number 2D1-32-9s-06 dated October 1, 2005 
through October 1, 2006. 
2. Notice and attachment of all right and interest in judgment debtor's causes of 
action and/or counterclaim(s) as set forth in Bonner County CV-2007-0088s. 
3. Notice and attachment of any and all right and interest in judgment debtor's 
contra!!tual right or claim to proceeds and/or monies from its contract to construct 
buildings five and six at the Seasons at Sandpoint Condominiums located at or about 
313 N. 1st Avenue, Sandpoint, Idaho. 
4. Notice and attachment of any and all of judgment debtor's accounts 
receivable(s) and/or right and interest in judgment debtor's contractual right or claim 
to proceeds and/or monies earned from any contracts upon which it is owed or due 
monies. 
CHOOSE ONLY ONE 
Request garnish wages at place of employment: No 
Request garnishment of Bank Account: Yes 
Request levy on personal property listed: No 
Additional information (Directions, etc.): As of November 10, 2009, the total judgment 
owed by the judgment debtor inclusive of interest is $449,625.66. Judgment creditor 
seeks levy and attachment on any and all real and/or personal property of the judgment 
debtor found in satisfaction of the judgment. Attached hereto is a true and correct copy 
of the Judgment on Special Verdict with Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant 
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Rimar Construction, Inc., dated August 14, 2008, and Amended Judgment on Special 
Verdict with Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc., 
dated March 20, 2009, and recorded March 30, 2009, Instrument #769177. Also 
attached is a copy of the Idaho Secretary of State business entity information sheet for 
Rimar Construction, Inc. 
Dated this /6 
---TI 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for PlaintiffsiCounterdefendants 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OFTHE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
DA VID DONNELLY and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife, 
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants, 
vs. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, 
DefendantlCounterclaimant. 
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Case No. CV-06-00445 
WRIT OF EXECUTION 
TO THE SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
GREETINGS: 
WHEREAS on the 20th day of March, 2009, plaintiff recovered an initial Judgment on 
Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. in 
the initial amount of $128,611.55 plus interest at the legal rate (7.625%) as entered on August 
14, 2008, and fmal Amended Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of Plaintiffs 
and Defendant Rimar Construction Inc. in the amended amount of $425,545.44 to accrue 
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interest at the legal rate (7.625% to July 1, 2009 and 5.625% after July 1, 2009) as entered on 
March 20, 2009 in the District Court of the State of Idaho, County of Bonner, against the 
defendant, Rimar Construction, Inc., for the total sum of $449,625.66, plus interest accrued at the 
legal rate from entry of the initial judgment on August 14,2008 up and until November 10, 2009 
as follows: 
Judgment Amount $128,611.55 $431,402.55 $440,594.97 
Interest on 
Judgment 0.07625 0.07625 0.05625 
InteresVYr $9,806.63 $32,894.44 $24,783.47 
DayslYr 365 365 365 
Per Day Rate $26.87 $90.12 $67.90 
Days 218 102 133 
$24,080.2 
Total Interest $5,857.11 $9,192.42 $9,030.69 2 
Total with Interest ~134.468.66 $440,594.97 $449,625.66 
Fees and Costs $296,933.89 
Total March 20, 
2009 $431,402.55 
Note: Rate of Interest on Money Judgments was 7.625% effective July 1, 2008 
Rate of Interest on Money Judgments was 5.625% effective July 1, 2009 
AND, WHEREAS, that final Amended Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to 
Claims of Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction Inc. was duly filed in the Clerk's office 
of the District Court of the First Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of 
Bonner, on March 20, 2009 and that Judgment' was duly recorded as a judgment lien with the 
Bonner County Recorder on March 30, 2009; 
NOW, you, the Sheriff of Bonner County, are hereby required to satisfy said Judgment, 
with t~e accrued interest 8B aforesaid, out of the personal property of the defendant Rimar 
Construction, Inc., the judgment debtor, or if sufficient property of said debtor cannot be found, 
then out of the real property in Bonner County belonging to said judgment debtor on the date of 
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service of this writ, and make return of this writ within sixty (60) days after the receipt,hereof, 
with what you have done endorsed thereon. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this n day of ~I oOcm bee 2009. 
Marie Scott, Clerk 
B 
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DOPCLAS B. ~...... 
CINDY ILLIOTT 
JA.J\aS S. l\fACDONALD 
-ALSO LlCENSW IN COLORADO 
tolJ.SO LrCllNSED IN WASUlNGTO,," 
ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW 
102 SOUTH EUCLID AVENUE, SUITE 307 
P. O. BOX 1049 
SANDPOINT, IDAHO 83864-0855 
TELEPHONE (208) 263-8517 
FACSIMILE (208) 263-0759 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Bonner County Sheriff 
Attn: Chief Civil Deputy 
400 1 North 'Boyer 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
cc: Larry Goins, Bonner County Prosecutor's Office 
Mike Ealy, Esq., Ramsden & Lyons, LLP 
From: Ford Elsaesser 
Date: November 24, 2009 
Re: First District Court of Idaho for Bonner County 
Case No; CV-06-0044S 









DONNA LaRUE, CLA 
PAAAU:OAL 
LOIS La POINTE, RP 
LEGAL ASSISTANT TO FORI> J!LSAliSS'ER. 
Reference is made to a WRIT OF EXECUTION issued on November 10,2009, with 
regard to the above-entitled matter. 
Please be advised. that. R1MAR CONStRUCTION, INC. owns no .property, real or 
personal. Further, RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC. owns no equipment, heavy 
equipment, titled or untitled motor vehicles, tools, receivables, inventory, or any other 
personal property of any description. The only property owned by RIMAR 
CONSTRUCTION, INC. was a bank account which was used to pay some tailing phone 
bi11~ after the company sh:ut down. Those funds have already been garnished by your 
office for the benefit of the judgment creditor. 
I wanted to advise the Sheriff s Department of these facts so that any further action that is 
~ or not taken, will be with the full kn:l::e of these circEiHIBIT ~ 
ELSA JARZ ANDE MARKS Fax:12082630759 
Bonner County Sheriff, Chief Civil Deputy 
November 24; 2009 
Page 2 
Nov 24 2009 15:04 P.03 
Please contact me if you have any questions of any kind Please note that this judgment 
has no effect or impact onlV AN RIMAR, personally, or on any other company with 
which he is assoCiated. 
Thank you. 
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State of IDAHO 
Bonner County Sheriff's Office 
Civil Division 
4001 N. Boyer Ave. 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Defendant Disposition: 
Rimar Construction 
1707 Culvers Drj PO Box 6 Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Garnishee Disposition: SRU Served, returned unsatisfied 
Mountain West Bank 
201 E Superior St Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Served on: 13th day'of November, 2009 
Served to: Cassidie Spinney 
201 E Superior St 
by Peasha, J 
Manager 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Bank of America 
402 N 2nd Ave Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Served on: 13th day of November, 2009 by Peasha, J 
Served to: Lynn Jennings Assistant Manager 
402 N 2nd Ave Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Panhandle State Bank 
414 Church St Sandpoint, ID 83864 
Served on: 13th day of November, 2009 by Peasha, J 
Served to: Kelly Glenn 
414 Church St Sandpoint, ID 
Plaintiff Disposition: 
David Michael Donnelly 
3662 Cocolalla Loop Road Cocolalla, ID 83813 
Attorney Disposition: 
Michael A Ealy Atty 
PO Box 1336 Coeur d'Alene, ID 83814 
Manager 
83864 
Process Number: C09-01949 Court Number: CV06-445 
I, Daryl D Wheeler, Sheriff of Bonner County Sheriff's Office do hereby certify 
that I received the foregoing Writ of Execution on the 12th day of November, 
2009 . 











Daryl D ~ler, Sheriff 
Bonner ounjy Sheriff's Office, IDAHO 
BY: 'I/Ir~~,~,._~".r... 
11/17/09 Mailed instructions to defendant. cmw EXHIBIT f 371 
07/08/10 15:21 FAX 2083424657 RINGERT LAW 
141 002/009 
JAMES G. REID, ISB # 1372 
DAVID P. CLAIBORNE, IS8 # 6579 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERE:D 
455 South Third Street i 
P. O. Box 2773 
Boise, Idaho 83701·2773 : 
Telephone: (208) 3424591 i 
Facsimile: (208) 342-4657' 
E-mail;dpc@ringertlaw.com: 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
i 
STATE OF IDAHu 
COUNTY OF BONNEr~ 
FIRST JUDICIAL DIS T. 
ZDlO .JUl -8 P 2: 2b 
hARiE ~~u j ; 
CLERK DISTRICT COUfn 
~ 
DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT CQURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUAL TV 




RIMAR CONSTRUCTION, INC., an 
Idaho corporation; and DAVID and 
KATHY DONNELLY, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV-2007-00885 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME 
AND CONTINUANCE OF HEARING 
COMES NOW. Plaintiff, Employers Mutual Casualty Company, pursuantto I.R.C.P. 
I' 
7(b)(1) and 7(b)(3), and move$ this Court for an Order extending the time for Plaintiff to file 
! 
a responsive brief to Def~ndant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Reconsideration dated July ~; 2010 and moves this Court for an Order continuing the 
I:· 
hearing scheduled for July 21,1'2010 on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration to a date 
I: 
convenient to Court and counsel. 
I .. 
!: 
This Motion is based upon the Memorandum filed in support hereof and upon the 




.07/08/10 15:21 FAX 2083424657 RINGERT LAW IgJ 003/009 
records and files in this proLeding. 
Counsel certifies he Jttempted, but Was unable to obtain the agreement of opposing 
counsel to the relief requ+d hereby. Counsel further certifies he has not previously 
requested by motion a contTuance or extension of time in this action. 
Oral argument is specifically requested via telephonic participation. 
Respectfully sUbmitt~ this 8th day of July, 2010. 
RINGERT LAW CHARTERED 
by: 





07/08/10 15: 22 FAX 20834246,57 RINGERT LAW 
I4J 004/009 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This does hereby certify that oli the 8th day of July, 2010, he served the foregoing 
document via facsimile as follows: 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, WA 99201 
(509) 625-1909 
Marc A. Lyons 
Michael A. Ealy 
Ramsden & lyons 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
(208) 664-5884 
MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TIME AND CONTINUANCE OF HEARING- 3 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
ZOIO JUL -8 A II: 2S 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMP ANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 
DONNELLY, husband and wife; 
Defendants. 
CASE NO.CV-07-00885 
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION 
FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 
ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COME NOW Defendants Donnelly, by and through their attorneys of record, 
Ramsden & Lyons, LLP, and pursuant to LR.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B) moves this Court for 
reconsideration of its Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment of April 7, 
2010, on the parties respective motions for summary judgment on the grounds set forth in the 
Donnelly'S Memorandum in Support filed herewith. 
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT- 1 
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This motion is based on the accompanying Memorandum in Support thereof and the 
record on file herein, including the parties' prior Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment and 
the memoranda and affidavits filed in support thereof. 
Oral argument is requested. 
DATED this '7 day ofJuly, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
By __ ~~~~~~ __ ~ ________ __ 
Mi 
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT- 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 7-'day of July, 2010, I served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to the following: 
James G. Reid 
, David P.· Claiborne 
Ringert Clark Chartered 
P.O. Box 2773 
Boise,ID 83701-2773 
Stephen D. Phillabaum 
Phillabaum, Ledlin, Matthews & Sheldon 
421 W. Riverside, Suite 900 
Spokane, W A 99201 
Brent C. Featherston 
Featherston Law Firm 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint, ID 83864 
M 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
_ Ijand Delivered 
_0'_ Faa(csimile (208) 342-4657 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
~csimile (509) 625-1909 
US Mail 
__ Overnight Mail 
Hand Delivered 
V'Pacsimile (208) 263-0400 
DEFENDANT D01\TNELLY'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT- 3 
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RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
700 Northwest Blvd. 
P.O. Box 1336 
Coeur d'Alene, ID 83816-1336 
Telephone: (208) 664-5818 
Facsimile: (208) 664-5884 
Michael A. Ealy, ISB #5619 
Marc A. Lyons, ISB #3145 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BONNER 
EMPLOYERS MUTUAL CASUALTY 
COMPANY, an Iowa Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RIMAR CONSTRUCTION INC., an Idaho 
Corporation; and DAVID and KATHY 




MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
COME NOW Defendants David and Kathy Donnelly, by and through their counsel of 
record, and submit this memorandum in support of their Motion for Reconsideration. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On January 20, 2010, the plaintiff, Employer's Mutual Casualty Company ("EMC") and 
the defendants, David and Kathy Donnelly ("Donnellys") made oral arguments in support of 
respective cross motions for summary judgment. On April 7, 20 I 0, the court issued its Order 
Denying Cross-Motions For Summary Judgment The Donnelly'S bring this motion to 
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 1 
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reconsider the denial of their prior motion for summary judgment based on the reasons and 
grounds set forth herein. 
II. UNDISPUTED FACTS (CONDENSED). 
F or the purpose of their Motion to Reconsider, the Donnellys incorporate by reference 
their prior Statement of Undisputed Facts set forth in their Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment dated December 18, 2009. For ease of reference, a condensed set of 
undisputed facts are repeated herein. 
1. From June 23, 2008 through July 9,2008, the Underlying Litigation of Donnelly 
v. Rimar Construction, Inc., Bonner County CV-06-00445 was tried to a jury. (Reid Aff. 1119/09 
Ex. F). On July 9, 2008, the jury rendered a Special Verdict in favor of Donnelly awarding 
damages in the total amount of $128,611.55. (Reid Aff. 1119/09 Ex. 's E, F). By Special Verdict, 
the jury awarded the Donnelly's $126,611.55 in damages for breach of the implied warranty of 
workmanship; $1,000 in damages for failure to provide required disclosures pursuant to the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act; and $1,000 in damages for other violations of the Idaho 
Consumer Protection Act. (Reid Aff. 1119/09 Ex. E, pp. 8-9). 
2. On August 14, 2008, Judgment on Special Verdict With Regard to Claims of 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. ("Judgment") was entered in the Underlying 
Litigation in the total amount of $128,611.55 to accrue post-judgment interest pursuant to Idaho 
Code § 28-22-104(2). (Reid Aff. 1119/09 Ex. F). 
3.. On February 13, 2009, an Order On Post-Trial Motions was entered in the 
Underlying Litigation finding the Donnelly's to be prevailing parties in the Underlying 
Litigation as against ReI and awarding further costs in the amount of$19,871.89 and attorney's 
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fees in the am9unt of $277,062.00. (Reid Aff. 11/9/09 Ex. G). The total cost award was 
$296,933.89. 
4. On March 20, 2009, Amended Judgment On Special Verdict With Regard to 
Claims of Plaintiffs And Defendant Rimar Construction, Inc. ("Amended Judgment") was 
entered in the Underlying Litigation in the total amount of $425,545.44 to accrue post-judgment 
interest pursuant to Idaho Code § 28-22-104(2). (Reid Aff. 11/9/09 Ex. H). On March 30, 2009, 
the Amended Judgment was recorded in Bonner County as record instrument number 769177. 
(Ealy Aff.l2118/09 Ex. J). 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Rule 1 1 (a)(2)(B) IRCP governs motions for reconsideration and provides in pertinent 
part as follows: 
A motion for reconsideration of any interlocutory orders of the trial court may be 
made at any time before the entry of final judgment but not later than fourteen 
(14) days after entry of the final judgment. 
When considering a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order pursuant to this 
section, the trial court should take into account any new facts presented by the moving party that 
bear upon the correctness of an interlocutory order; the burden is on the moving party to bring 
the trial court's attention to the new facts. Coeur d'Alene Mines Co. v. First Nat'/ Bank, 118 
Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990). 
This view of the effect of Rule 11(a)(2)(B) is consistent with the discussion of 
reconsideration in J.! Caseco v. McDonald, 76 Idaho 223, 280 P.2d 1070 (1955). In that case, 
the court noted: 
A rehearing or reconsideration in the trial court usually involves new or additional 
facts, and a more comprehensive presentation of both law and fact. Indeed, the 
chief virtue of reconsideration is to obtain a full and complete presentation of all 
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 3 
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available facts, so that the truth may be ascertained and justice may be done as 
nearly as may be. 
Jd. at 229, 280 P.2d at 1070. 
IV. LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
SUbject to the Donnellys pending Motion to Amend, the historical dispute between EMC 
and the Donnellys has centered around two issues. The first issue is whether the jury's damage 
award of$128,6l1.55 against RCI is covered as "property damage" under the EMC CGL policy 
and, therefore, payable to the Donnellys as claimants and judgment creditors of RCI. The 
Donnellys say "yes." EMC says "no." Regardless of the answer to this first question, the 
second issue is whether EMC has an independent and supplementary obligation to pay the 
Donnellys attorney's fees and costs of $296,933.89 awarded and taxed as costs against RCI in 
the Underlying Litigation. Again, the Donnellys say "yes" and EMC says "no." By this motion 
to reconsider, the Donnelly's ask the court reconsider the Donnelly's prior motion for summary 
judgment based on the grounds set forth below. 
A. WHETHER THE JURY'S DAMAGE AWARD OF $128,611.55 AGAINST RCI IS 
COVERED AS "PROPERTY DAMAGE" UNDER THE EMC CGL POLICY 
AND, THEREFORE, PAYABLE TO THE DONNELLYS AS CLAIMANTS AND 
JUDGMENT CREDITORS OF RCI. 
1. Cross Motions Operate As A Stipulation To That No Genuine Issue of Fact 
Exists to Preclude Entry of Summary Judgment. 
By filing cross motions for summary judgment, the Donnellys and EMC were effectively 
stipulating that there were no genuine issues of material fact that would preclude the court from 
entering summary judgment. Davis v. Peacock, 133 Idaho 637, 640, 991 P.2d 362,365 (1999) 
(citations omitted). While filing cross motions alone doesn't necessarily establish that there 
is no issue of genuine fact, it nevertheless operates as a stipulation that no genuine issues 
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 4 
exist that would preclude entry of summary judgment. Therefore, on reconsideration, the 
court can consider that the intent of the parties' cross motions was to effectively stipulate that 
no genuine issue of fact existed that would otherwise preclude the court from entering 
summary judgment. 
In addition, the court can and should consider that the Donnellys have or intend to 
waive any prior demand for jury trial that was raised in their prior Answer and Cross Claim. 
Therefore, the court in this instant matter will necessarily be the finder of fact on any 
contested factual issues. 
2. Allocation of the Jury Special Verdict Damage Award. 
In issuing its Order Denying Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment, the court found 
that "there remains a question as to whether or not the damages sustained by the Donnellys 
were property damage or contract based damages." (Order, pg. 6). In other words, the court 
determined there remained a genuine question of fact regarding how to allocate the jury's 
damage award in the Underlying Litigation for the purposes of determining whether the 
damages were "covered" or "uncovered" under the EMC policy. Because the jury in the 
Underlying Litigation was never asked to allocate its damage award in a manner that might 
lend itself to a characterization as "covered" and/or "uncovered" damages, the court appears 
to recognize the jury's damage award as a general verdict that may include "covered" and/or 
"uncovered" damages. 
A similar issue was faced in Idaho case of Buckley v. Orem, 112 Idaho 117, 730 P.2d 
1037 (Ct. App. 1986). In Buckley, Kelly and Betsy Buckley suffered personal injuries in a 
car wreck caused by the minor son of Chades and Donna Orem. Id. at 119, 730 P .2d at 1039. 
While Kelly Buckley suffered extensive personal injuries, his wife's injuries were relatively 
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minor. Id. Following a trial, the jury returned a Special Verdict awarding the Buckley's a 
lump sum award of $115,000 for personal injuries -to both Kelly and Betsy and $10,000 to 
Betsy for loss of consortium. Id. A total judgment of $125,000 was thereafter entered 
against the Orems. Id. 
At the time of the accident, the Orems were insured by Nationwide Mutual Insurance 
Company ("Nationwide"). Buckley, at 119, 730 P.2d 1039. Pursuant to Nationwide's auto 
policy, the stated limits were $100,000 per person per occurrence. Id. Because the jury's 
Special Verdict combined the personal injury award of Kelly and Betsy Buckley into one 
lump sum of $115,000, this created an issue as to Nationwide's total liability to Kelly 
Buckley under its $100,000 per person policy limit and whether it had to pay the total 
judgment of$125,000. Id. 
Following entry of the $125,000 judgment, the Orems filed certain post-trial motions 
including a motion asking the trial court to allocate the damages between Kelly and Betsy 
Buckley. Buckley, at 119, 730 P.2~ at 1039. The trial court denied the Orems post-trial 
motion to allocate the verdict. Id. Before the Orems' time to appeal .had run, the trial court 
allowed Nationwide to intervene in the action, in part, to contest its liability on the final 
judgment to Orem. Id. Following its intervention, Nationwide and the Buckley's filed cross 
motions for summary judgment, in part, seeking a determination of Nationwide's liability on 
the final judgment. Id. On summary judgment, the trial court ruled in favor of Buckley and 
found Nationwide liable for the total judgment. Id. Nationwide appealed. Id. 
On appeal, the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that the case presented an issue of first 
impression in Idaho. Buckley, at 125, 730 P.2d at 1045. In doing so, the Court of Appeals 
adopted what it characterized as the "majority rule" which it outlined as follows: 
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 6 
This rule requires the party seeking recovery to first show the claim is 
apparently within policy coverage. The insurer then bears the burden of 
producing evidence showing- a substantial likelihood of overpayment should 
the unallocated verdict be paid. It is then up to the claimant to prove that 
overpayment would not occur by full payment of the verdict. 
Id. at 122, 730 P.2d at 1042 (citing Universal Underwriters Insurance Corp. v. Reynolds, 129 
So.2d 689 (Fla. App. 1961) (further citations omitted). In making application of the majority 
rule, the Court of Appeals recognized that the Buckley's had obtained an unapportioned 
verdict for $115,000 and Nationwide had shown a substantial likelihood of overpayment to 
Kelly Buckley based on its $100,000 per person policy limit. The Court of Appeals also 
recognized that since the Buckley's could not prove all the damages awarded to Kelly came 
within the policy limits, the Buckley's would lose unless they were relieved of their burden 
of proof for other reasons. Buckley, at 123, 730 P.2d at 1043. 
In addressing whether the Buckley's were relieved of their burden of proof, the Court 
of Appeals relied on the federal Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals case of Duke v. Hoch. Id. at 
122-23,730 P.2d at 142-1043 (citing Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d 973 (5 th Cir. 1972). In Duke, 
Anthony Duke obtained a general judgment for $226,266 against his accounting firm and its 
individual partners (herein "Hoch"). Duke, 468 F.2d at 975. At the trial, Hoch was defended 
by its professional liability carrier, Home Indemnity Corporation ("Home"). Id. Thereafter, 
Duke, as a judgment creditor of Hoch, sought to satisfy the judgment through a garnishment 
action on the Home policy. Id. The garnishment action was tried without a jury to the same 
district judge that presided over the underlying liability case. Id. The district judge rendered 
a verdict for Home and Duke appealed. 14. 
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At issue in the Duke case was whether Home was liable to pay damages for liability 
on what was referred therein as the "trust account claim." Id. at 974-975. The tmst account 
claim was based on the intentional conduct on the part of one of the individual accountants 
and, therefore, characterized as an "uncovered" as opposed to "covered" claim under the 
intentional conduct exclusion found in the Home policy. Id. at 975. 
At the garnishment trial, the district court applied the majority rule and found that 
sInce Home had proven the trust account claim was intentional conduct and, therefore 
uncovered, and since Duke could not thereafter prove a precise portion of the unallocated 
verdict for which Home would be further responsible, that Home had prevailed and was not 
liable to pay any portion of the general verdict. Duke, at 974-975. The district judge never 
considered whether, under the circumstances, Duke should be relieved of its burden of proof. 
Id. 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals noted (as the district judge had) that, 
under the circumstances, it was impossible for Duke to meet his burden of proof. Id. at 975. 
Home conceded that impossibility and noted that it was seeking to take advantage of a "very 
technical defense." Id. The Court noted that unless Duke was relieved of his burden, Home 
would otherwise prevail. Id. In concluding that Duke was relieved of its burden, the Court 
scrutinized the conduct and relationship between Home and Hoch defendants in the 
underlying case. Id. at 977-984 (emphasis added). 
In doing so, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis with the following 
observation. 
The insurer undertaking the defense of a suit against its insured and having the 
right to control the litigation must meet a high standard of conduct. 
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'The right to control the litigation in all of its aspects carries -
with it the correlative duty to exercise diligence, intelligence, 
good faith, honest and conscientious fidelity to the common 
interest of the parties. . . . When the insurer undertakes the 
defense of the claim or suit, it acts as the agent of its assured in 
virtue of the contract of insurance between the parties, and when 
a conflict arises between the insurer, as agent, and assured, as 
principal, the insurer's conduct will be subject to closer scrutiny 
than that of the ordinary agent, because of his adverse 
interest. ' ... 
Id. (quoting Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Rudco Oil & Gas Co., 129 F.2d 621,627 (10th Cir. 
1942) (citations omitted). The Court noted that "[o]n the other side of the coin the insured is 
bound under the cooperation clause." Id. at 978. The Court recognized that Home had an 
interest in the Duke verdict not being allocated. Duke, 468 F.2d at 979 (emphasis added). 
The Court reasoned as follows: 
Home, in control of the defense, has protected its interest and secured for itself 
an escape from responsibility at the expense of the insureds, who remain 
personally liable for the full judgment, unprotected even to the extent they 
have paid for protection. Having gained that advantage, Home insists upon it. 
The consequence to the insureds of a nonallocated verdict is the catastrophic 
total loss of coverage. The risks to the insurer in requesting an allocated 
verdict are of no such magnitude, if of any consequence at all. 
Id., at 979. 
In relieving Duke of his evidentiary burden, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
analysis is further paraphrased and condensed as follows: 
Thus, at the merits trial Home's counsel was required to make known to the 
insured the availability of a special verdict and the divergence of interest 
between them and the insurer springing from whether damages were or were 
not allocated. The record before us does not indicate that counsel did so. 
Once Home's counsel disclosed the situation, the insureds, represented by their 
own retained counsel, would be entitled to make the decision whether to seek 
an allocated verdict. The presence of insured's own counsel did not dispense 
with the necessity of insurer's counsel discharging his responsibility to 
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disclose fully the precise situation before proceeding, as counsel having the 
right to control the defense, with a course of action inuring wholly to the 
insurer's benefit and wholly to the insureds' detriment. 
Since on the present record the insurer failed to fully advise its insureds of the 
divergence of interest between it and them with respect to the verdict, the 
insureds must, subject to the possibility noted in part III, infra, be freed of the 
impossible burden of proof placed on them. We discuss below in part III the 
procedure on remand. 
Id., at 980-9-83. In remanding the matter back to the district court, the Court further 
concluded as follows: 
In the District Court a threshold question is whether at the merits trial insurer's 
counsel, by some means not revealed by the present record, discharged his 
responsibility of notifying the insureds of their interest in the form of the 
verdict. If insurer cannot show that it did, the court will face the issue of 
attempting retrospectively to allocate the damages awarded. In saying that 
Duke is relieved of his burden, we refer to the "risk of non-persuasion." IX 
Wigmore, The Law of Evidence § 2485 (3d ed. 1940). Duke continues to have 
the burden of producing "a quantity of evidence fit .... to form a reasonable 
basis for the [judgment]," id. § 2487, at 279 (italics omitted). The primary 
source of evidence will be, of course, the transcript of the merits trial, 
containing the evidence on which the jury based its verdict. The trial judge, as 
trier of fact, will be in the position of establishing as best he can the allocation 
which the jury would have made had it been tendered the opportunity to do so. 
If it is impossible for the court to make a meaningful allocation based on only 
the transcript, Duke should have the right to adduce additional evidence and 
Home to present evidence in rebuttal. 
Duke, 468 F.2d at 984. The Court rejected Home's argument that its prior reservation of 
rights was sufficient notification to its insureds. Id., 468 F.2d at 980. 
In following the Duke holding, the Idaho Court of Appeals in Buckley, likewise 
relieved the Buckley's of their impossible burden and, in remanding the matter back to the 
trial court, concluded that: 
If Nationwide cannot show that it informed the Orems of their interest 
m the verdict form then the trial court should proceed retrospectively to 
allocate the damages award, as best it can, and then to apply the policy limits 
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to detennine whether Nationwide IS liable for any additional part of the 
unsatisfied judgment. 
Buckley, 112 Idaho at 125, 730 P.2d at 1045. 
In this case, there is no dispute that EMC defended its insured, RCI (and Ivan Rimar), 
through the Underlying Litigation in this matter and that RCI was defended by counsel 
appointed by EMC. Although EMC is the plaintiff and has the initial burden of proof in this 
action, the Donnelly's met any initial burden invoked by application of the majority rule cited 
in Buckley and have initially shown that their liability claim against RCI was and is 
"apparently" within EMC's policy coverage. In part, this is evidenced by the fact that EMC 
undertook a defense of RCI based on the Donnellys claims being apparently covered under 
the EMC policy. Otherwise, EMC would have simply denied the claim. In addition, this 
apparent coverage served as the underlying factual and/or legal basis for the previous stay 
entered in this action pending a trial of the Underlying Litigation. In other words, if there 
was no apparent coverage, there was no apparent basis to stay this action pending a trial in 
the Underlying Litigation. 
Therefore, in application of the majority rule cited by Buckley, this necessarily left the 
burden on EMC, in this action, to show a substantial likelihood of overpayment should the 
Donnellys unallocated verdict be paid. However, unlike Nationwide in Buckley, EMC can't 
meet this burden because the Special Verdict makes no allocation of the damages that would 
otherwise allow EMC to show a substantial likelihood of overpayment should the unallocated 
verdict be paid. This is because EMC's policy limit was $1,000,000 per occurrence and the 
Donnellys initial judgment of $128,611.55 was well below and within EMC's stated policy 
limit. 
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In addition, to date there is no evidence in the record that EMC informed or otherwise 
sought to inform RCI of its interest in the Special Verdict form in the Underlying Litigation 
and the risks to RCI in the event it sought an unallocated verdict. Both the Duke and 
Buckley decisions recognize the patent unfairness in the application of the majority rule in 
allowing· an insurer, like EMC, to control the defense of its insured and, in doing so, 
potentially escape liability at the expense of its insured (and judgment creditor) by obtaining 
an unallocated verdict that later places an impossible burden on the insured's (and judgment 
creditor) to prove coverage. 
In this case, the Donnellys are arguably in the same position as the plaintiffs 
Anthony Duke and Kelly and Betsy Buckley having obtained a judgment against an insured 
party and now having to fight with its liability insurer over the allocation of an unallocated 
verdict as "covered" or "uncovered" in a later action. The harshness in the majority rule 
recognized in Duke and Buckley, is placing the burden on parties, like the Donnellys, to 
allocate an unallocated verdict when, in reality, it is in the interest of the insurer (EM C) and 
its insured (RCI) to seek such an allocation in the underlying litigation. That is particularly 
true in this case where EMC controlled the defense of RCI and had a pending (albeit stayed) 
declaratory judgment action at the time of the trial in the Underlying Litigation. 
Therefore, the court in this case can find from the undisputed factual record that the 
Donnellys have met any initial burden that would be placed on them to show their liability 
claims were apparently within EMC's policy coverage and since EMC cannot, and has not, 
met its burden to prove a substantial likelihood of overpayment should the unallocated 
verdict be paid, the court can grant the Donnelly'S prior motion for summary judgment and 
allocate the $128,611.55 verdict as payable under the EMC policy because it would clearly 
DEFENDANT DONNELLY'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION - 12 
fall within EMC's $1,000,000 per occurrence policy limits. 
In the alternative, should the court find that EMC has or otherwis~ could show a 
substantial likelihood of overpayment if the unallocated verdict was paid, then the court can 
further apply the rationale of Duke and Buckley and relieve the Donnelly's of their burden to 
prove coverage and place the burden on EMC to show that it informed RCI of its interest in 
the Special Verdict form and, if so, the court can then allocate the damages "as best it can." 
See Buckly v. Orem, 112 Idaho 117, 125, 730 P.2d 1037, 1045 (Ct. App. 1986) (notably the 
Buckly court doesn't indicate how the trial court is to allocate the damages only stating that it 
do it "the best it can"). In following Duke, this might include the court reviewing the 
Underlying Litigation trial transcript containing evidence on which the jury based its verdict 
so the court, as the finder of fact and "as best it can" can make the allocation the jury would 
have made had it been given the opportunity to do so. See Duke v. Hoch, 468 F.2d 973, 984 
B. WHETHER EMC HAS A SUPPLEMENTARY OBLIGATION TO PAY THE 
DONNELLYS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS OF $296,933.89 AWARDED 
AND TAXED AS COSTS AGAINST RCI IN THE UNDERLYING LITIGATION. 
1. The Plain Language Of The EMC Policy. 
The EMC policy is organized by "Sections." Section I is labeled "COVERAGES" and 
includes four (4) capitalized and bold subparts labeled COVERAGE A BODILY INJURY 
AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY; COVERAGE B PERSONAL AND 
ADVERTISING INJURY LIABILIY; COVERAGE C MEDICAL PAYMENTS; and 
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS-COVERAGES A AND B. (ld.) (emphasis added). 
Coverage "A" is further organized by two (2) subparts labeled 1. Insuring Agreement and 2. 
Exclusions. In simple terms, the exclusions found in subpart (2) operate to "take away" or 
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exclude from the promise to insure or "cover" pursuant to the insuring agreement found in 
subpart ( 1). 
The Insuring Agreement found in Section I, Coverage A, subpart 1 a. provides as follows: 
We [EMC] will pay those sums [money] that the insured [RCI] becomes legally 
obligated to pay [Special Verdict/Donnelly Judgment} as damages because of 
"bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies. [Donnelly 
argues the special verdict was for "property damage" and, therefore, the 
insurance applies}. We [EMC] will have the right and duty to defend the insured 
[ReI] against any "suit" seeking those damages [Underlying Litigation). 
However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any "suit" seeking 
damages for "bodily injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance does 
not apply. [EMC already defended RCI in the Underlying Litigation]. 
No other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered 
unless explicitly provided for under Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and 
B. [EMC provides no other "coverage" unless explicitly provided for under the 
Supplemental Payments-Coverages A and B.} 
The policy language found in Section I, Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and B provides 
as follows: 
SUPPLEMENTARY PAYMENTS - COVERAGES A AND B 
1. We [EMC] will pay, with respect to any claim we investigate, settle, or any 
"suit" against an insured we defend [i.e. EMC defended RCI in the Underlying 
Litigation.) : 
e. All costs taxed against the insured in the "suit." [i.e. attorney's fees and 
costs taxed against RCI in the Underlying Litigation.] 
g. All interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues after entry of 
the judgment and before we have paid, offered to pay, or deposited in the 
court the part of the judgment that is within the applicable limit of insurance. 
[i. e. All interest on the foil amount of the Donnelly judgment.} 
These payments will not reduce the limits of insurance. [i.e. The obligation to 
make supplementary payments is an independent promise from the promise to pay 
damages for bodily injury or property damage.} 
(Reid Aff. ! 1/9/09 Ex. A. ) (emphasis added.) 
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2. The Rules Regarding the Construction of Insurance Policies. 
In Idaho, insurance policies are interpreted under general rules of contract construction 
subject to certain special rules of construction. Arregon v. Fanners Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 
Idaho 459, 461, 180 P.3d 498,500 (2008) (citation omitted.) In general, for a policy to be 
ambiguous it must be reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations. Id. (citations omitted). 
Because insurance policies are contracts of adhesion--typically not subject to negotiation 
between the parties-a special rule of construction is "that any ambiguity that exists in the 
contract must be construed most strongly against the insurer." Id. (citation omitted.) 
Therefore, a policy provision that seeks to exclude the insurer's coverage must be strictly 
construed in favor of the insured. Id. (citation omitted). This places the burden on the 
"insurer to use clear and precise language if it wishes to restrict the scope of its coverage." 
Id. Whether an insurance policy is ambiguous is a question of law. Id (emphasis added). 
3. Application of the Rules of Construction to the Language of the Policy. 
Under the general rules of contract construction, the first issue is to detennine whether the 
EMC policy language is ambiguous or not. Whether the policy language is ambiguous or not, is 
a question of law for the court. Since the EMC policy is a contract of adhesion, any ambiguity in 
the policy must be construed against EMC. In its Order Denying Cross Motions For Summary 
Judgment, while the court didn't specifically state whether it had found the EMC policy to be 
ambiguous or unambiguous, it apparently found the parties' respective arguments over 
application of the EMC policy language to result in some question of fact that otherwise 
precluded the entry of summary judgment in favor of either party. (Order at p. 6). 
However, with due respect, should the court find tIre policy language to be unambiguous, 
then that resolves any perceived questions of fact regarding application of the policy's 
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unambiguous language. As applied in this case, the EMC policy unambiguously provides that 
EMC has "[nJo other obligation or liability to pay sums or perform acts or services is covered 
unless explicitly provided/or under Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and B." (emphasis 
in original). Assuming arguendo that EMC had "no other obligation or liability to payor 
perform acts or services" under either Coverage A or B, that doesn't end the analysis on what 
EMC has promised to pay. This is because the unambiguous remainder of the sentence provides 
"unless explicitly provided/or under Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and B." Therefore, 
even if EMC had no other obligation or liability to pay under either Coverage A or B, EMC has 
to look to see if it made an "independent" promise-i.e. one "explicitly provided for under 
Supplementary Payments-Coverages A and B" to determine if it has made a supplementary 
promise to pay. 
There is no ambiguity in this policy language. It is susceptible to only this one 
reasonable construction. Therefore, as a matter of law, the court can find there is no ambiguity in 
EMC's policy and, therefore, the promises made in the Supplementary Payments section of the 
policy are "independent" from EMC's promises and/or exclusions from coverage found under 
section I, Coverage A or B. 
Having made this finding, as a matter of law, the court can than look at the unambiguous 
language of the EMC Supplementary Payments language set forth above. There is no ambiguity 
in EMC's supplementary promise to pay "[a]II costs taxed against the insured in the 'suit. ,,, The 
only reasonable construction of this language is that EMC promised to pay the Donnel1ys 
attorney's fees and costs taxed against RCI in the Underlying Litigation. There is no other 
reasonable construction of this language. Therefore, as a matter of law, the court can find this 
language to be unambiguous and give it is plain meaning and, thereby grant the Donnel1ys 
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Id., at 389-392. In short, the Court found Philadephia's arguments to lack merit. Id. at 390. 
In EMC v. Philadelphia, EMC was awarded $400,000 against Philadelphia based on the 
same supplementary payments language that is found in its own policy at issue in this case. This 
undercuts EMC's purported reliance on the Mintarsih decision and demonstrates the error EMC 
invites in attempt to circumvent the persuasive, if not controlling, authority of Mutual of 
Enumclaw v. Harvey, infra. In this case EMC defended RCI through trial in the Underlying 
Litigation in full recognition that-regardless of whether EMC had a duty to indemnify RCI or 
not following a jury verdict-- the Donnelly'S could prevail and, therefore, be awarded their 
attorney fees and costs to be taxed as costs against RCI. EMC can't be heard to complain that-
regardless of whether EMC had a duty to indemnify RCI or not-it made an independent and 
supplementary promise to pay "[a]ll costs taxed against the insured in the 'suit''' and, therefore, 
has obligated itself to pay the Donnelly's attorney fees and costs as a prevailing party in the 
Underlying Litigation. 
The court should reconsider that it is an undisputed fact that there is no language in the 
EMC's policy that conditions its promise to make supplementary payment of all the costs taxed 
against its insured in the suit as first "dependent" on their being coverage under some other 
section of its policy. EMC's argument-that its promise to pay the costs taxed against its 
insured in the suit is contingent or otherwise dependent on a coverage determination--defies the 
plain and unambiguous language of its own policy and offends common sense. EMC's own 
reliance on the unambiguous supplementary payments language in the EMC v. Philadelphia 
underscores this point. 
Therefore, the court can reconsider that the plain application-ill EMC's supplementary 
payments language doesn't create any questions of fact because the policy language itself is 
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unambiguous and, therefore, capable of only one reasonable construction. That construction, as 
a matter of law, is that EMC promised to pay the $296,933.89 in attorney's fees and costs that 
were taxed against RCI in the Underlying Litigation regardless of whether or not it had any other 
duty to cover or otherwise indemnify RCI under the policy. In addition, to the extent EMC's 
arguments purport to create some ambiguity in the policy, any such ambiguity should necessarily 
be construed against EMC and in favor of the Donnellys. Further, to the extent EMC concedes 
that its policy language is unambiguous, then it relies solely on the Mintarsih decision as a basis 
for "public policy" arguments that can be addressed by the court, as a matter of law. For the 
reasons set forth in the Donnellys prior motion for summary judgment and herein, it would 
indeed be poor public policy for the courts in this state to ignore the plain and unambiguous 
language found in adhesionary insurance policies, like EMC's, to reach a result that places the 
financial interest of insurers ,like EMC, over that of its insured's, like RCI, and its insured's 
claimants and judgment creditors, like the Donnellys. 
Therefore, the Donnellys ask the court to reconsider its earlier denial of their motion for 
summary judgment and find that, as a matter of law, the EMC policy is unambiguous and, 
therefore, the court can give the policy language its plain meaning. The Donnellys ask the court 
to find that, as a matter of law, the unambiguous and plain language of the EMC policy is 
susceptible to only one reasonable construction/interpretation. The Donnellys ask the court to 
find that, as a matter of law, the by plain application of the unambiguous policy language, EMC 
has made an independent and supplementary promise to pay the attorney fees and costs taxed 
against RCI in the Underlying Litigation regardless of whether RCI had any other liability to pay 
sums or perform acts under the policy. The Donnellys ask the court, as a matter of law, to reject 
EMC's public policy argument and reconsider the persuasive authority of Mutual of Enunclaw v. 
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Harvey, injra., and, at a minimum, grant them partial summary judgment finding EMC has a 
duty to pay the Donnelly's attorney fees and costs taxed against RCI in the Underlying Litigation 
along with an obligation to pay interest pursuant to EMC's plain and unambiguous promise to 
pay "[a]l1 interest on the full amount of any judgment that accrues after entry of the judgment 
and before we have paid, offered to pay, or deposited in the court the part of the judgment that is 
within the applicable limit of insurance." 
CONCLUSION 
The Donnellys respectfully ask the court to reconsider it prior Order Denying Cross-
Motions for Summary Judgment and, in reconsideration of this motion and the Donnellys prior 
Motion for Summary Judgment, grant the Donnellys summary judgment, in whole or in part, as 
a matter of law. 
/1-' 
DATED this ~day of July, 2010. 
RAMSDEN & LYONS, LLP 
BY __ ++-r~~~ __ ~~~ ________ _ 
Mi 
Attorneys for Defendants Donnelly 
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